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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
TAXATION AND HEALTH POLICIES
Soojin Kim
Harold L. Cole
Dirk Krueger
This dissertation consists of two essays that study the macroeconomic effects of taxation
and health policies. In the first chapter, I study the effects of international labor migra-
tion on optimal taxation. I develop an open economy model with global financial markets
and international labor migration, in which governments engage in an international tax
competition. By quantitatively applying the model to the United Kingdom and a set of
Continental European countries, I find that strategic interaction between governments, and
mobility of labor are important determinants of optimal taxation of capital and labor in
open economies. The second chapter (co-authored with Hal Cole and Dirk Krueger) studies
the short- and long-run effects of the labor and health insurance market policies in the
United States. Motivated by recent legislations aimed at reducing households’ exposure to
health risks during their working lives, we model the trade-offs between short-run insurance
benefits and long-run incentive costs of the social insurance policies. Our quantitative re-
sults show that there are non-trivial incentive costs to implementing both labor and health
insurance market policies in the long run, leading to a severe deterioration of population
health distribution.
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Chapter 1
The Effects of Labor Migration on
Optimal Taxation:
An International Tax Competition Analysis
Summary
This paper develops a two-country, open-economy model with labor mobility and a
global financial market to study optimal taxation. Governments in this economy engage in
a tax competition in which they choose a potentially progressive labor income tax code and a
capital income tax rate, taking as given the tax policies in the other country. A quantitative
application of the model to the United Kingdom (UK) and Continental European countries
(CE) shows that factor mobility and competition between governments are crucial in the
design of optimal policies. First, in the Nash equilibrium, the UK and CE use progressive
labor income taxes as dominant sources of tax revenue. Second, in order to isolate the
effects of competition, I compare the tax rates that the UK (CE) sets, assuming that the
other country does not respond to its policy changes, to the Nash equilibrium taxes. I find
that capital income tax rates are higher with competition. Third, I study the importance of
labor migration on optimal taxation in open economies, by comparing the optimal taxation
in an economy with only capital mobility to that of the benchmark economy. In this model,
incorporating labor migration leads to a divergence in the optimal tax system: Unlike in
1
an economy with only capital mobility, where both countries use similar capital income tax
rates, the optimal capital income tax rate in the UK is lower than that in the CE when both
capital and labor are mobile. This is due to the differences in productivity between the two
countries. In the calibrated economy, the UK, whose productivity is higher than that of the
CE, attracts more capital and labor through migration (higher population). Thus, given
a relatively small population (labor), the welfare-maximizing level of capital in the CE is
smaller: In the Nash equilibrium, the CE uses a higher capital income tax rate than the
UK does. The steady-state welfare gain from implementing the Nash equilibrium policies
is about 11 percent of consumption of the status quo economy.
1.1 Introduction
In September of 2012, French president Franc¸ois Hollande introduced his plans for a 75
percent income tax on “the rich.”1 The announcement immediately incited concerns about
the exodus of talented workers from France. These concerns were not unfounded: While
awaiting the French tax reform earlier in June, David Cameron, the Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom, had offered to“roll out the red carpet and welcome more French businesses
to Britain.”2
The controversy caused by this French legislation (and Britain’s ready response to it)
demonstrates the recent policy debates taking place in many countries. These debates have
centered on the issues surrounding the optimal degree of income redistribution through
taxation, and the competition between governments in attracting scarce resources – capital
and high-skilled labor. Although a progressive tax system provides income insurance to
households, it can lead to a flight of resources in open economies.3 Thus, governments may
engage in tax competitions in an effort to attract the factors of production. This paper
1On December 29, 2012, however, France’s Constitutional Council ruled that the policy was unconstitu-
tional. In response to the ruling, Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault said that the government “will present
a new proposal in line with the principles laid down by the Constitutional Court.”
2David Cameron made this comment at the G20 summit in Mexico on June 19, 2012. (Murphy, Richard.
“In wooing French tax exiles, Cameron makes a mockery of democracy,” The Guardian, 19 June 2012.)
3The distortionary effects of implementing progressive tax systems are also present in open economies
(as in closed economies): Households have less incentives to work and to accumulate human capital.
2
studies the optimal progressivity of labor income tax codes and capital income tax rates in
economies confronting international factor mobility and competition between governments.
While economists have long studied the effects of capital or labor mobility on taxation
in an international tax competition framework,4 a joint analysis of the mobility of both
factors on optimal taxation has not been conducted.5 However, since capital and labor are
complementary in production, considering both factors is important: A tax system that
induces accumulation of one factor increases the marginal product of the other. Thus,
optimal policies should weigh the tradeoffs of taxing capital and labor. Moreover, human
capital can differ in its quality (skilled and unskilled labor, for example), and the returns
to investment are heterogeneous across households. Therefore, when countries differ in the
relative efficiency of unskilled and skilled labor, the optimal progressivity of labor income
tax codes are affected by the possibility of labor mobility. Thus, the progressivity of the
labor income tax code is an important component in the design of government policies in
open economies.
In order to address these issues, I build a two-country, open-economy model with inter-
national labor mobility and a global financial market. Countries in the model differ in their
production technologies – the relative efficiency of unskilled and skilled labor – and human
capital production technologies.
Households, who reside in one of the countries, are altruistic toward their descendants
and live for two periods, one as a child, and the other as a parent; they are only able to make
economic decisions during the latter period. The households (parents) are heterogeneous
in several dimensions: country of residence, skill level, the ability of their child, assets,
and idiosyncratic labor productivity. Households can either be skilled or unskilled,6 with
market wages that differ for each. The ability of child follows a first-order Markov process
and it increases the probability that the child becomes a skilled worker (conditional on
human capital investment). Moreover, the higher the ability of child, the higher the return
4I discuss these papers in the related literature below.
5Galor (1992) compares the welfare implications of allowing for labor or capital mobility, but not both.
6When I calibrate the model, I define “skilled” households as those who have graduated from college.
3
to human capital investment is. The parents make consumption and leisure decisions, and
choose to invest in their offspring by leaving physical assets and/or investing in their human
capital. Although households can invest and trade international bonds,7 I assume that an
explicit insurance market for idiosyncratic labor risk does not exist. Modeling heterogeneity
across households allows the model to capture any differential responses of households to
tax systems. Moreover, since financial markets are incomplete, the governments can pro-
vide consumption insurance by using a progressive labor income tax system to redistribute
income across households. At the end of the parental life, after observing the migration
cost shock, parents make migration decisions.
Governments in this economy maximize the steady-state welfare of households who are
physically residing in their countries, by choosing a labor income tax code (allowing for
progressivity) and a flat capital income tax rate. They finance a fixed amount of revenue
per capita,8 with which they provide public education and transfer back the rest of the
proceeds to households in a lump-sum fashion. Since I model the endogenous accumulation
of human capital and the impact of tax policies on skill distribution, public education is an
important part of government policy in this analysis.9
I also take into consideration, the interaction between governments in choosing their
tax systems: They engage in a tax competition game. Governments maximize the steady-
state welfare of households, taking as given the other country’s tax system. They are
only allowed to change their tax systems once (one-shot tax competition game), and I
7As will be more clear in the following sections, in this paper, the financial market structure I assume
(which is the approach taken by Mendoza and Tesar in their 1998 and 2005 papers) does not strictly allow
the households to invest in both countries. However, there is a financial market for international bonds. This
structure allows the tax rates to have reallocative effect of capital in both countries in a simple way, which
is the key element for the analysis in this paper. From hereon, I use the term capital mobility to indicate
that there is a global financial market.
8The revenue requirement is chosen as the level of revenue per capita collected in the calibrated status
quo economy. I use a per capita revenue requirement since population sizes are endogenously determined by
mobility of labor. Using a fixed revenue requirement (regardless of the population size) creates incentives
for the governments to maximize population in order to minimize the tax burden.
9In this paper, I take as given the public education policies in both countries, and governments do not
choose public education spending as a policy tool. However, since progressive labor income taxation and
public education spending can interact with each other, it will be an interesting policy study to allow for an
endogenous choice of education policies for the governments. I discuss this issue briefly in the conclusion.
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assume that they can commit to policies, by for example, an institutional agreement.10
This tax competition framework I use builds on the one developed by Mendoza and Tesar
(2005); the focus of their paper is the role of capital mobility (assuming that labor is
immobile), which they analyze in a representative agent model. Incorporating heterogeneity
and allowing for a progressive labor income tax code makes the model suitable for the
analysis of the differential welfare impacts across households, which governments take into
account in designing optimal policies.
In the quantitative analysis, I apply the model to the United Kingdom (denoted as the
“UK” hereafter) and Continental European countries (an aggregate of France, Germany,
Italy, Spain, and Sweden, denoted as the “CE” hereafter). I calibrate the parameters to
match allocations with the observed intergenerational linkages of human capital, aggregate
outcomes, and migration statistics, taking the status quo tax systems and public education
spending of the UK and CE from data as given. In the calibrated economy, the UK has
higher overall efficiency, and higher relative efficiency of skilled labor in production. On the
other hand, in the CE, the return to human capital investment is higher than that in the UK.
These calibration results are necessary to match higher skill premium and higher percentage
of college graduates (which I define as “skilled” in the data) in the UK compared to the CE.
Moreover, the parameters for human capital production affect the skill distributions and
education spending in the UK and CE. Given the CE’s relatively low productive efficiency of
skilled labor and low skill premium, higher return to human capital investment is necessary
to match its skill distribution.
In the Nash equilibrium, the UK subsidizes capital income by 32 percent, and taxes
labor income at 52 percent (on average). On the other hand, the CE levies a 6 percent tax
on capital income, and a 50 percent tax on labor income (on average). Both countries use
progressive labor income taxes, while the progressivity is higher in the UK.
In order to isolate the importance of competition and labor mobility on optimal deter-
mination of the tax systems, I conduct two analyses. First, to investigate the effects of
10Klein, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2005) study time-consistent taxation in open economies.
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competition, I let the UK (CE) unilaterally reform its tax system, taking as a given the
status quo tax system of the other government in the economy. In the unilateral reform, I
find that the UK and CE act more aggressively in setting their policies: The capital income
tax rates are lower in the unilateral reform case. This is because the benefit of a lower
capital income tax rate is higher when the other country’s capital income tax rate is higher.
Second, to analyze the effects of labor mobility on optimal taxation, I compare the
optimal tax systems in an open economy with only capital mobility, and then in an economy
with both capital and labor mobility. The Nash equilibrium capital income tax rates are
similar in the economy where only capital is mobile. However, as countries open up to labor
mobility, the capital income tax rates diverge: The UK lowers its capital income tax rate
further, while the CE does the reverse. Since the UK has higher efficiency in production, the
benefit of using a lower capital income tax rate is higher: With higher capital, the marginal
product of labor in the UK increases more than it would in the CE. This in turn generates
a larger population in the UK. On the other hand, for the CE, whose population is smaller,
the welfare-maximizing level of capital is relatively lower. Moreover, when capital income
tax is lowered, the increase in labor income tax necessary to balance the budget is too high
and depresses the working hours of households. Thus, the CE finds it optimal to use a
relatively higher capital income tax rate than the UK does.
Finally, I find that implementing Nash equilibrium policies leads to welfare gain of 11 and
13 percent of consumption in the status quo economy in the UK and CE, respectively. Under
the Nash equilibrium policies, after-tax return to capital increases since capital income tax
rates are lower. Both countries have lower fraction of the skilled workforce, and households
enjoy more leisure (work less). Unskilled households benefit more from the reform than the
skilled households do, by about twofold.
Related Literature This paper is located at the intersection of several strands of litera-
ture, including that on international tax competition, optimal taxation of capital and labor,
and the effects of labor mobility on macroeconomic outcomes.
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There is a wide literature that studies international tax competition in capital and
labor.11 With regard to the capital income tax dimension, Gordon (1986) and Razin and
Sadka (1991) theoretically study two different types of capital income taxation: source
versus residence-based taxation, as well as taxation of different kinds of capital. As for
labor income tax competition, Mirrlees (1982) and Bhagwati and Hamada (1982) are seminal
papers that focus on the taxation of foreign and domestic labor income in less-developed
countries. Razin and Sadka (2010, 2011) also conduct analytical studies of labor income
tax competition, but take the flow of migrants as exogenous.12 These papers offer insightful
theoretical analysis. However, they do not endogenize the migration decisions of households,
which I model, and lack the quantitative dimension that I provide in this paper.
The paper that most closely relates to my work is a 2005 study by Mendoza and Tesar.
In it, the authors study a tax competition game in a dynamic general equilibrium framework.
They only allow for capital mobility, and the capital income tax rate is chosen to maximize
welfare in the balanced growth path, while the labor income tax (or a consumption tax) is a
tool used to ensure fiscal solvency. They find that in the UK and Continental Europe (which
they define as France, Germany, and Italy), Nash equilibrium tax rates are consistent with
observed tax rates, when labor income tax is used to resolve fiscal solvency.13 However, when
consumption taxes are used to maintain fiscal solvency, the optimal policy is to subsidize
capital income. Unlike Mendoza and Tesar’s analysis, this paper incorporates labor mobility,
heterogeneity in households, and a possibility of using progressive labor income taxes to
allow for a richer analysis of optimal policies in a tax competition framework.
Another related paper is Armenter and Ortega (2010), which quantitatively studies
the effects of labor mobility on the redistributive ability of regional governments in the
United States. Rather than modeling non-cooperative tax competition, the authors find
redistributive policies that are incentive-compatible for skilled workers to stay in a region.
11There are also tax competition papers that deal with tax on consumption goods; among them are Chari
and Kehoe (1990) and Kanbur and Keen (1993).
12The model in Tiebout (1956) also studies labor mobility and its impact on the provision of public goods
in multiple communities.
13In their calibrated model, the implied Frisch elasticity of labor supply is around 1.7, whereas in my
model, the Frisch elasticity is around 0.3. Thus, distortions from taxing labor are higher in their model.
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The analysis shows that the competition between regions brings about a convergence in tax
rates.
The topics studied in this paper also intersect with the dynamic optimal taxation lit-
erature. Starting with Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986), dynamic optimal taxation has
been widely studied, both theoretically and quantitatively.14 Most of these studies have
been conducted in a closed economy, with complete markets and a representative household
framework. My model, on the other hand, studies taxation in large open economies, each
of which has incomplete asset markets.
Aiyagari (1995) studies optimal capital taxation in an incomplete markets model. He
finds that governments can improve the welfare of households by taxing capital income,
which induces households to decrease their precautionary savings. This result is driven by
the fact that the government endogenously chooses its expenditure level. A more recent
study by Davila et al. (2012) examines constrained efficiency in incomplete markets, which
has implications for capital income taxation. They find that if the consumption-poor in a
country have little wealth (but relatively high labor income), social planners can improve
overall welfare by increasing capital (which results in higher wages) – an argument for lower
(or negative) capital income tax. Also related is a study of the dynamic optimal taxation
in large open economies, analyzed by Gross in a 2012 paper.15 He finds that when large
open economies use a territorial tax system, a zero capital income tax rate in the long run
is still optimal. Among others, Conesa et al. (2009) quantitatively studies optimal taxation
allowing for a progressive labor income tax system. They find that positive capital income
tax is optimal, in an overlapping generations model. This paper complements the existing
literature by quantitatively studying the optimal taxation of both capital and labor in large
open economies with incomplete markets.
Moreover, this paper is related to the studies of optimal progressivity of the labor in-
14Atkeson et al. (1999) study the robustness of the zero capital income tax result and conclude that it
also applies to open economies.
15Ha and Sibert (1997) also study strategic capital taxation in large open economies. They distinguish
between corporate and savings taxes, and find that capital importers set positive tax rates, while exporters
subsidize capital.
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come tax code and its impact on human capital accumulation. Recent papers by Erosa and
Koreshkova (2007) and Guvenen et. al (2011) relate the effects of progressive tax systems on
household behaviors and aggregate outcomes, such as inequality and intergenerational per-
sistence in earnings. Erosa and Koreshkova formulate a human capital production function
that requires both time and goods input and quantitatively analyze the effects of progressive
taxation on intergenerational persistence and inequality. While Erosa and Koreshkova focus
on the intergenerational inequality, Guvenen et. al study the life-cycle effects of taxation
and compare its implications on inequality using cross-country data. The papers in the lit-
erature focus on closed economies; here, I consider how the possibility of migration affects
the incentives for human capital accumulation.
Lastly, this paper both relates to and expands on existing studies of the effects of labor
mobility on macroeconomic outcomes. Two studies by Klein and Ventura (2007, 2009) use
a general equilibrium model to quantify the implications for output and welfare between
countries of different total factor productivities when labor is mobile. They find large gains
from removing barriers to labor mobility. On a similar note, Benhabib and Jovanovic (2011)
study optimal migration in a global perspective. They solve the social planning problem of
maximizing the welfare of rich and poor country residents, and show that migration should
be higher to achieve optimum welfare. However, these papers do not consider the taxes nor
human capital accumulation that I endogenize in this paper.16 As this paper demonstrates,
enriching the analysis to allow for the effects on human capital yields important implications
for the impact of taxes on labor mobility and skill distribution in both countries.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I describe the model in detail.
The model description comprises defining the competitive equilibrium of the open-economy
model and the Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game between the governments.
Following the model, I present the calibration strategies and results in section 1.3. In
section 1.4, quantitative results are discussed in several steps. I first analyze key household
16There are also papers that relate immigration to resolving fiscal imbalances in the US. Storesletten
(2000) uses a general equilibrium overlapping generations model to capture the fiscal impact of immigration
and claims, that immigration can be used as a tool to solve fiscal imbalance in the US. Auerbach and
Oreopoulos (1999), on the other hand, finds a very small fiscal impact from immigration.
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behaviors: the human capital investment and migration decisions. Then, in section 1.4.2,
I discuss the effects of changes in the tax code on aggregate outcomes, which provides
insights into the results of the unilateral reforms of the UK and CE governments. In 1.4.3,
I present the Nash equilibrium policies and discuss the effects of competition and aggregate
outcomes in the Nash equilibrium. In section 1.4.4, I compare the optimal taxation results
with only capital mobility and with both capital and labor mobility to study the effects of
labor mobility in isolation. Finally, I conclude in section 1.5.
1.2 The Model
In this section, I describe the model and define the competitive equilibrium.17
1.2.1 Model Description
I consider a two-country, large open-economy model where both physical and human capital
are endogenously accumulated and mobile. Time is discrete and there is a fixed measure 1
of total households (the sum of households residing in both countries is constant). Agents
in the economy live for two periods, one as a child and one as a parent, but only make
decisions as a parent.
Endowments and Preferences. Households (parents) are endowed with one unit of
time which they can divide between leisure and work.
Each household (in country i) is heterogeneous in his child’s ability (z), human capital
(θ), capital goods (k), international bonds (b), and idiosyncratic labor productivity shock
(ε). Ability and human capital operate as described in the previous section. Each household
can invest in domestic capital markets by amount k which yields return of ri, and can also
hold international bonds b whose gross return is R. The fact that households can only invest
in domestic capital markets (but not in foreign capital market) is based on assumptions
about the financial market structure, which I discuss in more detail in the next subsection.
17I formulate the dynamic problem recursively and conduct a steady state analysis. Thus, I abstract from
time subscripts in the notations below.
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Domestic capital investment, k, and international bonds, b, compose the wealth portfolio
bequeathed to the households by their parents. Consequently, parents have two ways of
leaving their wealth to their offspring: they can either leave assets (in capital or bonds) or
invest in the human capital of their child to increase the child’s labor earnings.
The labor productivity shock ε is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across
time as well as across households and has distribution piε(ε). In each period, a household
with skill level θ and i.i.d. labor productivity shock ε, who works l hours, earns wi(θ)lε in
country i.
When households decide to migrate to the other country, they incur a utility cost of
moving h. The migration decision is made after the realization of the moving cost shock,
which has a probability distribution function (pdf) of f(h). In the model, I interpret h as
incorporating both moving cost and location preference, and thus use location preference
and moving cost interchangeably to denote h hereafter.
Preferences of households are assumed to be represented by
u(c, l) + βEV ′
where c and l are consumption and labor hours, respectively. The term EV ′ represents
the expected utility of the offspring, which is weighted by the altruism factor β. The
expectation is taken with respect to the ability of the grandchild (z′), human capital (θ′)
and labor productivity shock (ε′) of the offspring, and the moving cost (h).
Human Capital Technology. Each household is born with his child’s ability level z ∈
[z, z¯]. The ability level is persistent across generations and evolves stochastically according
to pi(z′|z).
Human capital investment x˜18 increases the probability of becoming a skilled worker.
18In the current formulation of the model, human capital is accumulated through goods input (buying
books, for example). Erosa and Koreshkova (2007), on the other hand, models human capital investment as
human capital services purchased at the market wage rate, which makes parental decisions less responsive
to changes in taxation. If I were to follow their modeling choices, I would need to take a stand on whether
human capital services are provided by skilled or unskilled workers (and the human capital investment would
enter the budget constraints as wx˜).
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Since I assume that public and private spending on education are perfect substitutes, x˜
refers to the total education spending (public and private). Probabilities of becoming a
skilled or unskilled worker are represented by Q(s|z, x˜) and Q(u|z, x˜), where Q(·|z, x˜) is
continuous in z and x˜. Moreover, Qzx˜(s|z, x˜) is positive, which implies that the return to
human capital investment is higher for children with higher ability.
Production. Production requires three inputs: physical capital, unskilled labor, and
skilled labor. I denote by K, capital, and U and S are the total amount of labor provided
by unskilled and skilled households, respectively. The production functions represented by
F (K,U, S) and capital depreciates at rate δ.
Government Policy. The sources of government revenue are proceeds from labor and
capital income taxes. With the proceeds, the governments provide public education (Ei)
and transfer back the rest of the proceeds in a lump-sum fashion (TRi). I restrict that the
transfers must be greater than or equal to zero (TRi ≥ 0). Since with labor mobility, pop-
ulation size is endogenously determined, I denote by ei and tri, per capita public education
and lump-sum transfer provided by the governments. I do not allow the governments to
issue debt, and thus, they must satisfy a period-by-period budget constraint.
The labor income tax code is denoted by τ(y; y¯): An individual who earns y in an
economy where average labor earning is y¯ faces a tax rate of τ(y; y¯). The purpose of this
function is to allow for the progressive labor income tax code, present in many countries.
Though I explicitly model progressive labor income taxation, for capital income taxes, I
assume a flat tax rate of τk.
19 Moreover, I also assume that governments levy capital
income tax on returns from the domestic capital market (k), but not on returns from
international bonds (b). In most countries, returns from participating in domestic and
international capital markets are treated the same. However, due to no-arbitrage conditions,
tax rates on international bonds must be the same in equilibrium. This would imply that
19This is the approach commonly taken in the dynamic optimal taxation literature. In a quantitative
exercise, Conesa, et al. (2009), among others, also allow for a progressive labor income tax code and a flat
capital income tax rate.
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different tax rates on capital income cannot be supported. One way of circumventing this
problem is to assume that countries levy different taxes on international bond returns than
they do on domestic capital income, with the restriction that tax rates on bonds are same
across countries. Under the current formulation, I assume that tax rates on interest from
international bonds are zero in both countries.20
These are the restrictions on the kinds of tax instruments that governments use that
I impose. Therefore, in the tax competition game, governments maximize within the tax
functions that I describe, taking per capita public education expenditure ei and transfers
tri as given.
Market Structure. Households cannot insure against idiosyncratic labor income risk by
trading insurance contracts. However, they can participate in financial markets.
Financial market structures in open-economy models can take several forms, and each
has important implications for the model outcomes. If households have costless access to
both domestic and foreign capital markets and pay taxes based on residence, the pre- and
post-tax returns to capital in the two countries must be equalized in equilibrium. This
is in marked contrast to observed differences in capital income tax rates across countries.
In order to allow for the equilibrium capital income tax rates that differ across countries
and for the existence of a global financial market, I follow Mendoza and Tesar (1998)
who assume that households can only trade international bonds and invest in domestic
capital markets. Under this market structure, after-tax returns to capital is equalized in
equilibrium.21 Therefore, even though capital cannot be invested in both countries, there
will be reallocative effects of capital in response to changes in tax rates, not only in the
home country, but also in the foreign country; this is the key mechanism necessary for the
20Mendoza and Tesar (1998) also make the same assumption (zero taxes on international bonds) in
their benchmark model. In the sensitivity analysis, they conduct an experiment where they levy taxes on
international bonds in both countries at the same level, but lower the capital income tax rate in the U.S.
This leads to important welfare consequences due to the higher cost of borrowing from abroad for the U.S.
Taxes on bonds decrease welfare in the U.S. when it decreases capital income taxes, although without the
tax on bonds (benchmark), welfare increases.
21As pointed out in Gross (2012), the equilibrium condition of this financial market structure is the same
as the one in which households can invest in both countries and countries levy source-based capital income
taxes.
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analysis in this paper.
Timing. The model timing is as the following (summarized in Figure 1.1).
A household enters its current period with the state variables (i, z, θ, k, b, ε). Each in-
dividual (household) residing in country i becomes a parent with the child’s ability z, his
own human capital θ (skilled or unskilled), capital goods k and international bonds b be-
queathed from his parents, and productivity shock ε. Households provide labor (l), consume
(c), invest in human capital (x), purchase private capital (k′), and trade international bonds
(b′).
After the ability of the grandchild (z′), skill (θ′) and labor productivity shock (ε′) of the
child, and location preference shock (h) are realized, households make migration choices.
According to the model timing, parents start their lives in one country, at which point
their skill level has been determined (e.g., whether or not they have received college edu-
cation) and they have a child; this would roughly correspond to the ages between 30 and
40. A recent report from the UN (Population Division, DESA, 2011), documents that the
median age of migrants in developed countries is 42. Since the survey was taken in the
migrant’s country, it implies that the migration decision was made before the age of 42.
Thus, the data can be taken to suggest that the timing assumption is not unreasonable.
1.2.2 Competitive Equilibrium of the Economy
This section contains a detailed discussion of the household problem, the firm problem,
government budget constraints, and the definition of the competitive equilibrium (given an
exogenous tax system in both countries).
Household Problem. Each household starts his parental life in country i with offspring’s
ability level (z), human capital (θ), assets bequeathed from parents (a), and the i.i.d. labor
productivity shock (ε). As mentioned above, households can bequeath assets as domestic
capital (k) or international bonds (b). However, due to the existence of a global financial
market, the returns to assets must be equalized in equilibrium. Therefore, the sufficient
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statistic for the household problem is a, and the choice variable, a′. The household problem
can then be stated as
V i(z, θ, a, ε) = max
l,c,x,a′
u(c, l) (1.1)
+β
∑
z′,θ′,ε′,h′
Ξ(z, x, z′, θ′, ε′, h)
 Eh max
 V i(z′, θ′, a′, ε′),
V j(z′, θ′, a′, ε′)− h


s.t. c+ x+ a′i = (1− τ(y))y +Ra+ TRi, (1.2)
y = wi(θ)lε, (1.3)
a′ ≥ 0, c ≥ 0, 0 ≤ l ≤ 1 (1.4)
where Ξ(z, x, z′, θ′, ε′, h) ≡ pi(z′|z)Q(θ′|z′, x+ Ei)piε(ε′)f(h).
Each household (parents) chooses the optimal level of labor hours (l), consumption (c),
human capital investment (x), and total bequest (a′) that maximizes his utility. Utility is
derived from consumption and leisure today and the expected value of the child’s utility in
the future. The term Ξ(z, x, z′, θ′, ε′, h) reflects the future expectations about realization of
abilities (z′), skill level (θ′), i.i.d. labor productivity shock (ε′), and migration cost shock
(h). The ability of the grandchild evolves stochastically, conditional on the ability of the
child through pi(z′|z), and the skill level of the child is a function of the child’s ability (z′)
and the sum of human capital investment by parents (x) and public education expenditure
(Ei). I assume that private and public investment are perfect substitutes, and therefore, the
probability of becoming a skilled worker is Q(s|z, x+Ei). Moreover, the i.i.d. productivity
shock (ε′) is taken into account for evaluating the future value function, as well as moving
cost (h), which has a pdf of f(h).
The second part of the household objective function (1.1) includes the max operator
that reflects migration decisions of the households. Although all economic decisions of
the parents are made prior to the decision of migration, households only migrate after all
realizations ({z′, θ′, a′, ε′, h}) have been made. I also assume that the migrants do not face
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any depreciation in their productivity, following Bell (1997), who does not find any wage
differential between immigrants and natives in the long run.
Households maximize their lifetime utility subject to constraints (1.2)–(1.4). The budget
constraint of the household is represented by (1.2). The left-hand side represents possible
expenditures, consumption, human capital investment, and physical capital investment (be-
quests), and the right-hand side represents sources of income, after-tax labor income, assets,
and transfers from the government. Equation (1.3) specifies labor income of the households,
and equation (1.4) states that parents cannot borrow against the future earnings of their
child (they can only leave zero or positive levels of assets).
Because households make human capital investment choices prior to moving, having
the option to migrate can affect their human capital investment decisions. For example, in
high-tax countries, households might want to over -invest in human capital, relative to what
is optimal conditional on not migrating with probability one, in expectation of moving to
the low-tax country, whereas in low-tax countries, households might have less incentives to
do so, compared to a world without labor mobility, since the skill premium can decrease
due to an increased supply of skilled workers through immigration.
From here after, for simplicity, I denote as s, the vector of state variables (i, z, θ, a, ε),
and Φ(s), the measure of households of type s.
Firm Problem. Firms in country i produce goods using unskilled and skilled labor and
capital, given market wage rates and rental rate of capital
max
Ki,U i,Si
F (Ki, U i, Si)− (ri + δ)K − wiuU i − wisSi, (1.5)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital.
16
This implies that in equilibrium, factor prices satisfy
ri = FK(K
i, U i, Si)− δ (1.6)
wiu = FU (K
i, U i, Si) (1.7)
wis = FS(K
i, U i, Si). (1.8)
Government Budget Balance. Governments use labor and capital income tax to pro-
vide per capita public education ei and transfer back tri to households in a lump-sum
fashion. They balance their budget every period, and thus the government budget balance
condition reads as:
ei
∫
s
dΦi(s) + tri
∫
s
dΦi(s) =
∫
s
yi(s)τ i(yi(s))dΦi(s) + riτ ikK
i, tri ≥ 0. (1.9)
Governments cannot levy lump sum taxes, i.e., tri ≥ 0. Moreover, since governments tax
capital at a flat rate τk, the sufficient statistic for obtaining the total tax proceeds from
capital income is total private capital (Ki) in each country.
Market Clearing. Market clearing conditions for the markets for goods and bonds are:
∑
i=1,2
(
F (Ki, U i, Si) + (1− δ)Ki
)
=
∑
i=1,2
(
Ci +Xi +K
′i + Ei
)
(1.10)
B1 +B2 = 0, (1.11)
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where
Ci =
∫
s
ci(s)dΦi(s), (1.12)
Xi =
∫
s
xi(s)dΦi(s), (1.13)
Ai =
∫
s
aidΦi(s)
= Ki +Bi, (1.14)
U i =
∫
z,a,ε
li(z, u, a, ε)εdΦi(z, u, a, ε), (1.15)
Si =
∫
z,a,ε
li(z, s, a, ε)εdΦi(z, s, a, ε), (1.16)
and Ki and Bi are aggregate capital and bonds in country i. As I noted in the previ-
ous section, since the sufficient statistic in the household problem is the amount of assets
bequeathed (a), but not its allocation in private capital (k) and bonds (b), there is an in-
determinacy of the capital and bond position at the household level. However, by strict
concavity of the production function, for a given equilibrium price of capital ri, there is a
unique level of aggregate capital such that the equilibrium price condition (1.6) is satisfied.
This condition pins down the level of aggregate capital (Ki) in both economies, and from
Ai, I back out aggregate bond positions using Bi = Ai −Ki.
Now, I define a stationary competitive equilibrium of this economy, given government
policy in country i {ei, tri}, and the set of government policies, {τ 1, τ 2}.
Definition 1. Given an exogenous level of public education expenditure per capita {e1, e2},
transfers per capita {tr1, tr2}, and tax policies {τ 1, τ 2}, a stationary competitive equi-
librium consists of value functions for households, V i; policy functions for households,
{ci, li, xi, a′i}; production plans for the firms, {Ki, U i, Si}; prices, {R, ri, wiu, wis}; and mea-
sures, Φi, in both countries i ∈ {1, 2}, such that:
(i) households maximize given prices and policies: value functions solve (1.1) subject to
constraints (1.2)–(1.4) with {ci, li, xi, a′i} as associated policy functions;
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(ii) firms maximize given prices and policies: prices {ri, wiu, wis} satisfy (1.6)–(1.8);
(iii) government budget balance condition (1.9) is satisfied;
(iv) market clearing conditions (1.10) and (1.11) are satisfied with the associated aggregate
variables defined in (1.12)–(1.16); and
(v) Law of Motion: Φi is derived from the policy functions of households and probability
distribution for i.i.d. labor productivity shocks.
Thus far, I have defined the stationary competitive equilibrium of the economy for
given tax systems in both countries. In the next section, I will describe how I model
tax competition between the two countries and define the Nash equilibrium of the tax
competition game between the governments.
1.2.3 Tax Competition and Nash Equilibrium
Governments choose income tax function and a capital income tax rate that maximizes
the steady-state welfare of households at the stationary equilibrium supported by the tax
system, taking as given the other country’s tax rates. They decide on their time-invariant
tax rates (functions) in the beginning of the period that satisfy their budget constraints,
and I assume that both governments can fully commit to the tax system.
The welfare function that the governments maximize can take several forms depending
on the value they put on immigrants and emigrants. In this paper, I assume that govern-
ments have a utilitarian social welfare function over the population physically residing in
the country, at the time the tax system is chosen.22 Thus, each government’s social welfare
function, given the stationary distribution of households Φi(s) and the welfare of households
achieved in stationary equilibrium V i(s) is
∫
s
V i(s)dΦi(s). (1.17)
22The social welfare criterion that I use only captures the lifetime utility of the residents. However, the
lifetime utility of current residents includes the potential utility gain from migrating to the other country in
the future.
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Moreover, the tax functions must be chosen so that they satisfy the governments’ period-
by-period budget constraints. The tax revenue requirements are set at the same per capita
level as calculated from the calibrated equilibrium, that I describe in the next section.
Rather than using a fixed (regardless of population size) amount of government expenditure,
I use a per capita tax revenue requirement. It captures that the revenues necessary to provide
a given amount of government services increase with population, which is important in this
model, since population size is determined endogenously when labor is mobile.
In the next, I formally define a Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game.
Definition 2. A Nash equilibrium (non-cooperative equilibrium) of the tax competition
game (given public education expenditures per capita {e1, e2} and transfers per capita
{tr1, tr2}) in this economy consists of a vector of government policies τ i, and associated
competitive equilibrium prices {R, ri, wiu, wis}, and allocations {ci, li, xi, a
′i}, and the sta-
tionary distribution of households in each country Φi for i ∈ {1, 2} such that:
(i) for each country i, τ i maximizes the steady-state welfare of the economy (1.17), taking
as given the tax system of the other country, τ−i; and
(ii) for {τ 1, τ 2}, the resulting prices, allocations, and stationary distributions are a com-
petitive equilibrium.
Since this is a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous households and
incomplete markets, it is difficult to derive analytical characteristics of the effects of changing
tax rates on macroeconomic outcomes and the best response of the game. However, I briefly
discuss some (qualitative) effects of changing labor and capital income tax rates that shed
light on their consequences.
Lowering either labor or capital income tax rates would attract capital and labor, since
in equilibrium, (1−τk)r = (1−τ∗k )r∗ must hold by no-arbitrage condition in an economy with
international financial market. In the case of lower capital income taxes, increased capital
flows attract migrants through higher wages. On the other hand, under lower labor income
taxes, an increase in migrants and the domestic labor supply attracts capital to equalize
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after-tax returns to capital. Moreover, lower labor income taxes would increase incentives
for households to invest in the human capital of their offspring, as well as increase incentives
for labor hours. The extent to which taxes can be better employed as a tool for increasing
the welfare of households, therefore, is not straightforward and must be solved numerically
under a reasonable set of parameter values. That is the goal of the quantitative analysis
conducted in the following section.
1.3 Calibration
I use the United Kingdom and Continental Europe (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and
Spain, hereafter referred to as the“CE”) as countries of interest for the quantitative analysis.
The free movement of labor within countries in the European Union23 makes the UK and
CE an appropriate choice for the tax competition analysis with labor mobility. Moreover,
as presented in Table 1.1, the UK has a tax system and aggregate economic outcomes that
differs considerably from the CE in consideration. Therefore, considering the UK and CE
is a suitable division of the countries in the EU for calibration, and for the further analysis
of the impact of free labor mobility on optimal taxation.
1.3.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Macroeconomic Data in the UK and
CE
Before I present in detail the calibration strategy and parameter values, I first summarize
some of the relevant data statistics (in 2000) in the UK and CE in Table 1.1.24
For the CE data, I use weighted averages from France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and
Sweden. Weights are obtained using the average weights of GDP and population: 0.24,
0.34, 0.23, 0.15, and 0.04 respectively for France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden.25
23By Article 45 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (ex 39 and 48), which states that: “1.
Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community. 2. Such freedom of movement
shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States
as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.”
24Statistics for individual countries in Continental Europe are summarized in the Appendix (Table A.1).
25Although the total population in the Continental European countries I use is about four times larger
than the population in the United Kingdom, I normalize the sizes in the two countries in the quantitative
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As shown in Table 1.1, the UK and CE have comparable GDP per capita. The UK has
a higher skill premium, higher labor earnings inequality, and a higher percentage of college
graduates. However, overall tertiary education spending is higher in the CE, with its public
spending comprising about 75 percent of the total expenditure on tertiary education.
Intergenerational persistence in schooling is obtained from Causa and Johansson (2009).
They use OECD data to obtain the percentage increase in probability of an offspring obtain-
ing college education when his or her father is college educated, compared to those whose
fathers only have upper-secondary education.26
Migration-related statistics are obtained from OECD bilateral migration data. I calcu-
late immigration stocks from the UK to the CE and vice versa, and find the percentage of
college-educated immigrants among the migrants from the UK and CE. Positive selection is
evident from data, as the percentage of college graduates among immigrants is 37.7 percent
in the UK (36.4 percent in the CE), whereas the same statistic for the total population
within the country is 25.7 percent (20.0 percent).
In the following, I first describe the public policies in the UK and CE, and discuss the
functional forms and calibration strategies.
1.3.2 Public Policies in the UK and CE
Following Benabou (2002) and Heathcote et al. (2012), the after-tax labor income is as-
sumed to take the following functional form:
y˜ = a0y
1−a1 . (1.18)
The after- and before-tax labor income is represented by y˜ and y, respectively. The pa-
rameter a1 denotes the degree of progressiveness. The average labor income tax function
analysis. In tax competition, sizes can matter, and Kanbur and Keen (1993) is one of the papers that study
tax competition and harmonization with countries that differ in size. They find that small countries tend
to be tax havens. I discuss a possible implication of this assumption briefly in footnote 42 in section 1.4.3.
26They also report the same measure comparing fathers with college education and those with less than
upper-secondary education. In the UK and CE, the probability premium is around 0.38 and 0.45 respectively
(calculated as weighted average of France, Italy, Sweden, and Spain. German data is not available.).
22
implied by the suggested tax relation is
τ(y) = 1− a0y−a1 . (1.19)
Note that with a1 = 0, the labor income tax rate is flat at 1 − a0. This is the income tax
formulation that reflects the labor income tax system in different countries quite well.
I use this tax function to obtain the status quo tax function from data of the UK and
CE. Following Guvenen, et al. (2011), I use top marginal income rates and thresholds to
impute tax rates at multiples of average wages. Then, using the functional form (1.19), I
find estimates of a0 and a1 that minimize the distance between the tax rates observed from
the imputed tax rates and the labor income tax function. Figure 1.2 plots the estimated
labor income tax function in the UK and CE.
The corresponding tax functions are
τUK(y) = 1− 0.7792
(
y
y¯
)−0.0692
,
τCE(y) = 1− 0.7196
(
y
y¯
)−0.0970
,
where y¯ is the average labor earnings in the economy. The smaller value of a0 and a greater
absolute value of a1 in the CE tax function imply a higher (in levels) and a more progressive
labor income tax code in the CE than in the UK.
For capital income taxes, I take effective average capital income taxes directly from
Carey and Tschilinguirian (2000) who calculate capital income taxes between 1991 and
1997 using the methods of Mendoza et al. (1994). The capital income tax rates are 48
percent in the UK and 28 percent in the CE.27
In the model, I allow governments to use some of their tax proceeds on providing public
education. As will be clear in the next subsection, I will define the skilled labor as those
27The trends in capital and labor income tax rates in the UK and CE over the last thirty years show that
the UK had lower labor income tax rates and higher capital income tax rates than the CE. The trends of
tax rates are reported in the Appendix. Moreover, capital and labor income tax rates of individual countries
in the CE are also in the Appendix.
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who have graduated from college. Therefore, I use the percentages of GDP spent on tertiary
education in the UK and CE as their status quo public education policies. The UK, which
has a lower labor income tax rates with less progressive income tax code, spends 0.6 percent
of GDP in providing tertiary education, whereas the CE spends 0.9 percent of GDP.28 In
the status quo, the CE, whose labor income tax code is more progressive, provides more
public education, which can offset the disincentives created by its tax policies. The rest of
the tax proceeds are assumed to be transferred back to the public in a lump-sum fashion.
These lump-sum transfers are meant to represent the governments’ redistributive policies,
which are not explicitly modeled in this paper.
1.3.3 Calibration Strategy
Given the labor and capital tax income systems and public education expenditure (as a
percent of GDP) in the UK and CE, I find parameters to match equilibrium outcomes of
the model (with capital and labor mobility) to the observed data. In doing so, I allow for
heterogeneity in the relative efficiency of unskilled (Aiu) and skilled (A
i
s) labor in production
and heterogeneity in parameters in the human capital production function (νi, ξi) across
countries. All other parameters – utility function (σ, η, γ), ability distribution (ρz, σz), labor
productivity shocks (σε), and migration costs (ku, ks, ku, ks) – are chosen to match relevant
statistics in the UK. Although countries might differ in labor productivity shocks29 and
migration costs30, in this paper, I keep the model parsimonious. By doing so, I can focus
more on the effects of differences in tax and education policies on the migration decision of
households and optimal taxation.
While each parameter has implications for different economic outcomes, I simultaneously
28One might argue that public education spending per student is a better indication of a country’s
education policy. Since using the measure necessitates the information on the number of students and
requires some normalization across countries, using the GDP measure is more straightforward. However,
education spending per student is also higher in the CE than it is in the UK, and thus is qualitatively
consistent with the public education measures that I use.
29Different labor market institutions (more rigid labor market in the CE, for example) might manifest as
differences in labor productivity shocks.
30While (almost all) households in the CE learn to speak English, it is not necessarily the case the
households in the UK learn to speak French or German.
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calibrate the parameters to match equilibrium outcomes of the model to the data. Using
these parameters, I quantitatively solve for the Nash equilibrium of the tax competition
game.
A. Production. I use a constant returns to scale production function, which takes the
form31 of
Y i = Kα(AiuU
ρ +AisS
ρ)
1−α
ρ .
The labor input in production is a constant elasticity of substitution aggregate of
unskilled (U) and skilled labor (S), with the implied skill premium of
wis
wiu
=
Ais
Aiu
(
Si
U i
)ρ−1
.
The parameter α represents the capital share in production, while Au and As are the
country-specific efficiency of unskilled and skilled labor, and ρ controls the elasticity
of substitution between unskilled and skilled labor (the elasticity of substitution is
1
1− ρ).
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This parametrization has several benefits when compared to a version which models
only one kind of labor input. Most importantly, there is evidence of cross-country
differences in the substitutability of skilled and unskilled labor.33 In a model with
labor mobility as this one, differences in relative efficiency of two kinds of labor have
implications for the tax-induced efficiency gain from reallocation of labor across coun-
31This is a simplified version of Krusell et al. (2000): I abstract from capital-skill complementarity and
the division of capital into the capital equipment and capital structures. Caselli and Coleman (2006) uses
this production function for estimation of the production parameters across countries.
32The production function can be rewritten as
F (K,U, S) = ziKα(A˜iUρ + (1− A˜i)Sρ) 1−αρ , (1.20)
where zi = (Aiu + A
i
s)
1−α
ρ , and A˜i =
Aiu
Aiu+A
i
s
. Thus, differences in Aiu and A
i
s can also be interpreted as
differences in total factor productivity zi, and efficiency of skilled and unskilled labor with a normalization
(A˜i).
33Caselli and Coleman (2006) estimate labor efficiency parameters Au and As of the CES production
function using the skill premium, and find heterogeneity across countries.
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tries. In quantitative analysis, as I define the skilled labor in the model to be the
college-educated workers in the data, the skill premium (college premium)34 directly
obtained from the production function has the data counterparts that I can use as
a target in the calibration exercise. Moreover, I can use data on migration statistics
for households with and without college education by mapping them directly to the
model.
As is customary in the literature, I set capital share in production (α) to be 0.33.
Another production function parameter, ρ, which controls the elasticity of substitution
between skilled and unskilled labor, is set so that the CES is around 1.4 following Katz
and Murphy (1992).
Taking as given capital share α and ρ, which controls elasticity of substitution between
skilled and unskilled labor, I calibrate AUKs , A
UK
u , A
CE
s , and A
CE
u that represent the
efficiency of skilled and unskilled labor in production within the model. Skilled labor
in my model is defined as workers who have graduated from college, and unskilled
labor, as those who have not. With this classification, productivities are normalized
by letting AUKs +A
UK
u = 1. Then, using the college premium in the UK and CE, and
the ratio of GDP per capita in the UK to the CE, values for AUKu , A
CE
s , and A
CE
u are
determined. The estimates of the college premium are taken from a series of papers
published as a part of the project“Cross Sectional Facts for Macroeconomists”35. This
calibration strategy is similar to the one used by Caselli and Coleman (2006), in which
they estimate the parameters of the CES production function in different countries
using skill premiums, capital level, and supply of skilled and unskilled labor.
The capital depreciation rate δ is chosen to match the capital-output ratio in the UK.
34I use skill and college premium interchangeably.
35A summary of the project is presented in Krueger, et al (2010). I also obtain data for individual countries
from Blundell and Etheridge (2010), Domeij and Floden (2010), Fuchs-Schuendeln, et al. (2010), Jappelli
and Pistaferri (2010), and Pijoan-Mas and Sanchez-Marcos (2010), which summarize macroeconomic facts
in Britain, Sweden, Germany, Italy, and Spain, respectively. From here on, I denote this series of papers as
CSFM.
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B. Utility Function. Households’ life time function is
u(c, l) + βEV ′ =
c1−σ − 1
1− σ − η
l
1+ 1
γ
1 + 1γ
+ βEV ′,
where c and l are consumption and labor hours, respectively. Under this specification,
the theoretical Frisch elasticity of labor supply is γ.
I set the risk aversion parameter σ to be 2, leaving three parameters to be calibrated
within the model: the altruism factor β, weight on utility of leisure η, and the cur-
vature of the utility of leisure γ. Since households live for two periods, I assume a
model time period of 30 years. Thus, I find β
1
30 to match the annual interest rate of
5 percent. In order to jointly pin down the values of η and γ, average hours worked
in the UK and the Frisch labor supply elasticity as targets. The OECD reports that
the average hours worked in the UK is around 1,715 hours annually, or 4.70 hours a
day. Letting time endowment be around 13 hours a day, this is equivalent to labor
hours of 0.361. Moreover, the target value of the Frisch labor supply elasticity (γ) is
0.3 (Browning et al. (1999)).36
C. Ability and Human Capital Production. I assume that ability across generations
follows a first-order Markov process with mean normalized to one. In particular, the
following AR(1) process is used:
log z′ = ρz log z + ε, ε ∼ (0, σ2z),
which leaves two parameters, ρz (correlation of ability across generations) and σ
2
z
(variance of error term) to be calibrated, where I use Tauchen method with 5 grid
points to discretize the process.
Probabilities of becoming a skilled or unskilled worker, Q(s|z, x˜) and Q(u|z, x˜), are
36Since the model time period is around 30 years, households might not respond to wage rates as much as
macro Frisch elasticities used in business cycle studies suggest. Therefore, I use the target Frisch elasticity
to those estimated and commonly used in micro literature.
27
specified as follows:
Q(s|z, x˜) = min{νizx˜ξi , 1}
Q(u|z, x˜) = 1−Q(s|z, x˜).
This functional form satisfies decreasing marginal returns in human capital invest-
ment. Additionally, ability (z) and investment (x˜) are complementary, generating
intergenerational persistence in schooling. Therefore, there are two parameters for
each country to be calibrated: {νUK , νCE}, the technology of human capital produc-
tion, and {ξUK , ξCE}, the returns to human capital investment. I normalize νUK = 1
and find {ξUK , ξCE , νCE} within the model, leaving a total of 5 parameters including
the ability parameters ρz and ε
2
z.
These parameters affect the intergenerational persistence in schooling, percentage of
college graduates, and percentage of GDP spent on education. In the UK, schooling
persistence is 0.22. The OECD reports that the percentage of college graduates among
the 25 – 64-year-old age group is 25.7 percent for the UK and about 20 percent in
the CE. Moreover, the total percentages of GDP spent on tertiary education in 2000
are 0.78 percent and 1.06 percent in the UK and CE, from which 0.6 percent and 0.9
percent are public spending, and the rest, private.
One of the key aggregate outcomes that I would like to analyze in this paper is the skill
distribution in different countries. As shown in the summary statistics, the share of
skilled population in the CE is only about 80 percent of that in the UK. With common
ability and human capital production function parameters, such big differences in skill
distribution cannot be matched. Since the education system and quality of countries
can differ, I allow for heterogeneity in technology (ν) and returns to human capital
investment (ξ) across countries. This makes it possible to match the skill distribution
across countries, with which I can analyze the effects of different tax systems in both
countries.
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D. Labor Productivity Shocks. I assume that the i.i.d. productivity shock to labor
income is drawn from a log-normal distribution:
log ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε).
The value of σ2ε is found to match labor earnings Gini in the UK, which is reported
to be 0.45 in 2000 from Blundell and Etheridge (2010).
E. Migration. Moving cost shocks have an exponential distribution (as in Armenter
and Ortega (2009)) with skill-dependent scale parameters of {ku, ks} and a minimum
value of moving cost {ku, ks}, i.e.,
f(h) = kie
−ki(h+ki), i ∈ {u, s}.
Since this is a steady-state analysis of an open-economy with labor and capital mobil-
ity, net mobility is always zero (while gross mobility might not be). Therefore, I set
the percentage of migration stock in the UK (from the CE) in its population as one
of the data targets.
In order to match the percentage of college-educated migrants (positive selection is
evident, as seen in Table 1.1), I assume heterogeneity in scale parameters of the
exponential distribution across skill levels. Relevant targets are the population ratio
between the two countries and the percentage of college-educated immigrants.
Table 1.2 summarizes the model parametrization.
1.3.4 Calibration Results
Values of the calibrated parameters and model fit are presented in Tables 1.3 and 1.4.
As emphasized before, there are two fundamental differences between the two countries:
the efficiency of skilled and unskilled labor in production, and the human capital production
technology. In the calibration exercise, I find that the UK has higher efficiency of skilled
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labor compared to unskilled labor in production, i.e.,
AUKS
AUKU
>
ACES
ACEU
.
Moreover, the sum of labor efficiencies in the CE (ACEu +A
CE
s ) is 0.945, which is lower than
normalized value of 1 in the UK.37 The differences in labor efficiency parameters between
the UK and CE are qualitatively similar to those found in Caselli and Coleman (2006). The
calibrated parameters of the human capital production technology shows that the CE has
higher technology (ν) and higher returns to human capital investment (ξ).
These parameters (production and human capital technology) are found jointly to match
the GDP per capita ratio and skill premiums, skill distributions, and education spending in
both economies. The UK has higher skill premium and higher percentage of skilled workers
in general equilibrium, which is consistent with the higher relative efficiency of the skilled in
production. Moreover, high technology of human capital production and returns to human
capital investment are necessary to match the skill distribution in the CE, while having a
low skill premium. The model is successful in matching targets along these dimensions.
Migration parameter choices also require some discussion. Since I conduct a steady-
state analysis, net migration in both countries is always zero by construction. Therefore, in
order to ensure a stationary distribution of population in both countries, households should
migrate to and from both countries. To achieve this, I allow for the minimum value of the
location preferences (including moving costs) to be negative, which implies that a household
living in the UK might prefer living in the CE and vice versa. This allows households in
the UK to migrate to the CE, for example, even though it is not in their best interest to
do so for economic reasons. I use data on migration stock as a calibration target. In the
status quo economy, migration stocks from the CE in the UK is only 1.1 percent of the
37The parameter values imply that the production function in Equation (1.20) is represented as
FUK(K,U, S) = Kα(0.5762Uρ + 0.4238Sρ)
1−α
ρ ;
FCE(K,U, S) = 0.8764Kα(0.6534Uρ + 0.3466Sρ)
1−α
ρ ,
for the UK and CE, respectively. The overall productivity is lower in the CE (0.8764) and the unskilled
efficiency in production, higher (0.6534), than in the UK.
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total UK population.38 This leads the scale of the distribution to be very high, implying a
very strong preference for households to live in their birth country. The lower scale for the
skilled compared to unskilled reflects the lower cost of migration for the skilled.39
In the fully calibrated economy, government revenues collected from labor and capital
income taxes amount to about 30 percent of GDP in the UK and CE. According to the
OECD Tax Database, total tax revenues in the UK and CE (in 2000) are 37 percent and 40
percent respectively, among which 30 percent are collected as consumption taxes (general
and specific). Since consumption, capital, and labor income taxes constitute three major
sources of tax revenues, labor and capital tax revenue range between 26 and 28 percent.40
Thus, the calibrated economy is within a reasonable range in terms of the magnitude of tax
revenues relative to GDP.
1.3.5 Computation of Nash Equilibrium
Before I analyze the results in detail, I briefly describe the quantitative procedures of solving
for the Nash equilibrium.
In order to find a Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game, I generate a grid of
the labor income tax parameters, a0 and a1. Taking as given the tax system of country j
({aj0, aj1, τ jk}), country i searches over the set of grids {a0, a1} to find the tax system that
maximizes the steady-state welfare of households, while collecting a fixed amount of tax
revenue per capita.
As governments’ budget constraints have to be satisfied period by period, I find capital
income tax rate τk that balances country i’s budget, given the labor income tax code
represented by {a0, a1}.41 This procedure is repeated iteratively for countries i and j,
38Total migration stock in the UK is about 11 percent of its population, with 3.5 percent coming from
other EU countries. However, since I want to focus on the effect of different tax policies on migration and
aggregate outcomes between the UK and the CE, 1.1 percent is the relevant data target for the purpose of
this paper.
39This is consistent with qualitative differences in estimates for moving costs in Armenter and Ortega
(2009).
40Specific tax categories include personal income tax, corporate income tax, social security contributions,
payroll taxes, property taxes, and general and specific consumption taxes.
41Notice that since this is a general equilibrium model, equilibrium allocations and prices are determined
given the tax systems in both countries.
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until a fixed point is found. Given the high dimensionality of the choice variables, the
uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium cannot be guaranteed. However, I searched over big
domains of tax parameters and tried starting from various initial tax systems, and have not
found multiple equilibria. I describe this procedure in more detail in Appendix A.3.
In the following sections, I present the quantitative results based on the calibrated
parameters.
1.4 Results
To more intuitively understand the forces leading to the optimal taxation results, I first
start by analyzing household behaviors. Then I let each government (UK and CE) vary its
tax code (a0, a1, and τk) one by one, and analyze its aggregate effects and welfare. This
exercise provides an intuitive picture of what the best response of each country is, taking
as given the status quo tax system of the other. After presenting the best responses, I
discuss the Nash equilibrium tax system and its aggregate outcomes. Finally, by comparing
the optimal taxation in the benchmark economy (both capital and labor mobility) to the
economy with only capital mobility, I study how labor mobility affects the fiscal choices of
governments.
1.4.1 Understanding Household Behavior
Governments in the economy maximize the steady-state welfare of households. Therefore,
understanding household behaviors is an important first step in fully analyzing the optimal
taxation results.
Among the most important components in the model are the human capital investment
and the migration decisions of households. Since governments in both countries provide
public education, for households whose return to human capital investment is low, their
optimal investment (x) in the model is zero. Given the marginal complementarity between
ability (z) and human capital investment, these are households with low ability levels.
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The incentives to invest in human capital also differ across skill group and country of
residence. Figure 1.3 shows the human capital investment decisions of households living in
the UK and CE across skill groups, for the highest-ability parents as a function of asset
level. The skilled parents, whose labor income is higher, invest more in the human capital
of the offspring than their unskilled counterparts do, since they have higher total wealth.
Moreover, households living in the CE have lesser incentives to invest in human capital,
since the skill premium is lower, the labor income tax rate (and progressivity) is higher, and
the public education expenditure in the CE is higher.
To understand the migration decisions of households, in Figure 1.4, I plot the differences
in the value of living in the CE and living in the UK, for households with different skill and
ability levels, across assets. As is evident from the figure, the skilled prefer living in the UK,
since the skill premium is higher and the labor income tax rate is lower than those in the
CE. Moreover, parents whose children are of low ability prefer living in the CE (conditional
on their own skill level), where the public education expenditure and the return to human
capital investment are higher than those in the UK. However, the differences in the value
of living in the UK and CE vanish as assets increase, since labor income becomes a smaller
share of the total household wealth and there is a global financial market (the after-tax
returns to capital are equalized across countries).
These household behaviors show that government policies, along with fundamentals in
the economy, can have important implications for the aggregate outcomes, especially with
international movement of labor.
1.4.2 From Status Quo to the Nash Equilibrium
In this subsection, I discuss the response of the UK (CE) government to the status quo
tax system of the CE (UK). This analysis provides insight into the optimal choices of the
governments.
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Effects of Changes in the Tax Code
First, I consider the effects of changes in τk, a0, and a1 of the UK, taking as given the CE’s
status quo tax system. Table 1.5 presents the effects of lowering the capital income tax rate
τk and average labor income tax rate a0 (keeping progressivity constant) by 1 percent, and
the effects of reforming the labor income tax code to a proportional tax.
As is evident in Table 1.5, lowering the capital income tax rate is the most effective
tool for increasing capital. Capital increases by 0.04 percent in response to a 1 percent
decrease in the capital income tax rate. On the other hand, changes in the labor income
tax code increase average hours worked in the economy. In the current formulation of the
tax code, the governments can take two routes for reforming the tax code: either lower
the average labor income tax rate (through higher a0) or lower the progressivity of the tax
code (through lower a1). The comparison of the last two columns of Table 1.5 shows that
lowering the progressivity of the labor income tax code leads to a higher increase in labor
provided, as well as an increase in the number of skilled immigrants.
The last three rows in Table 1.5 present the consumption equivalent variations: the
consumption increase necessary for households to be indifferent between living in the status
quo economy or in the economy with the new tax regime. It is clear that the capital
income tax reform performs the best in increasing the overall welfare of households; the
consumption equivalent variations are the highest in this case. Another interesting aspect
of the economy is that implementing a proportional labor income tax system results in a
welfare loss: the insurance benefits from using a progressive labor income tax code outweigh
its incentive costs. Even though the skilled households are in favor of the proportional labor
income tax code (0.019), the unskilled, who comprise about 75 percent of the population
in the UK, suffer welfare loss (-0.008). The heterogeneity in ability levels and idiosyncratic
labor income risks cannot be insured in the market, and governments play important roles
in providing insurance benefits against these risks. A progressive labor income tax code
achieves this goal.
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Best Responses to the Status Quo Tax System
The analysis in the previous section provides insight into what the best response of the UK
is (I call this the unilateral reform by the UK government). In the best response, the UK
sets its capital income tax rate at -35 percent (subsidized), average labor income tax rate at
53 percent, and progressivity at 0.25 (value of a1). The changes to the aggregate outcomes
in the UK compared to the status quo are presented in Table 1.6.
The dramatic decrease of the capital income tax rate in the UK (from 48 percent to -35
percent) leads to higher capital and output per capita. The return to capital decreases by
42 percent, but due to the capital income subsidy, the after-tax return to capital increases
by 19 percent. Moreover, as higher capital increases the marginal product of labor, wages
of both unskilled and skilled labor also increase by around 37 percent.
The results of the analogous exercise for the CE are presented in Table 1.7. The CE
also lowers its capital income tax rate and increases progressivity, but the magnitudes are
smaller. Since the status quo capital income tax rate in the UK (48 percent) is higher than
that in the CE (28 percent), it attracts sufficient capital at a relatively higher capital income
tax rate.
The presentations of the effects of changes in the tax code and the best responses to the
status quo tax system lead us to analyze the Nash equilibrium results, which I proceed to
do in the following section.
1.4.3 Nash Equilibrium of the Model
The Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game is
τ¯∗UKy (y) = 0.52, a
∗UK
1 = 0.28 ; τ
∗UK
k = −0.32
τ¯∗CEy (y) = 0.50, a
∗CE
1 = 0.11 ; τ
∗CE
k = 0.06.
The average labor income tax rates in the UK and CE are 52 percent and 50 percent,
respectively. While the UK subsidizes its capital income at 32 percent, it uses a more
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progressive labor income tax code than the CE does.42 Figure 1.5 plots the average labor
income tax rates in the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, as a measure of progressivity, I also
plot in Figure 1.6, progressivity wedges defined as
1− 1− τ(k × 0.5)
1− τ(0.5) for k = 2, 3, ...5,
following Guvenen et al. (2011) The interpretation is as follows: In the Nash equilibrium,
a household living in the UK, whose labor earning is two times the average earning in the
economy, earns 25 percent less than they would in a flat-tax system. An analogous worker
earns 12 percent less, if he resides in the CE. In the status quo, the wedges are 8 and 10
percent respectively, in the UK and CE. Therefore, it is evident that the UK uses a much
more progressive labor income tax code to collect tax revenues.
Before discussing the aggregate effects of implementing the Nash equilibrium policies
and the impact of competition between the two countries, I provide a brief insight for why
the UK sets a lower capital income tax rate than the CE does.
In the model economy, labor income risks cannot be insured in the market, i.e., financial
markets are incomplete. From the government’s point of view (which maximizes the steady-
state welfare of households, using a utilitarian welfare function), the most efficient way of
increasing societal welfare is to increase the lifetime utility of the consumption-poor, as they
are the segment of society with the highest marginal utility of consumption. Thus, as shown
in Davila et al. (2012),43 the most important determinant of the optimal capital income
tax rate is the wealth composition of the poor in the competitive equilibrium (without
government policies). If the consumption of the poor is low since they are relatively more
42As I have noted in footnote 25 section 1.3.1, I normalize the country size of the CE in this analysis.
The main result of Kanbur and Keen (1993), who studies tax competition between countries with different
sizes, is that the small country sets a lower tax rate, since there is more to be taken advantage of from the
big country. In the Nash equilibrium, the UK sets a lower capital income tax rate than the CE does, and it
attracts capital, which is the more mobile factor of production (compared to labor). Thus, I expect to see
a even stronger incentive for the UK to set a lower capital income tax rate, if I take into account the size
of the CE. Of course, I will have to recalibrate the model to be able to analyze it more accurately, which I
plan to do in the future.
43The condition for constrained efficiency in a simplified version of my model with three factors of pro-
duction (capital, unskilled, and skilled labor) in an open economy is presented in Appendix A.4. This is an
extended version of Davila et al.
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wealth-poor (but have an abundant labor endowment), then social planners can increase the
welfare of the poor by increasing capital, since an increase in capital would result in higher
wages. On the other hand, if the poor in the economy is relatively more labor income-poor
(but have high asset positions), the welfare of the poor can be increased if the return to
capital is higher – an argument for positive capital income tax rate.
In the UK, with higher efficiencies in production, capital and wages are higher than in
the CE in competitive equilibrium (without government policies). Moreover, the wealth
inequality in the UK is higher than that in the CE. Thus, the UK government benefits
more from increasing capital, which also drives up wages. This leads to the optimal capital
income tax rate being relatively lower (negative – capital income is subsidized) than that
in the CE, and the optimal labor income tax code, progressive.
Aggregate Outcomes in the Nash Equilibrium
Table 1.8 presents the changes in the aggregate outcomes in the UK and CE when both
countries implement the Nash equilibrium tax systems.
In the Nash equilibrium, the UK lowers its capital income tax rate dramatically. As a
consequence, output and capital per capita increases in the UK by 0.21 and 1.18. However,
the CE, which under the status quo had higher capital per capita than the UK does not
perform economically as well as the UK does in the Nash equilibrium. Its output and capital
per capita decreases in the Nash equilibrium. However, the lower capital income tax rate
in both countries, compared to the status quo leads to higher after-tax returns to capital.
Therefore, even with lower average working hours, consumption per capita in both countries
increases.
Another notable aspect of the economy is that, in the Nash equilibrium, there is a less
skilled population. As the after-tax return to physical capital investment increases, the
incentives to invest in human capital decreases. Moreover, the highly progressive labor
income tax code, compared to the status quo, decreases the incentives for parents to invest
in the human capital of their offspring. The lower human capital investment leads to
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lower intergenerational schooling persistence in the UK, while in the CE, the schooling
persistence increases. Under the Nash equilibrium policies and with its (relatively more)
generous public education system, in the CE, households’ human capital investment nears
zero and the schooling persistence increases slightly. On the other hand, in the UK, the
decrease in the human capital investments are more pronounced for the skilled, since they
have higher asset income. This leads to a lower schooling persistence in the UK. The cross-
sectional inequality in both countries increases, as measured by the income Gini coefficient,
because the asset-rich households decrease their working hours.
Overall, implementing the Nash equilibrium policies leads to a significant increase in
lifetime welfare of households, as measured in consumption equivalent variation. While the
welfare in the UK increases by around 13 percent, the welfare in the CE increases by around
10 percent. The welfare increase is derived from the higher consumption per capita and
lower hours worked. The unskilled benefit more than the skilled do, by about twofold, in
both countries.
Effects of Competition
Given the best responses of the governments discussed in section 1.4.2, the model can be used
to analyze the effects of competition on optimal taxation. Comparing the Nash equilibrium
tax rates with the tax rates of the unilateral reforms, I find that the governments set lower
capital income tax rates under unilateral reform than they do in the Nash equilibrium. For
both countries, the benefit of lowering the capital income tax rate is higher when the other
country’s tax rate is high, since there is more capital that can be taken advantage of. Thus,
both governments set lower capital income tax rates when they unilaterally reform their
tax systems.
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1.4.4 Effects of Labor Mobility on Optimal Taxation and Aggregate Out-
comes
In this subsection, I study the effects of labor mobility on optimal taxation in the UK and
CE, which is the main contribution of this paper.
For the analysis, I find the optimal tax code in a closed economy, an economy with only
capital mobility, and an economy with both capital and labor mobility (benchmark result).
In the first subsection, I compare the optimal taxation under different mobility assumptions
and provide elasticities to tax rates to understand the optimal taxation results. I also discuss
the aggregate outcomes under the economy with only capital mobility and with both capital
and labor mobility to analyze the macroeconomic effects of labor mobility.
I find that labor mobility is crucial in determination of the optimal tax system in the
UK and CE. Given the differences in the two countries, incorporating labor mobility leads
to a divergence in the tax systems and reallocation of unskilled and skilled labor across
countries. I discuss these issues in more detail in the following.
Optimal Taxation with versus without Labor Mobility
Tables 1.9 and 1.10 present the optimal tax codes of the UK and CE in the economies with
different mobility assumptions.
First, I focus on the optimal taxation results in the UK. A noticeable finding is that the
optimal capital income tax rate is lower under both labor and capital mobility in the UK.
When labor is mobile, the governments can attract migrants by decreasing labor income tax
rates or by increasing wages directly: Households’ economic decisions depend on the level
of after-tax labor income. Thus, the governments weigh the trade-off they face in choosing
labor or capital income tax rates as a source of their tax revenue. If they lower capital
income tax rates, at the expense of higher labor income tax rates, they can induce higher
labor hours and attract migrants through higher wages. Similarly, lower labor income tax
rates achieve the same goal.
The quantitative exercise in the calibrated model, however, shows that the former (a
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lower capital income tax rate) is more effective in improving economic well-being in the
UK. To more formally argue this point, I present in Table 1.11 the effects of a one percent
decrease in the capital income tax rate under different mobility assumptions in the UK.
In the closed economy, when the government lowers the capital income tax rate, capital
increases, return to capital decreases, and wages increase. When a global financial market
is formed (capital mobility), the lower capital income tax rate attracts higher capital, but
its effect is smaller, as the price of capital is set in the global market: The return to capital
increases, despite the higher level of capital. As a consequence, the effects on wages are also
lower than under the closed economy.
In the last column of the Table 1.11 are the results in the economy with both capital
and labor mobility. It is evident that the benefit of a lower capital income tax rate is
higher under dual capital and labor mobility, than it is under only capital mobility. Capital
increases more, and unlike in the other cases, so does average hours worked. In the UK, the
benefit of a lower capital income tax rate is higher with labor mobility.
This result is driven by two facts. Firstly, capital is more mobile than labor. This is
assumed in the model,44 and reflects reality. International migration of households is not
only costly financially, but in most cases, also requires overcoming language and cultural
barriers. On the other hand, financial markets in recent years have been largely global-
ized, and households can easily engage in international financial transactions with no cost.
Secondly, capital and labor are complementary in production: An increase in one factor
increases the marginal product of the other. Therefore, governments may find it more effi-
cient to use lower capital income tax rates to attract capital and thus, indirectly, labor. The
UK therefore lowers its capital income tax rate further with labor mobility, and it attracts
migrants by doing so. The population ratio (UK to CE) in the Nash equilibrium is 1.03.
Another effect of labor mobility is that the optimal tax systems diverge in the UK
and CE. In an economy where only capital is mobile, the capital income tax rates in both
44Although after-tax returns to capital are equalized in the global financial market, there is a cost to
migrate to the other countries. This not only reflects the reality, but is necessary for the existence of a
steady-state in the economy with a non-degenerate distribution of population in the two countries.
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countries are around -11 percent. However, with labor mobility, while the UK lowers its
capital income tax rate further, the CE lowers its labor income tax rate (higher capital
income tax rate).
The divergence of the tax system in an economy with labor mobility is driven from the
productivity differences in the UK and CE. As emphasized before, in the calibrated economy,
the UK has higher productivity than the CE does45. Thus, when labor is mobile, the UK
attracts more capital and labor: The population ratio between the UK and CE (UK to CE)
is greater than one. Given a relatively smaller population, the welfare-maximizing capital
in the CE is smaller. Moreover, since in equilibrium, after-tax returns to capital between
the UK and CE are equalized (no-arbitrage condition in the global financial market), the
CE finds it optimal to use a higher capital income tax than the UK does.
In order to analyze the welfare effects of using different tax policies further, I present in
Table 1.12, the effects of lowering the capital versus labor income tax rate by one percent
(from the Nash equilibrium policies) in the UK and CE, respectively. The UK, which
has higher overall production efficiency and relative skilled efficiency, benefits more from
lowering its capital income tax rate, as measured by consumption equivalent variation. On
the other hand, the consumption equivalent variation in the CE is higher when it lowers its
labor income tax rate. This leads to a divergence of tax systems in the two countries.
Comparison of Aggregate Outcomes with Different Mobility Assumption
In Table 1.13, I compare aggregate outcomes in the economy with only capital mobility and
the one with both capital and labor mobility.
As countries open up for labor mobility, the UK, which is more productive, gains as
output and capital per capita increase. While the output and capital per capita in the CE
decreases, with more unskilled and skilled labor provided, consumption per capita increases.
Moreover, given the higher relative efficiency of the skilled in the UK, more skilled workers
live in the UK, while in the CE, more unskilled workers reside. Thus, skilled and unskilled
45As specified in footnote 31, the overall productivity in the CE (0.8764) is lower than that in the UK
(1).
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labor are reallocated across countries as labor becomes mobile.
The analysis in this section shows that labor mobility has important implications for the
optimal taxation of capital and labor. In the calibrated model, the UK lowers its capital
income tax rate, while the CE lowers its labor income tax rate, compared to an economy
with only capital mobility. In the aggregate, the UK, which is more productive and has
higher relative efficiency of the skilled, enjoys higher population rates and output and capital
per capita, when labor is mobile.
1.5 Conclusions
The recent trend of increased labor mobility has raised concerns about the possibility of
international labor income tax competition among policy makers. In light of this trend, this
paper asks how labor mobility affects the optimal choice of governments’ tax policies in an
international tax competition framework.
Based on a two-country, open-economy model, I find that labor mobility and a global
financial market are important factors in determining the optimal tax systems. The appli-
cation of the model to the United Kingdom and Continental European countries shows that
countries set their capital income tax rates less aggressively in a competitive environment.
Moreover, in the United Kingdom, the optimal taxation of capital income is lower under
both capital and labor mobility, compared to an economy with only capital mobility, while
the reverse is true in Continental Europe. Though some policy makers worry that inter-
national tax competition can be harmful, implementing the Nash equilibrium tax rates in
both countries increases welfare by 11 percent of consumption in the status quo economy.
An interesting avenue for future research is to endogenize the choice of public education
expenditures in governments’ problems. Since governments’ public education policies affect
the migration decisions of skilled and unskilled households differentially, education policies
might be used to attract migrants selectively.46 Moreover, the interaction between using a
46Anderson (2005) theoretically investigates the link between taxation and educational policies in presence
of migration.
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progressive labor income tax code and a generous public education policy can be analyzed
in an international tax competition framework.
The model framework developed in this paper is useful beyond the analysis of the United
Kingdom and Continental Europe. It is also suitable for investigating the effects of increased
labor mobility on the Nash equilibrium as well as aggregate outcomes. As workers become
more mobile, governments face stronger constraints on labor income taxes, with higher
benefits from an increased level of capital stock. A quantitative assessment of the strength
of the two effects can shed some light on the future direction of optimal tax policies for
governments facing a more globalized world. Moreover, the model can also be used for the
analysis of migration reforms. Tightening immigration policies, for example, in the United
States, can have implications for optimal taxation and aggregate economics outcomes. I
leave these questions for future research.
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1.6 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics in the United Kingdom and Continental Europe
United Kingdom Continental Europe
GDP per capitaa $25,255 $25,174
Skill premiuma 1.62 1.45
Intergenerational persistence in schoolingb 0.22 0.23
Gini coefficient of labor earninga 0.45 0.36
% college graduatesc 25.7 % 20.0%
Tertiary education spending (% GDP)c 0.78% 1.06%
Public spending 0.58% 0.90%
Private spending 0.20% 0.16%
Average hours workedc 0.361 0.342
% of immigrants among pop.b 1.10% 0.56%
% college graduates among immigrantsd 37.70% 36.41%
a. Cross Sectional Facts for Macroeconomists (2011)
b. Causa and Joahnsson (2009)
c. OECD
d. OECD and World Bank
Note: All statistics are data from 2000.
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Table 1.2: Calibration Targets
Parameter Description Target Value
AUKu Unskilled efficiency – UK Skill premium – UK 1.62
ACEu Unskilled efficiency – CE Skill premium – CE 1.45
ACEs Skilled efficiency – CE GDP per capita ratio 1.00
α∗ Capital share - 0.33
1
1− ρ
∗ Elasticity of Substitution - 1.4
δ Depreciation rate Capital-output ratio – UK 3.0
σ∗ Risk aversion - 2
η Weight in disutility of labor Average hours worked – UK 0.36
γ Curvature of leisure Frisch elasticity 0.3
β
1
30 Discount (altruism) factor Annual bond yields 4%
ρz Persistence in ability Intergen. sch. pers. – UK 0.22
σ2z Variance in ability Educ. spending – UK 0.78%
νCE HC technology Educ. spending – CE 1.06%
ξUK Returns to HC inv. – UK % college grads – UK 26%
ξCE Returns to HC inv. – CE % college grads – CE 20%
σ2ε Var. of iid. shock Labor earnings Gini – UK 0.45
hU Min. utility cost of moving – unskilled Pop. ratio – UK to CE 0.94
hS Min. utility cost of moving – skilled % imm. among pop. – UK 1.1%
hU Scale of cost distribution % skilled among imm. – UK 38%
hS Scale of cost distribution % skilled among imm. – CE 36%
∗ These parameters are chosen outside the model, and take standard values used in macroeco-
nomics literature.
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Table 1.3: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description Value
AUKu Unskilled efficiency – UK 0.577
ACEu Unskilled efficiency – CE 0.618
AUKs Skilled efficiency – UK 0.423
ACEs Skilled efficiency – CE 0.329
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.049
ρz Persistence in ability 0.362
σ2z Variance in ability 0.570
ξUK Returns to HC investment – UK 0.197
ξCE Returns to HC investment – CE 0.253
νUK Skill production technology – UK 1.000
νCE Skill production technology –CE 1.145
σ2ε Variance in labor productivity shock 1.076
η Weight in disutility of labor 777
γ Frisch elasticity 0.3
β Discount (altruism) factor 0.948
hU Minimum utility cost of moving – unskilled 89
hS Minimum utility cost of moving – skilled 59
hU Scale of moving cost distribution –unskilled 9800
hS Scale of moving cost distribution – skilled 3200
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Table 1.4: Model Fit
Moments Data Model
Skill premium – UK 1.62 1.62
Skill premium – CE 1.45 1.44
GDP per capita ratio 1.00 0.96
Capital-output ratio 0.1 0.1
Annual bond yields 1.04 1.04
Intergenerational persistence in schooling – UK 0.22 0.20
Gini coefficient of labor earning – UK 0.45 0.45
% college graduates – UK 25.7% 25.2%
% college graduates – CE 20.0% 20.1%
Tertiary education spending (% GDP) – UK 0.78% 0.74%
Tertiary education spending (% GDP) – CE 1.06% 1.05%
Average hours worked – UK 0.36 0.35
Population ratio – UK to CE 0.94 0.97
% of immigrants among Pop. – UK 1.1% 1.1%
% college graduates among immigrants – UK 38% 34%
% college graduates among immigrants – CE 36% 41%
Table 1.5: Effects of Changes in the Tax Code – United Kingdom
Variable τUKk ↓ aUK0 (y) ↑ aUK1 (y) ↓
Capital 0.038 0.006 0.015
Hours worked 0.000 0.002 0.005
Skilled immigrants -0.001 0.000 0.004
Consumption equivalent variation 0.004 0.001 -0.002
Unskilled 0.003 0.000 -0.008
Skilled 0.007 0.004 0.019
Note: Starting from the status quo tax system in the United Kingdom, I vary each
component in the tax system (capital income tax rate, average labor income tax rate,
and progressivity of the labor income tax code) one by one. Since labor income tax
function is
τ(y; y¯) = 1− a0
(
y
y¯
)−a1
,
increasing a0 is equivalent to lowering the average labor income tax rate, while de-
creasing a1 represents a less progressive labor income tax code. All variables represent
the changes of the aggregate outcomes from the status quo tax system in the United
Kingdom, taking as given the status quo tax system in the Continental Europe.
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Table 1.6: Unilateral Reform of the United Kingdom and Aggregate Outcomes
Status Quo Unilateral
UK CE UK CE
Tax code
Capital income tax 0.48 0.28 -0.35 0.28
Average labor income tax 0.24 0.31 0.53 0.31
Progressivity 0.07 0.10 0.25 0.10
Aggregate outcome
Output per capita 0.27
Capital per capita 1.42
Average hours worked -0.08
Return to capital -0.42
After-tax return to capital 0.19
Wages, unskilled 0.37
Wages, skilled 0.38
Note: Aggregate variables are changes from the status quo tax system.
Table 1.7: Unilateral Reform of Continental Europe and Aggregate Outcomes
Status Quo Unilateral
UK CE UK CE
Tax code
Capital income tax 0.48 0.28 0.48 -0.11
Average labor income tax 0.24 0.31 0.24 0.44
Progressivity 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.28
Aggregate outcome
Output per capita 0.08
Capital per capita 0.35
Average hours worked -0.04
Return to capital -0.21
After-tax return to capital 0.12
Wages, unskilled 0.12
Wages, skilled 0.12
Note: Aggregate variables are changes from the status quo tax system.
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Table 1.8: Aggregate Outcomes in the Nash Equilibrium
Nash Equilibrium
Variable United Kingdom Continental Europe
Output per capita 0.21 -0.11
Capital per capita 1.18 -0.17
Average hours worked -0.12 -0.13
Consumption per capita 0.04 0.04
Return to capital -0.40 -0.02
After-tax return to capital 0.21 0.21
% skilled -0.02 -0.01
Labor income Gini coefficient 0.04 0.06
Schooling persistence -0.14 0.01
Population 0.04 -0.04
Skilled immigrants -0.03 -0.03
Consumption equivalent variation 0.13 0.10
Unskilled 0.14 0.11
Skilled 0.07 0.06
Note: All variables represent changes from the status quo tax system.
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Table 1.9: Effects of Labor Mobility on Optimal Taxation in the United Kingdom
Optimal Tax Code Closed Capital Mobility Capital & Labor
Capital income tax rate -0.26 -0.12 -0.32
Average labor income tax rate 0.51 0.49 0.52
Progressivity 0.30 0.25 0.28
Note: The tax codes are based on the optimal taxation in a closed economy, in an economy with
only capital mobility, and in an economy with both capital and labor mobility.
Table 1.10: Effects of Labor Mobility on Optimal Taxation in the Continental Europe
Optimal Tax Code Closed Capital Mobility Capital & Labor
Capital income tax rate -0.15 -0.11 0.06
Average labor income tax rate 0.35 0.51 0.50
Progressivity 0.28 0.25 0.11
Note: The tax codes are based on the optimal taxation in a closed economy, in an economy with
only capital mobility, and in an economy with both capital and labor mobility.
Table 1.11: Effects of Changes to the Capital Income Tax Rate in the United Kingdom
under Different Mobility Assumptions
Variable Closed Capital Mobility Capital & Labor
Capital 0.012 0.006 0.012
Return to capital -0.003 0.003 0.000
Average hours worked -0.002 -0.001 0.001
Wages, unskilled 0.005 0.003 0.004
Wages, skilled 0.005 0.002 0.002
Note: The variables represent the changes in aggregate outcomes under the optimal tax
code and outcomes under a capital income tax rate that is one percent lower than the
optimal capital income tax rate (fixing the labor income tax code).
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Table 1.12: Effects of Changes to Tax Codes in the United Kingdom and Continental Europe
at Nash Equilibrium
United Kingdom Continental Europe
Variable τUKy ↓ τUKk ↓ τCEy ↓ τCEk ↓
Capital 0.001 0.012 -0.003 0.017
Consumption 0.007 0.006 0.016 0.011
Consumption equivalent variation 0.003 0.006 0.013 0.011
Note: The variables represent the changes from aggregate outcomes under the optimal tax
code and outcomes under a labor (capital) income tax rate that is one percent lower than
the optimal capital income tax rate, fixing the labor (capital) income tax code.
Table 1.13: Effects of Labor Mobility on Aggregate Outcomes
Nash Equilibrium
Variable United Kingdom Continental Europe
Output per capita 0.079 -0.074
Capital per capita 0.268 -0.219
Consumption per capita -0.010 0.057
Unskilled labor -0.001 0.002
Skilled labor 0.002 0.005
% skilled 0.001 -0.002
Labor income Gini coefficient -0.002 0.013
Population 0.014 -0.014
Note: All variables represent changes from the optimal tax system with only capital mobility.
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Figure 1.1: Timing of the Model
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Figure 1.2: Average Labor Income Tax Rates in the Continental Europe and United King-
dom
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Note: The United Kingdom has a less progressive labor income tax code, with a lower average labor income
tax rate, when compared to the Continental Europe.
52
Figure 1.3: Human Capital Investment Decisions of Households
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
0
1
2
3
4
5
6 x 10
−4
Asset
H
um
an
 C
ap
ita
l I
nv
es
tm
en
t
 
 
UK, Unskilled
UK, Skilled
CE, Unskilled
CE, Skilled
Note: Households living in the United Kingdom have higher incentives to invest in the human capital of their
offspring conditional on skill level, thanks to the country’s high skill premium and low labor income tax rate.
Moreover, public education spending in the United Kingdom is lower, leaving more room for investment
in children. On the other hand, investment by households in the Continental Europe is lower, since public
education expenditures are high and the market incentives are lower (low skill premium and high labor
income tax rates). The skilled parents invest more (conditional on assets) than the unskilled parents, since
they have higher labor income.
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Figure 1.4: Differences in the Value of Living in the United Kingdom versus Continental
Europe
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Note: The y-axis represents the differences in the value of living in the Continental Europe and living in
the United Kingdom. A positive value implies that a household of a given characteristic prefers living in the
Continental Europe. Overall, the skilled labor force prefers the United Kingdom, while households whose
offspring is of low ability prefer living in the Continental Europe. The differences between living in the
United Kingdom and Continental Europe vanish as assets increase.
Figure 1.5: Average Labor Income Tax Rates in the Nash Equilibrium
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Note: In the Nash equilibrium, the United Kingdom uses a more progressive labor income tax code than
the Continental Europe does.
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Figure 1.6: Progressivity Wedge in the Status Quo and in the Nash Equilibrium
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Note: Following Guvenen et al. (2011), progressivity wedge is defined as 1− 1− τ(k × 0.5)
1− τ(0.5) for k = 2, 3, ...5.
The interpretation is as follows: In the Nash equilibrium, a household living in the United Kingdom, whose
labor earning is two times the average earning in the economy, earns 25 percent less than in a flat-tax system.
An analogous worker earns 12 percent less, if he resides in the Continental Europe. In the status quo, the
wedges are 8 and 10 percent respectively, in the United Kingdom and Continental Europe.
55
Chapter 2
Analyzing the Effects of
Insuring Health Risks:
On the Tradeoff between Short-Run Insurance Benefits vs.
Long-Run Incentive Costs
This chapter is co-authored with Harold L. Cole and Dirk Krueger.
Summary
This paper constructs a dynamic model of health insurance to evaluate the short- and
long run effects of policies that prevent firms from conditioning wages on health conditions
of their workers, and that prevent health insurance companies from charging individuals
with adverse health conditions higher insurance premia. Our study is motivated by recent
US legislation that has tightened regulations on wage discrimination against workers with
poorer health status (Americans with Disability Act of 2009, ADA, and ADA Amendments
Act of 2008, ADAAA) and that will prohibit health insurance companies from charging
different premiums for workers of different health status starting in 2014 (Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, PPACA). In the model, a trade-off arises between the static
gains from better insurance against poor health induced by these policies and their adverse
dynamic incentive effects on household efforts to lead a healthy life. Using household panel
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data from the PSID we estimate and calibrate the model and then use it to evaluate the
static and dynamic consequences of no-wage discrimination and no-prior conditions laws
for the evolution of the cross-sectional health and consumption distribution of a cohort of
households, as well as ex-ante lifetime utility of a typical member of this cohort. In our
quantitative analysis we find that although a combination of both policies is effective in
providing full consumption insurance period by period, it is suboptimal to introduce both
policies jointly since such policy innovation induces a more rapid deterioration of the cohort
health distribution over time. This is due to the fact that combination of both laws severely
undermines the incentives to lead healthier lives. The resulting negative effects on health
outcomes in society more than offset the static gains from better consumption insurance
so that expected discounted lifetime utility is lower under both policies, relative to only
implementing wage nondiscrimination legislation.
2.1 Introduction
In this paper we study the impact of social insurance policies aimed at reducing households’
exposure to health related risk during their working life. These risks come through higher
medical costs, higher medical premiums and lower earnings. Historically there have been
major insurance efforts aimed at the elderly through Medicaid and Social Security, and
the poor through Medicare and income support programs like Welfare and Food Stamps.
Recently the extent of these programs and the scope of the different groups they impact on
has been greatly expanded. On the health insurance front, HIPPA in 1966 and the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010 sought to increase access to health care and
to prevent health insurance being differentially priced based upon pre-existing conditions.
On the income front, the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act and its Amendment in 2009
sought to restrict the ability of employers to employ and compensate workers differentially
based upon health related reasons.
In order to analyze the impact of these policies we construct a dynamic model of health
insurance with heterogeneous households. As in Grossman (1972), health for these house-
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holds is a state variable. A household’s health state helps to determine both their productiv-
ity at work and the likelihood that they will be subject to adverse health shocks. Our model
features the two-way interaction between health and income that has been emphasized in
the literature. Our model of health shocks includes temporary health shocks that impact
on productivity and can be offset by medical expenditures (as in Dey and Flinn 2005),
and catastrophic health shocks which require nondiscretionary health expenditures to avoid
death. Health status in our model is persistent and evolves stochastically. This evolution is
affected by the household’s efforts to maintain their health which results in a moral hazard
problem as health related insurance reduces households’ incentives to maintain their health.
We explicitly model the choice of medical expenditure and thereby endogenously determine
the health insurance policy and how it responds both to the household’s state in terms of
health status, age and education.
The focus of our analysis is how the distributions of health status, earnings and health
insurance costs will evolve under different policy choices and the impact of these choices
on welfare. We consider several different policy regimes. The first is a complete insurance
benchmark in which the social planner can dictate both the health insurance contract,
the effort made to maintain health and the extent of redistributive transfers that provide
full insurance against all health related shocks. The second is pure competition in which
workers enter into one-period employment and insurance contracts. Competition leads these
contracts to partially insure the worker against within period temporary health shocks, but
not against his initial health status and the transition of this status. The second is a
version of the no-prior conditions restriction on health insurance in which health insurance
companies compete to offer one-period health insurance contracts in which they cannot
differentially charge based upon the worker’s health status. The third is a version of the
no-discrimination restrictions on employment in which firms cannot differentially hire or
pay workers based upon their health status. In the fourth version we consider the impact
of both the no-prior conditions and the no-discrimination restrictions jointly.
We study both the static and the dynamic impact of these policies. One of the key
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aspects of the dynamic analysis is the impact these policies have on individuals’ incentives
to maintain their health and the feedback this creates between the health distribution of
the population and the costs of health insurance and productivity of the workforce.
We evaluate the quantitative impacts of the different policies on consumption insurance,
incentives and aggregate outcomes, and, ultimately, welfare. To do so, we first estimate and
calibrate the model using PSID data to match key aggregate statistics on labor earnings,
medical expenditures and observed physical exercise levels. We then use the parameterized
version of the model as a laboratory to evaluate different policy scenarios. Our results show
that a combination of wage non-discrimination law and no prior conditions law provides full
insurance against health risks and restores the first-best consumption insurance allocation in
the short run, but leads to a severe deterioration of incentives and thus the population health
distribution in the long run. Quantitatively evaluating the welfare consequences of this
trade-off we find that even though both policies improve upon the laissez-faire equilibrium,
implementing them jointly is suboptimal, relative to introducing a wage nondiscrimination
in isolation.
2.1.1 Institutional Background
The U.S. has a long history of policy initiatives in relation to health risk. Implicitly Welfare
programs, which date back to the 1930s and were greatly expanded by the Great Society
in the 1960s, insure workers against a variety of shocks, implicitly including health related
shocks insofar they affect earnings. Since 1965 Medicare has sought to provide health
insurance to the elderly and the disabled. Medicaid has sought to provide health insurance
to the poor since the 1990s. The last two decades legislation in the U.S. was passed that
limits the ability of employers to condition wages on the health conditions of employees, and
to discriminate against applicants with prior health conditions when filling vacant positions.
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Wage Based Discrimination
In 1990 Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to ensure that the
disabled have equal access to employment opportunities.1 At this point a disability was
interpreted as an impairment that prevents or severely restricts an individual from doing
activities that are of central importance to one’s daily life. In 2009 the ADA Amendments
Act (ADAAA) went into effect. This act rejected the strict interpretation of the ADA,
broadening the notion of a disability. This included prohibiting the consideration of mea-
sures that reduce or mitigate the impact of a disability in determining whether someone is
disabled. It also allowed people who are discriminated against on the basis of a perceived
disability to pursue a claim on the basis of the ADA regardless of whether the perceived
disability limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity. The ADAAA excludes from
the definition of a disability those temporary or minor impairments.2 Under the ADAAA
people can be disabled even if their disability is episodic or in remission. For example people
whose cancer is remission or whose diabetes is controlled by medication, or whose seizures
are prevented by medication, or who can function at a high level with learning disabilities
are all disabled under the act.
Before the ADA job seekers could be asked about their medical conditions and were
often required to submit to a medical exam. The act prohibited certain inquiries and
conducting a medical exam before making an employment offer. However, the job could
still be conditioned upon successful completion of a medical exam.3
The ADA permits an employer to establish job-related qualifications on the basis of
business necessity. However, business necessity is limited to essential functions of the job.
So impairments that would only occasionally interfere with the employee’s ability to perform
tasks cannot be included on this list.4 A job function is essential if the job exists to perform
1The ADA sets the federal minimum standard of protection. States may have a more stringent level.
2Under the ADAAA major life activities now include: caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing , lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading,
concentrating, thinking, communicating, working, as well as major bodily functions.
3For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has ruled that an employee
may be asked ”how many days were you absent from work?”, but not ”how many days were you sick?”.
4For example, an employer cannot require a driver’s license for a clerking job because it would occa-
sionally be useful to have that employee run errands. Also qualification cannot be such that a reasonable
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that function or if the limited number of employees available at the firm requires that the
task must be performed by this worker. Furthermore, a core requirement of the ADA is
the obligation of the employer to make a reasonable accommodation to qualified disabled
people.5
Insurance Cost and Exclusion Discrimination
In 1996, Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
which placed limits on the extent to which insurance companies could exclude people or
deny coverage based upon pre-existing conditions. Although insurance companies were
allowed exclusions periods for coverage of pre-existing conditions, these exclusion periods
were reduced by the extent of prior insurance. In particular, if an individual had at least
a full year of prior health insurance and she enrolled in a new plan with a break of less
than 63 days, she could not be denied coverage. However, insurers were still allowed to
charge higher premiums based upon initial conditions, limit coverage and set lifetime limits
on benefits.6 There is evidence that many patients with pre-existing conditions ended up
either being denied coverage,7 or having their access to benefits limited.8
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 further extended protection
against pre-existing conditions. Beginning in 2010 children below the age of 19 could not
be excluded from their parents’ health insurance policy or denied treatment for pre-existing
conditions. Beginning in 2014 this restriction will apply to adults as well. Moreover, insur-
ance companies will no longer be able to use health status to determine eligibility, benefits
or premia. In addition, insurers will be prevented from limiting lifetime or annual benefits
or from taking away coverage because of an application mistake.9
accommodation would allow the employee to perform the task.
5These accommodations include: a) making existing facilities accessible and usable b) job restructuring
c) part-time or modified work schedules d) reassigning a disabled employee to a vacant position e) acquiring
or modifying equipment or devices f) providing qualified readers or interpreters.
6See http://www.healthcare.gov/center/reports/preexisting.html
7See Kass et al. (2007).
8See Sommers (2006).
9See again http://www.healthcare.gov/center/reports/preexisting.html
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Summary
It is our interpretation of these legislative changes that, relative to 20 years ago, it is much
more difficult now for employers to condition wages on the health status of their (potential)
employees and preferentially hire workers with better health. In addition, current and
pending legislation will make it increasingly difficult to condition the acceptance into, and
insurance premia of health insurance plans on prior health conditions.
The purpose of the remainder of this paper is to analyze the aggregate and distributional
consequences of these two legislative innovations in the short and in the long run, with
specific focus on their interactions.
2.1.2 Related Literature
Our paper incorporates health as a productive factor, and studies the effect of labor and
health insurance market policies on its evolution. The dynamics of health transitions (but
not current health status) in our model is affected by costly effort choices, which empirically
we proxy by physical exercise. Colman and Dave (2013) provide empirical support for
this modeling choice when they find that, controling for observables and accounting for
unobserved heterogeneity, physical activity reduces the risk of heart disease, and that the
effect of past physical activity has a larger impact on current health status than current
physical activity.
In the model we allow for a two-way interaction between health shocks and earnings
through worker productivity. We model medical expenditures which mitigate the impact
of these health shocks. There have been a number of studies that empirically estimate the
effect of health on wages. These papers (see the summary in Currie and Madrian, 1999)
generally find that poor health decreases wages, both directly and indirectly through a
decrease in hours worked. The effect of a health shock on wages ranges from 1% to as high
as 15%. Many studies consistently find that the effects on hours worked is greater than that
on wages. Specifically relevant for us is Cawley (2004). In addition, there is a substantial
empirical literature that estimates the effects of health inputs (and primiarily, nutrition) on
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health outcomes and wages in developing countries. Weil (2007) surveys this literature and
uses its findings to determine the impact of country-wide health differences on cross-country
income variation.
Similarly to what we do for working age individuals, Pijoan-Mas and Rios-Rull (2012),
use HRS data on self-report health status to estimate a health transition function from age
50 onwards. They find that there is an important dependence in this transition function
on socioeconomic status (most importantly education), and that this dependence is quan-
titatively crucial for explaining longevity differentials by socioeconomic groups. As we do
Hai (2012) and Prados (2012) model the interaction between health and earnings over the
life cycle, but focus on the implications of their models for wage-, earnings- and health
insurance inequality.10
A relatively small literature examines the incentive linkages between health insurance
and health status. Bhattacharya et al. (2009) use evidence from a Rand health insurance
experiment, which featured randomized assignment to health insurance contracts, to show
that access to health insurance leads to increases in body mass and obesity. They argue that
this comes from the fact that insurance, especially through its pooling effect, insulates people
from the impact of their excess weight on their medical expenditure costs. Consistent with
this, they find the impact of being health-insured is larger for public insurance programs
than in private ones in which the health insurance premium is more likely to reflect the
individuals’ body mass.11
This paper contributes to the broad literature that examines the macroeconomic and
distributional implications of health, health insurance and health care policy reform. Im-
portant related contributions include Grossman (1972), Ehrlich and Becker (1972), Ehrlich
and Chuma (1990), French and Jones (2004), Hall and Jones (2007), Jeske, and Kitao
(2009), Jung and Tran (2010), Attanasio, Kitao and Violante (2011), Ales, Hosseini and
Jones (2012), Halliday, He and Zhang (2012), Hansen, Hsu and Lee (2012), Kopecky and
10Both papers also study the impact of compulsary health insurance legislation.
11Kowalski (2012) empirically investigates, in the context of a static model, the trade-off between insurance
and the moral hazard effects of health insurance provision on mdeical spending, finding that the latter
outweight the former.
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Koreshkova (2012), Laun (2012), Ozkan (2012), Pashchenko and Porapakkam (2012) and
Scholz and Seshadri (2012). Bru¨gemann and Manovskii (2010), while endogenizing health,
study the macroeconomic effects of the employer-sponsored health insurance system that is
unique to the US labor market. Concretely, they determine the effect of PPACA on health
insurance coverage, but do not study the incentive effects of the regulation that we formalize
in our model.
Several papers investigate the impact of regulation designed to limit the direct effect
of health on both health insurance costs and on wages.12 Short and Lair (1994) examine
how health status interacts with insurance choices. Madrian (1994) studies the lock-in
effect of employer provided health care. Dey and Flinn (2005) estimate a model of health
insurance with search, matching and bargaining and argue that employer provided health
care insurance leads to reasonably efficient outcomes.
Related to our study of wage non-discrimination laws is the literature that studies the
effect of the ADA legislation of 1990 on employment, wages and labor hours of the disabled
(see DeLeire (2001) and Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), for example). Most find that it has
decreased the employment of the disabled. DeLeire (2001) quantifies the effect of ADA on
wages of disabled workers and reports that the negative effect of poor health on the earnings
of the disabled fell by 11.3% due to ADA.
Finally, a recent literature examines the impact of health on savings and portfolio choice
in life cycle models that share elements with our framework. These include Yogo (2009),
Edwards (2008) and Hugonnier et al. (2012). The latter study jointly portfolio of health
and other asset choices. In their model health increases productivity (labor income) and
decreases occurrence of morbidity and mortality shock arrival rates (as they do in our
model). The paper argues that in order to explain the correlation between financial and
health status, these should be modelled jointly.
12A mostly empirical literature studies the impact of the 2006 health care reform in Massachusetts. See
e.g. Miller (2011).
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2.2 The Model
Time t = 0, 1, 2, . . . T is discrete and finite and the economy is populated by a cohort of a
continuum of individuals of mass 1. Since we are modeling a given cohort of individuals
we will use time and the age of households interchangeably. We think of T as the end of
working life of the age cohort under study.
2.2.1 Endowments and Preferences
Households are endowed with one unit of time which they supply inelastically to the market.
They are also endowed with an initial level of health h and we denote by H = {h1, . . . , hN}
the finite set of possible health levels. Households value current consumption c and dislike
the effort e that helps maintain their health. We will assume that their preferences are
additively separable over time, and that they discount the future at time discount factor
β. We will also assume that preferences are separable between consumption and effort, and
that households value consumption according to the common period utility function u(c)
and value effort according to the period disutility function q(e).
We will denote the probability distribution over the health status h at the beginning of
period t by Φt(h), and denote by Φ0(h) the initial distribution over this characteristic.
Assumption 1. The utility function u is twice differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly
concave. q is twice differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly convex, with q(0) = q′(0) = 0
and lime→∞ q′(e) =∞.
2.2.2 Technology
Health Technology
Let ε denote the current health shock.13 In every period households with current health
h remain healthy (that is, ε = 0) with probability g(h). With probability 1 − g(h) the
13In the quantitative analysis we will introduce a second, fully insured (by assumption) health shock to
provide a more accurate map between our model and the health expenditure data.
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household draws a health shock ε ∈ (0, ε¯] which is distributed according to the probability
density function f(ε).
Assumption 2. f is continuous and g is twice differentiable with g(h) ∈ [0, 1] , and g′(h) >
0, g′′(h) < 0 for all h ∈ H.
An individual’s health status evolves stochastically over time, according to the Markov
transition function Q(h′, h; e), where e ≥ 0 is the level of exercise by the individual. We
impose the following assumption on the Markov transition function Q
Assumption 3. If e′ > e then Q(h′, h; e) first order stochastically dominates Q(h′, h; e′).
Production Technology
A individual with health status h and current health shock ε that consumes health expen-
ditures x produces F (h, ε− x) units of output.
Assumption 4. F is continuously differentiable in both arguments, increasing in h, and
satisfies F (h, y) = F (h, 0) for all y ≤ 0, and F2(h, y) < 0 as well as F2(h, ε¯) < −1. Finally
F22(h, y) < 0 for all y > 0 and F12(h, y) ≥ 0.
The left panel of figure A.2 displays the production function F (h, .), for two different
levels of the current health shock. Holding health status h constant, output is decreasing in
the uncured portion of the health shock ε−x, and the decline is more rapid for lower levels
of health (h∗ < h). The right panel of figure 2.1 displays the production function as function
of health expenditures x, for a fixed level of the shock ε, and shows that expenditures x
exceeding the health shock ε leave output F (h, ε−x) unaffected (and thus are suboptimal).
Furthermore, a reduction of the shock ε to a lower level, ε∗, shifts the point at which health
expenditures x become ineffective to the left.
The assumptions on the production function F imply that health expenditures can offset
the impact of a health shock on productivity, but not raise an individual’s productivity above
what it would be if there had been no shock. In addition, the last assumption on F that
F12 ≥ 0 implies that the negative impact of a given net health shock y is lower the healthier
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a person is.14 The assumption F2(h, ε¯) < −1 insures that, if hit by the worst health shock
the cost of treating this health shock, at the margin, is smaller than the positive impact on
productivity (output) this treatment has.
2.2.3 Time Line of Events
In the current period the timing of events is as follows
1. Households enter the period with current health status h.
2. Households choose e.
3. Firms offer wage w(h) and health insurance contracts {x(ε, h), P (h)}15 to households
with health status h which these households accept.
4. The health shock ε is drawn according to the distributions g, f.
5. Resources on health x = x(ε, h) are spent.
6. Production and consumption takes place.
7. The new health status h′ of a household is drawn according to the health transition
function Q.
2.2.4 Market Structure without Government
There are a large number of production firms that in each period compete for workers.
Firms observe the health status of a worker h and then, prior to the realization of the
health shocks, compete for workers of type h by offering a wage w(h) that pools the risk
of the health shocks and bundle the wage with an associated health insurance contract
(specifying health expenditures x(ε, h) and an insurance premium P (h)) that breaks even.
Perfect competition for workers of type h requires that the combined wage and health
14This is also the approach taken by Hugonnier et al. (2012) and Ehrlich and Chuma (1990).
15Since we restrict attention to static contracts, whether firm offers contracts before or after the effort is
undertaken does not matter.
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insurance contract maximize period utility of the household, subject to the firm breaking
even.16
In the absence of government intervention a firm specializing on workers of health type
h therefore offers a wage wCE(h) (where CE stands for competitive equilibrium) and health
insurance contract (xCE(ε, h), PCE(h)) that solves
UCE(h) = max
w(h),x(ε,h),P (h)
u (w(h)− P (h)) (2.1)
s.t.
P (h) = g(h)x(0, h) + (1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
0
f(ε)x(ε, h)dε (2.2)
w(h) = g(h)F (h,−x(0, h)) + (1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
0
f(ε)F (h, ε− x(ε, h))dε (2.3)
Note that by bundling wages and health insurance the firm provides efficient insurance
against health shocks ε, and the only source of risk remaining in the competitive equilib-
rium is health status risk associated with h. This risk stems both from the dependence of
wages w(h) as well as health insurance premia P (h) on h in the competitive equilibrium,
and these are exactly the sources of consumption risk that government policies preventing
wage discrimination and prohibiting prior health conditions to affect insurance premia are
designed to tackle.
2.2.5 Government Policies
We now describe in turn how we operationalize, within the context of our model, a policy
that outlaws health insurance premia to be conditioned on prior health conditions h, and a
policy that limits the extent to which firms can pay workers of varying health h differential
wages.
16Note that instead of assuming that firms completely specialize by hiring only a specific health type of
workers h we could alternatively consider a market structure in which all firms are representative in terms of
hiring workers of health types according to the population distribution and pay workers of different health h
differential wages according to the schedule wCE(h). In other words health variation in wages and variation
in hired health types h are perfect substitutes at the level of the individual firm in terms of supporting the
competitive equilibrium allocation.
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No Prior Conditions Law
Under this law health insurance companies are assumed to be constrained in terms of
their pricing, their insurance schedule offers and their applicant acceptance criteria. The
purpose of these constraints is to prevent the companies from differentially pricing insurance
based upon health status.17 To be completely successful, these constraints must lead to a
pooling equilibrium in which all individuals are insured at the same price. The best such
regulation in addition assures that the equilibrium health insurance schedule x(ε, h), given
the constraints, is efficient. We now describe the regulations sufficient to achieve this goal.
The first constraint on health insurers is that a company must specify the total number
of contracts that it wishes to issue, it must charge a fixed price independent of health status,
and accept applications in their order of application up to the sales limit of the company. In
this way, the insurance company cannot examine applications first and then decide whether
or not to offer the applicant a health insurance contract.
The second constraint regulates the health expenditure schedule. If the no-prior con-
ditions law is to have any bite the government needs to prevent the emergence of a sep-
arating equilibrium in which the health insurance companies (or the production firms in
case they offer health insurance contracts) use the health expenditure schedule x(ε, h) to
effectively select the desired health types, given that they are barred from conditioning the
health insurance premium P on h directly. Therefore, to achieve any sort of pooling in the
health insurance market requires the government to regulate the health expenditure sched-
ule x(ε, h). To give the legislation the best chance of being successful we will assume that
the government regulates the health expenditure schedule x(ε, h) efficiently. For the same
reason, since risk pooling is limited if some household types h choose not to buy insurance,
we assume that all individuals are forced to buy insurance.
Given this structure of regulation and a cross-sectional distribution of workers by health
type, Φ, the health insurance premium P charged by competitive firms (or competitive
17Consistent with this restricted purpose, we will assume that the government cannot use health insurance
to offset underlying differences in productivity coming from, say, education. This will prove important in
the quantitative section.
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insurance companies, who offer health insurance in the model), given the set of regulations
spelled out above, is determined by
P =
∑
h
[
g(h)x(0, h) + (1− g(h))
∫
f(ε)x(ε, h)dε
]
Φ(h) (2.4)
where x(ε, h) is the expenditure schedule regulated by the government. This schedule is
chosen to maximize ∑
h
u(w(h)− P )Φ(h)
with wages w(h) determined by (2.3).
No Wage Discrimination Law
The objective of the government is to prevent workers with a lower health status h, and
hence lower productivity, being paid less. As with the no prior conditions law, the purpose
of this legislation is to help insure workers against their health status risk. However, if a
production firm is penalized for paying workers with low health status h low wages, but not
for preferentially hiring workers with a favorable health status (high h), then a firm can
effectively circumvent the wage nondiscrimination law. Therefore, to be effective such a law
must penalize both wage discrimination and hiring discrimination by health status.
Limiting wage dispersion with respect to gross wages w(h) via legislation necessitates
regulation of the health insurance market as well, in order to prevent the insurance gains
from decreasing wage dispersion being undone through the adjustment of employer-provided
health insurance. For example, the firm could also offer health insurance and overcharge
low productivity workers and undercharge high productivity workers for this insurance,
effectively undermining the illegal wage discrimination. This suggests that the government
will need to limit the extent to which the cost of a worker’s health insurance contracts
deviates from its actuarially fair value. However, this will not be sufficient to make this
policy effective.
Since the productivity of a worker depends upon the extent of his health insurance,
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workers whose expected productivity is below their wage will face pressure to increase
their productivity through increased spending on health (and hence better health insurance
coverage) while those whose productivity is above their wage will have an incentive to lower
their health insurance purchases. To prevent these distortions in the health insurance market
and thereby achieve better consumption insurance across h types, policy makers will need
to regulate the health insurance directly as well. The moderate version of health insurance
regulation would be to ensure that each policy was individually optimal and actuarially
fair. The most extreme version of regulation would be to combine no-wage discrimination
legislation with no-prior conditions legislation and thereby achieve the static first-best, full
insurance outcome. In this case health insurance would be socially efficient and actuarially
fair on average (that is, across the insured population).
We will analyze both cases. It will turn out that limiting wage dispersion with respect
to net wages, w(h) − P (h), avoids the negative incentive effects on the health insurance
market. The policy of combining both no-wage discrimination and no-prior conditions can
therefore be implemented through a policy of limiting net wage dispersion. The impact of
the nondiscrimination law will, unfortunately, be sensitive to the way in which the law is
implemented, and in particular, to the form of punishment used. If the limitation in wage
variation is achieved through a policy that penalizes the firms for discriminating, then these
costs are realized in equilibrium, reducing overall efficiency in the economy. If, however,
the limitation on wage variation is achieved either through the threat of punishment (e.g.
through grim trigger strategies in repeated interactions between firms and the government)
or through the delegation of hiring in a union hiring hall type arrangement, then costs from
the wage nondiscrimination law will not be realized in equilibrium.18
Since we wish to give the no wage discrimination law the best shot of being successful,
in the main text we focus on the version of the policy in which no costs from the policy
are realized in equilibrium, leaving the analysis of the alternative case to appendix B.2.2
18The delegation method is similar to the structure we assumed in the insurance market since insurance
companies were restricted to serving their customers on a first-come-first-serve basis. This assumption to
us seems more problematic in the labor market because of the idiosyncratic nature of the benefits to the
worker-firm match.
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and B.2.3. In either case we only tackle the extreme versions of these policies in which
there is no wage discrimination (rather than limited wage discrimination) in equilibrium for
reasons of analytic tractability. Under the policy, the firm takes as given thresholds on the
size of the gap in wages or employment shares that will trigger the punishment. Assume
that the wage penalty will be imposed if the maximum wage gap within the firm exceeds
the threshold εw. Since type h = 0 will receive the lowest wage in equilibrium, to avoid the
penalty a firm has to offer a wage schedule that satisfies:
max
h
|w(h)− w(0)| ≤ εw.
Letting n(h) denote the number of workers of type h hired by the firm, assume that the hiring
penalty will be imposed if the employment share of type h deviates from the population
average by more than δ, and hence
∣∣∣∣ n(h)∑
h n(h)
− Φ(h)∑
h Φ(h)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ.
We will assume that the punishment is sufficiently dire that the firm will never choose to
violate these thresholds.
We analyze the more general case in appendix B.2.1, but here focus on the limiting case
in which the thresholds εw and δ converge to zero. In this case, the firm will simply take as
given the economy-wide wage w∗ at which it can hire a representative worker. We assume
that the government regulates the insurance market determining the extent of coverage by
health type, x(e, h), subject to the requirement that the offered health insurance contracts
exactly break even, either health type by health type (in the absence of a no prior conditions
law) or in expectation across health types (in the presence of the no prior conditions law).
Perfect competition drives down equilibrium profits of firms to zero which determines
the equilibrium wage rate as
w∗ =
∑
h
{
g(h)F (h,−x(0, h)) + (1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
0
f(ε) [F (h, ε− x(ε, h))] dε
}
Φ(h) (2.5)
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The insurance premium charged to the household is
P (h) = g(h)x(0, h) + (1− g(h))
∫
f(ε)x(ε, h)dε (2.6)
in the absence of a no-prior conditions law and
P =
∑
h
[
g(h)x(0, h) + (1− g(h))
∫
f(ε)x(ε, h)dε
]
Φ(h) (2.7)
in its presence. Household consumption is given by
c(h) = w∗ − P (h) or
c = w∗ − P
depending on whether a no prior conditions law is in place or not.
Given a cross-sectional health distribution Φ the efficiently regulated health insurance
contract x(ε, h) is the solution to
max
x
∑
h
u(w∗ − P (h))Φ(h)
subject to (2.5) and (2.6) if the no-prior conditions restriction is not imposed on health
insurance, and subject to (2.7) instead of (2.6) if the no-prior conditions restriction is
present.
We now turn to the analysis of the model, starting with a static version in which by
construction the choice of effort is not distorted in equilibrium. We will show that in this
case the competitive equilibrium implements an efficient allocation of health expenditures,
but fails to provide efficient consumption insurance against prior health conditions, that is
against cross-sectional variation in h. We then argue that a combination of a strict wage
non-discrimination law and a no prior conditions law in addition results in efficient con-
sumption insurance in the competitive equilibrium, restoring full efficiency of allocations in
the regulated market economy.
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2.3 Analysis of the Static Model
We now turn to the analysis of the static version of our model, and we will characterize both
efficient and equilibrium allocations (in the absence and presence of the nondiscrimination
policies). The purpose of this analysis is two-fold. First, it will result in the characterization
of the optimal and equilibrium health insurance contract, a key ingredient for our dynamic
model. Second, the analysis will demonstrate that in the short run (that is statically) the
combination of both policies is ideally suited to provide full consumption insurance in the
regulated market equilibrium, and thus restores full efficiency of the market outcome. The
static benefits of these policies are then traded off against the adverse dynamic consequences
on the health distribution, as our analysis of the dynamic model will uncover in the next
section.
2.3.1 Social Planner Problem
Given an initial cross-sectional distribution over health status in the population Φ(h) the
social planner maximizes utilitarian social welfare. The social planner problem is therefore
given by
USP (Φ) = max
e(h),x(ε,h),c(ε,h)≥0
∑
h
 −q(e(h)) + g(h)u(c(0, h))+(1− g(h)) ∫ f(ε)u(c(ε, h))dε
Φ(h)
subject to
∑
h
 g(h)c(0, h) + (1− g(h))
∫
f(ε)c(ε, h)dε+ g(h)x(0, h)
+(1− g(h)) ∫ f(ε)x(ε, h)dε
Φ(h)
≤
∑
h
{
g(h)F (h,−x(0, h)) + (1− g(h))
∫
f(ε)F (h, ε− x(ε, h))dε
}
Φ(h)
We summarize the optimal solution to the static social planner problem in the following
proposition, whose proof follows directly from the first order conditions and assumption 4
(see Appendix B.1).
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Proposition 1. The solution to the social planner problem
{cSP (ε, h), xSP (ε, h), eSP (h)}h∈H is given by
eSP (h) = 0
cSP (ε, h) = cSP
xSP (ε, h) = max
[
0, ε− ε¯SP (h)]
where the cutoffs satisfy
− F2(h, ε¯SP (h)) = 1, (2.8)
and the first best consumption level is given by
cSP =
∑
h
 g(h)F (h, 0)
+(1− g(h)) ∫ ε¯0 f(ε) [F (h, ε− xSP (ε, h))− xSP (ε, h)] dε
Φ(h) (2.9)
The optimal cutoff {ε¯SP (h)} is increasing in h, strictly so if F12(h, y) > 0.
The social planner finds it optimal to not have the household exercise (given that there
are no dynamic benefits from doing so in the static model) and to provide full consumption
insurance against adverse health shocks ε, but also against bad prior health conditions as
consumption is constant in h.
The optimal level of health expenditure and its implications on production is graphically
presented in Figure 2.4. As shown in the previous proposition, optimal medical expenditures
take a simple cutoff rule: small health shocks ε < ε¯SP (h) are not treated at all, but all larger
shocks are fully treated up to the threshold ε¯SP (h). These optimal medical expenditures
are displayed in Figure 2.4(b) for two different initial levels of health h1 < h2: below the
h-specific threshold ε¯SP (h) health expenditures are zero, and then rise one for one with the
health shock ε. The determination of the threshold itself is displayed in Figure 2.4(a). It
shows that under the assumption that the impact of health shocks on productivity is less
severe for healthy households (F12(h, y) > 0, reflected as a “more concave” curve for h1
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than for h2 in Figure 2.4(a)), then the social planner finds it optimal to “insure” healthier
households less, in the sense of undoing less of the negative health shocks ε through medical
treatment x(ε, h). This is reflected in a lower threshold (more insurance) for h1 than for h2,
that is ε¯SP (h2) < ε¯
SP (h1). The optimal health expenditure policy function leads to a net
of-health-treatment production function F (h, ε− xSP (ε, h)) as shown in Figure 2.4(c).
2.3.2 Competitive Equilibrium
As in the social planner problem there is no incentive for households to exercise in the static
model, and thus e(h) = 0. As described in section 2.2.4 the equilibrium wage and health
insurance contract solves
UCE(h) = max
w(h),x(ε,h),P (h)
u (w(h)− P (h)) (2.10)
s.t.
P (h) = g(h)x(0, h) + (1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
0
f(ε)x(ε, h)dε (2.11)
w(h) = g(h)F (h,−x(0, h)) + (1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
0
f(ε)F (h, ε− x(ε, h))dε (2.12)
The following proposition characterizes the solution to this problem:
Proposition 2. The unique equilibrium health insurance contract and associated consump-
tion are given by
xCE(ε, h) = max
[
0, ε− ε¯CE(h)] (2.13)
cCE(ε, h) = cCE(h) = wCE(h)− PCE(h) (2.14)
PCE(h) = (1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
ε¯CE(h)
f(ε)
[
ε− ε¯CE(h)] dε (2.15)
wCE(h) = g(h)F (h, 0) + (1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
0
f(ε)F (h, ε− x(ε, h))dε (2.16)
and the cutoff satisfies
− F2(h, ε¯CE(h)) = 1 (2.17)
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Proof: See Appendix
We immediately obtain the following
Corollary 3. The competitive equilibrium implements the socially efficient health expen-
diture allocation since ε¯CE(h) = ε¯SP (h) for all h ∈ H.
Corollary 4. The cutoff ε¯CE(h) is increasing in h, strictly so if F12(h, y) > 0.
While it follows trivially from our assumptions that the worker’s net pay, w(h)− P (h),
is increasing in h, it is not necessarily true that his gross wage, w(h), is increasing in h
as well since optimal health expenditures are decreasing in health status. We analyze the
behavior of gross wages w(h) with respect to health status further in Appendix B.3, where
we provide a sufficient condition for the gross wage schedule to be monotonically increasing
in h.
In any case, the previous results show that in the static case the only source of inefficiency
of the competitive equilibrium comes from the inefficient lack of consumption insurance
against adverse prior health conditions h. This can be seen by noting that
cSP =
∑
h
 g(h)F (h, 0)+(1− g(h)) ∫ ε¯0 f(ε) [F (h, ε− xSP (ε, h))− xSP (ε, h)] dε
Φ(h)
=
∑
h
[
wCE(h)− PCE(h)]Φ(h) = ∑
h
cCE(h)Φ(h)
In contrast to what will be the case in the dynamic model, effort trivially is not distorted
in the equilibrium, relative to the allocation the social planner implements (since in both
cases eSP = eCE = 0). Furthermore the equilibrium allocation of health expenditures is
efficient, due to the fact that the firm bundles the determination of wages and the provision
of health insurance, and thus internalizes the positive effects of health spending x(ε, h) on
worker productivity.
Given these results it is plausible to expect, within the context of the static model, that
policies preventing competitive equilibrium wages wCE(h) to depend on health status (a
wage non-discrimination law) and insurance premia PCE(h) to depend on health status
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(a no prior conditions law) will restore full efficiency of the policy-regulated competitive
equilibrium by providing full consumption insurance. We will show next that this is indeed
the case, providing a normative justification for the two policy interventions within the
static version of our model.
2.3.3 Competitive Equilibrium with a No Prior Condition Law
As discussed above, in order to effectively implement a no prior conditions law the govern-
ment has to regulate the health insurance provision done by firms or insurance companies.
Given a population health distribution Φ the regulatory authority solves the problem:
UNP (Φ) = max
x(ε,h)
∑
h
u(w(h)− P )Φ(h) (2.18)
s.t.
P =
∑
h
[
g(h)x(0, h) + (1− g(h))
∫
f(ε)x(ε, h)dε
]
Φ(h) (2.19)
w(h) = g(h)F (h,−x(0, h)) + (1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
0
f(ε)F (h, ε− x(ε, h))dε (2.20)
The next proposition characterizes the resulting regulated equilibrium allocation
Proposition 5. The equilibrium health expenditures under a no-prior condition law satis-
fies, for each h˜ ∈ H
xNP (ε, h˜) = max[0, ε− ε¯NP (h˜)]
with cutoffs uniquely determined by
−F2(h˜, ε¯NP (h˜)) =
∑
h u
′(wNP (h)− PNP )Φ(h)
u′(w(h˜)− PNP ) .
The equilibrium wage, for each h˜, is given by
wNP (h˜) = g(h˜)F (h˜, 0) + (1− g(h˜))
∫ ε¯
0
f(ε)[F (h˜, ε− xNP (ε, h˜))]dε
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and the health insurance premium is determined as
PNP =
∑
h
[
g(h)xNP (0, h) + (1− g(h))
∫
f(ε)xNP (ε, h)dε
]
Φ(h).
Moreover, the optimal cutoffs are increasing in health status.
Proof: See Appendix.
Note that the health expenditure levels are no longer efficient as the government provides
partial consumption insurance against initial health status when choosing the cutoff levels
ε¯NP (h), in the absence of direct insurance against low wages induced by bad health. In fact,
as shown in the next proposition, it is efficient to over-insure households with bad health
status and under-insure those with good health status, relative to the first-best.
Proposition 6. Let h˜ be the health status whose marginal utility of consumption is equal
to the population average, i.e. for h˜,
− F2(h˜, ε¯(h˜)) =
∑
h u
′(w(h)− P )Φ(h)
u′(w(h˜)− P ) = 1 (2.21)
holds.19 Then,
ε¯NP (h) < ε¯SP (h), for h < h˜
ε¯NP (h) = ε¯SP (h), for h = h˜
ε¯NP (h) > ε¯SP (h), for h > h˜,
The cutoffs ε¯(h) are strictly monotonically increasing in health status h.
Proof: See Appendix.
This feature of the optimal health expenditure with a no prior conditions law also
indicates that mandatory participation in the health insurance contract is an important
part of government regulation, since in the allocation described above healthy households
19For the purpose of the proposition it does not matter whether h˜ ∈ H or not.
79
cross-subsidize the unhealthy in terms of insurance premia and they are given a less generous
health expenditure plan (higher thresholds) than the unhealthy.
2.3.4 Competitive Equilibrium with a No Wage Discrimination Law
The equilibrium with a no wage discrimination law is determined by the solution to the
program:
UND(Φ) = max
x(ε,h)
∑
h
u(w − P (h))Φ(h) (2.22)
s.t.
P (h) =
[
g(h)x(0, h) + (1− g(h))
∫
f(ε)x(ε, h)dε
]
w =
∑
h
{
g(h)F (h,−x(0, h)) + (1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
0
f(ε)F (h, ε− x(ε, h))dε
}
Φ(h)
Proposition 7. The equilibrium health expenditures under a no-wage discrimination law
alone satisfies, for each h˜ ∈ H
xND(ε, h˜) = max
[
0, ε− ε¯ND(h˜)
]
with cutoffs determined by
−F2(h˜, ε¯ND(h˜)) = u
′(wND − P (h˜))∑
h u
′(wND − P (h))Φ(h) .
The equilibrium wage is given by
wND =
∑
h
[
g(h) [F (h, 0)] + (1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
0
f(ε)
[
F (h, ε− xND(ε, h))] dε]Φ(h)
and the health insurance premium is given by, for each h˜,
PND(h˜) =
[
g(h˜)xND(0, h˜) + (1− g(h˜))
∫
f(ε)xND(ε, h˜)dε
]
.
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Proof: Follows directly from the first order conditions of the program (2.22).
Unlike in the no prior conditions case, we cannot establish monotonicity in the cutoffs
ε¯ND(h˜). Note that under a no prior conditions law the regulatory authority partially insures
consumption of the unhealthy by allocating higher medical expenditure to them. Under a
no wage discrimination law instead, there are two opposing forces, preventing us from
establishing monotonicity in cutoffs ε¯ND(h) across health groups h. On one hand, a one
unit increase in medical expenditure P (h) is more costly to the unhealthy since marginal
utility of consumption is higher for this group. On the other hand, production efficiency
calls for higher medical expenditure for the unhealthy, given our assumption of F12 ≥ 0
(as was the case for the no prior conditions law). Thus the cutoffs ε¯ND(h) need not be
monotone in h.
2.3.5 Competitive Equilibrium with Both Policies
Finally, combining both a no-wage discrimination law and a no-prior conditions legislation
restores efficiency of the regulated equilibrium since both policies in conjunction provide full
consumption insurance against bad health realizations h. This is the content of the next.
Corollary 8. The unique competitive equilibrium allocation in the presence of both a no
wage discrimination and a no prior conditions law implements the socially efficient allocation
in the static model.
Proof: The equilibrium is the solution to
max
x(ε,h)
∑
h
u(w∗ − P )Φ(h)
s.t.
P =
∑
h
[
g(h)x(0, h) + (1− g(h))
∫
f(ε)x(ε, h)dε
]
Φ(h)
w∗ =
∑
h
{
g(h)F (h,−x(0, h)) + (1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
0
f(ε)F (h, ε− x(ε, h))dε
}
Φ(h).
The result then follows trivially from the fact that this maximization problem is equivalent
81
to the social planner problem analyzed above. The no prior conditions law equalizes health
insurance premia P across health types, the no wage discrimination law implements a
common wage w∗ across health types, and the (assumed) efficient regulation of the health
insurance market assures that the health expenditure schedule is efficient as well.
2.3.6 Summary of the Analysis of the Static Model
The competitive equilibrium implements the efficient health expenditure allocation but does
not insure households against initial health conditions. Both a no-prior conditions law and
a no-wage discrimination law provide partial, but not complete, consumption insurance
against this risk, without distorting the effort level. The health expenditure schedule is
distorted when each policy is implemented in isolation, relative to the social optimum, as the
government provides additional partial consumption insurance through health expenditures.
Only both laws in conjunction implement a fully efficient health expenditure schedule and
full consumption insurance against initial health conditions h, and therefore restore the first
best allocation in the static model. Enacting both policies jointly is thus fully successful in
what they are designed to achieve in a static world (partially due to the fact that additional
government regulation severely restricted the options of firms to circumvent the government
policies).
2.4 Analysis of the Dynamic Model
We now study a dynamic version of our economy. Both in terms of casting the problem,
as well as in terms of its computation we make use of the fact that there is no aggregate
risk (due to the continuum of agents cum law of large numbers assumption). Therefore
the sequence of cross-sectional health distributions {Φt}Tt=0 is a deterministic sequence.
Furthermore, conditional on a distribution Φt today the health distribution tomorrow is
completely determined by the effort choice et(h) of households
20 (or the social planner), so
20We assert here that the optimal effort in period t is only a function of the current individual health
status h. We will discuss below the assumptions required to make this assertion correct.
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that we can write
Φt+1 = H(Φt; et(.)) (2.23)
where the time-invariant function H is in turn completely determined by the Markov tran-
sition function Q(h′;h, e). The initial distribution Φ0 is an initial condition and exogenously
given.
Under each policy, given a sequence of aggregate distributions {Φt}Tt=0 we can solve an
appropriate dynamic maximization problem of an individual household for the sequence
of optimal effort decisions {et(h)h∈H}Tt=0 which in turn imply a new sequence of aggregate
distributions via (2.23). Our computational algorithm for solving competitive equilibria then
amounts to iterating on the sequences {Φt, et}. Within each period the timing of events
follows exactly that of the static problem in the previous section.
2.4.1 Social Planner Problem
The dynamic problem of the social planner is to solve
V (Φ0) = max{et(h)}
T∑
t=0
βt
{
USP (Φt)−
∑
h
q(et(h))Φt(h)
}
where {Φt+1} is determined by equation (2.23) and
USP (Φ) = max
x(ε,h),c(ε,h)
∑
h
{
g(h)u(c(0, h)) + (1− g(h))
∫
f(ε)u(c(ε, h))dε
}
Φ(h)
= u(cSP (Φ))
is the solution to the static social planner problem characterized in section 2.3.1:
xSP (ε, h) = max
[
0, ε− ε¯SP (h)]
with cutoffs defined by
− F2(h, ε¯SP (h)) = 1 (2.24)
83
and consumption of each household given by
cSP (Φ) =
∑
h
 g(h)F (h, 0)
+(1− g(h)) ∫ε f(ε) [F (h, ε− xSP (ε, h))− xSP (ε, h)] dε
Φ(h).
We now want to characterize the optimal effort choice by the social planner, the key
dynamic decision in our model both in the planner problem and the competitive equilibrium.
In contrast to households in the competitive equilibrium, the social planner fully takes into
account the effect of effort choices today on the aggregate health distribution and thus
aggregate consumption tomorrow.
A semi-recursive formulation of the problem is useful to characterize the optimal effort
choice, but also to explain the computational algorithm for the social planner problem. For
a given cross-sectional distribution Φt at the beginning of period t the social planner solves:
Vt(Φt) = u(ct) + max
et(h)h∈H,
{
−
∑
h
q(et(h))Φt(h) + βVt+1(Φt+1)
}
s.t. ct = c
SP (Φt)
Φt+1(h
′) =
∑
h
Q(h′;h, et(h))Φ(h) (2.25)
In appendix B.4 we discuss how we solve this problem numerically, iterating on sequences
{ct, et(h),Φt(h)}Tt=0 from the terminal condition VT (ΦT ) = u(cT ). To characterize the opti-
mal effort choice, for an arbitrary time period t we obtain the first order condition:
q′(et(h))Φt(h) = β
∑
h′
∂Vt+1(Φt+1)
∂Φt+1(h′)
· ∂Φt+1(h
′)
∂et(h)
= β
∑
h′
∂Vt+1(Φt+1)
∂Φt+1(h′)
· ∂Q(h
′;h, et(h))
∂et(h)
Φt(h),
This simplifies to
q′(et(h)) = β
∑
h′
∂Vt+1(Φt+1)
∂Φt+1(h′)
· ∂Q(h
′;h, et(h))
∂et(h)
. (2.26)
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Thus the marginal cost of extra effort q′(et(h)) is equated to the marginal benefit, the
latter being given by the the benefit that effort has on the health distribution tomorrow,
∂Q(h′;h,et(h))
∂et(h)
, times the benefit of a better health distribution ∂Vt+1(Φt+1)∂Φt+1(h′) from tomorrow
on. By assumption 1, q′(0) = 0, and assumption 3 guarantees that the right hand side of
equation (2.26) is strictly positive. Therefore the social planner finds it optimal to make
every household exert positive effort to lead a healthy life: et(h) > 0 for all t and all h ∈ H.
From the envelope theorem the benefit of a better health distribution is given by:
∂Vt(Φt)
∂Φt(h)
= u′(ct) ·Ψ(h)− q(et(h)) + β
∑
h′
∂Vt+1(Φt+1)
∂Φt+1(h′)
·Q(h′;h, et(h)). (2.27)
Here Ψ(h) denotes the expected output, net of health expenditures, that an individual of
health status h delivers to the social planner.21
2.4.2 Competitive Equilibrium without Policy
In our model, since absent wage and health insurance policies households do not interact in
any way, we can solve the dynamic programming problem of each household independently
of the rest of society. The only state variables of the household are her current health h
and age t, and the dynamic program reads as:
vt(h) = U
CE(h) + max
et(h)
{
−q(et(h)) + β
∑
h′
Q(h′;h, et(h))vt+1(h′)
}
(2.28)
21Note that
Ψ(h) =
[
g(h)F (h, 0) + (1− g(h))
∫
ε
f(ε)
[
F (h, ε− xSP (ε, h))− xSP (ε, h)
]
dε
]
is exclusively determined by the optimal cut-off rule ε¯SP (h) for health expenditures, which is independent
of ct or Φt.
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where
UCE(h) = max
x(ε,h),w(h),P (h)
u(w(h)− P (h))
s.t.
w(h) = g(h)F (h,−x(0, h)) + (1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
0
f(ε)F (h, ε− x(ε, h))dε
P (h) = g(h)x(0, h) + (1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
0
f(ε)x(ε, h)dε
is the solution to the static equilibrium problem in section 2.3.2, which was given by:
xCE(ε, h) = max
[
0, ε− ε¯CE(h)]
cCE(h) = wCE(h)− PCE(h)
PCE(h) = (1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
ε¯CE(h)
f(ε)
[
ε− ε¯CE(h)] dε
wCE(h) = g(h)F (h, 0) + (1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
0
f(ε)F (h, ε− x(ε, h))dε
with cutoff:
−F2(h, ε¯CE(h)) = 1
Note again that the provision of health insurance is socially efficient in the competitive
equilibrium.
In contrast to the social planner problem, and in contrast to what will be the case in a
competitive equilibrium with a no-wage discrimination law or a no-prior conditions law, in
the unregulated competitive equilibrium there is no interaction between the maximization
problems of individual households. Thus the dynamic household maximization problem
can be solved independent of the evolution of the cross-sectional health distribution. It is a
simple dynamic programming problem with terminal value function
vT (h) = U
CE(h)
and can be solved by straightforward backward iteration.
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Given the solution {et(h)} of the household dynamic programming problem and given
an initial distribution Φ0 the dynamics of the health distribution is then determined by the
aggregate law of motion (2.23). The optimal choice et(h) solves the first order condition
q′(et(h)) = β
∑
h′
∂Q(h′;h, et(h))
∂et(h)
vt+1(h
′) (2.29)
Note that at time t when the decision et(h) is taken the function vt+1(.) is known. Further-
more, given knowledge of vt+1 and the optimal et the period t value function vt is determined
by (2.28). As in the social planner problem, by assumptions 1 and 3 effort et(h) is positive
for all t and h.
2.4.3 Competitive Equilibrium with a No Prior Condition Law
As discussed above, we assume that the government in every period t takes as given the
health distribution Φt and enforces the no prior condition law and regulates health insurance
contracts efficiently, as in the static analysis of section 2.3.3. We now make explicit that
the solution of the static government regulation problem (2.18)-(2.20) is a function of the
cross-sectional health distribution,
xNP (ε, h˜; Φt) = max[0, ε− ε¯NP (h˜; Φt)] (2.30)
with cutoffs for each h˜ ∈ H determined by
− F2(h˜, ε¯NP (h˜; Φt))u′(wNP (h˜; Φt)− PNP (Φt)) =
∑
h
u′(wNP (h; Φt)− PNP (Φt))Φt(h)
:= Eu′(Φt) (2.31)
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and
wNP (h; Φt) = g(h)F (h, 0) + (1− g(h))
∫
f(ε)[F (h, ε− xNP (ε, h; Φt))]dε (2.32)
PNP (Φt) =
∑
h
 g(h)xNP (0, h; Φt)
+(1− g(h)) ∫ f(ε)xNP (ε, h; Φ)dε
Φt(h) (2.33)
In order for the household to solve her dynamic programming problem she only needs to
know the sequence of wages and health insurance premia {wt(h), Pt}, but not necessarily the
sequence of distributions that led to it. Given such a sequence the dynamic programming
problem of the household then reads as
vt(h) = u(wt(h)− Pt) + max
et(h)
{
−q(et(h)) + β
∑
h′
Q(h′;h, et(h))vt+1(h′)
}
(2.34)
with terminal condition vT (h) = u(wT (h) − PT ). As before the optimality condition reads
as
q′(et(h)) = β
∑
h′
∂Q(h′;h, et(h))
∂et(h)
vt+1(h
′). (2.35)
and thus equates the marginal cost of providing effort, q′(e) with the marginal benefit of an
improved health distribution tomorrow. Although equation (2.35) looks identical to equa-
tion (2.29) from the unregulated equilibrium, the determination of the value functions that
appear on the right hand side of both equations is not (compare the first terms on the right
hand sides of equations (2.28) and (2.34)). The difference in these equations highlights the
extra consumption insurance induced by the no-prior conditions law, in that with this pol-
icy the health insurance premium does not vary with h. This extra consumption insurance,
ceteris paribus, reduces the variation of vt+1 in h
′ and thus limits the incentives to exert ef-
fort in order to achieve a (stochastically) higher health level tomorrow. In appendix B.5 we
describe a computational algorithm to solve the dynamic model with a no-prior conditions
law.
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2.4.4 Competitive Equilibrium with a No Wage Discrimination Law
The main difference to the previous section is that now the static health insurance contract
and premium are given by health spending
xND(ε, h˜; Φt) = max[0, ε− ε¯ND(h˜; Φt)] (2.36)
with cutoffs for each h˜ ∈ H determined by
− F2(h, ε¯ND(h))Eu′t = u′(wND(Φt)− PND(h,Φt)) (2.37)
where
Eu′t :=
∑
h
u′(wND(Φt)− PND(h,Φt))Φt(h). (2.38)
The equilibrium wage is given by
wND(Φt) =
∑
h
{
g(h)F (h, 0) + (1− g(h))
∫
f(ε)[F (h, ε− xND(ε, h; Φt))]dε
}
Φt(h).
(2.39)
The equilibrium health insurance premium depends on whether a no prior conditions law
is in place or not: Without such policy the premia are given as
PND(h; Φt) = P
ND(h) = (1− g(h))
∫
f(ε)xND(ε, h)dε (2.40)
whereas with both policies in place the premium is determined by22
PBoth(Φt) =
∑
h
[
(1− g(h))
∫
f(ε)xBoth(ε, h)dε
]
Φt(h) (2.41)
For a given sequence of wages {wt, Pt(h)} the dynamic problem of the household reads
22Wages still take the form as in (2.39), but with xBoth(ε, h) replacing xND(ε, h). Recall from the static
analysis that xBoth(ε, h) = xSP (ε, h), that is, the medical expenditure schedule is socially efficient.
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as before:
vt(h) = u(wt − Pt(h)) + max
et(h)
{
−q(et(h)) + β
∑
h′
Q(h′;h, et(h))vt+1(h′)
}
(2.42)
and the terminal condition vT (h) = u(wT − PT (h)), first order conditions and updating of
the value function for this version of the model are exactly the same, mutatis mutandis, as
under the previous policy. In appendix B.5 we discuss the algorithm to solve this version
of the model.
2.4.5 Competitive Equilibrium with Both Laws
If both policies are in place simultaneously, we can give a full analytical characterization
of the equilibrium without resorting to any numerical solution procedure. We do so in the
next
Proposition 9. Suppose there is a no wage discrimination and a no prior condition law in
place simultaneously. Then
et(h) = 0 for all h, and all t.
The provision of health insurance is socially efficient. From the initial distribution Φ0 the
health distribution in society evolves according to (2.23) with et(h) ≡ 0.
The proof is by straightforward backward induction and is given in Appendix B.1. In the
presence of both policies there are no incentives, either through wages or health insurance
premia, to exert effort to lead a healthy life. Since effort is costly, households won’t provide
any such effort in the regulated dynamic competitive equilibrium. Thus in the absence
of any direct utility benefits of better health the combination of both policies leads to a
complete collapse in incentives, with the associated adverse long run consequences for the
distribution of health in society.
Equipped with these theoretical results and the numerical algorithms to solve the various
versions of our model we now map our model to cross-sectional health and exercise data
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from the PSID to quantify the effects of government regulations on the evolution of the
cross-sectional health distribution, as well as aggregate production, consumption and health
expenditures.
2.5 Bringing the Model to the Data
2.5.1 Augmenting the Model
The model described so far only included the necessary elements to highlight the key static
insurance-dynamic incentive trade-off we want to emphasize. However, to insure that the
model can capture the significant heterogeneity in health, exercise and health expenditure
data observed in micro data we now augment it in four aspects. We want to stress, however,
that none of the qualitative results derived so far rely on the absence of these elements, which
is why we abstracted from them in our theoretical analysis.
First, in the data some households have health expenditures in a given year from catas-
trophic illnesses that exceed their labor earnings. In the model, the only benefit of spending
resources on health is to offset the negative productivity consequences of the adverse health
shocks ε. Thus it is never optimal to incur health expenditures that exceed the value of a
worker’s production in a given period. In order to capture these large medical expenditures
in data and arrive at realistic magnitudes of health insurance premia we introduce a sec-
ond health shock. This exogenous shock z stands in for a catastrophic health expenditure
shock, and when households receive the z-shock, they have to spend z; otherwise, they
die (or equivalently, incur a prohibitively large utility cost). Households in the augmented
model are assumed to either not receive any health shock, face either a z-shock, or an
ε-shock, but not both. We denote by µz(h) the mean of the health expenditure shock z,
conditional on initial health h, and by κ(h) the probability of receiving a positive z-shock.
Households that received a z-shock can still work, but at a reduced productivity ρ < 1
relative to healthy workers. As described in more detail in appendix B.6.1, the z-shock
merely scales up health insurance premia by µz(h) and introduces additional health-related
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wage risk (since z-shocks come with a loss of 1− ρ of labor productivity).
Second, in our model so far all variation in wages was due to either health (h and ε−x)
or age t. When bringing the model to the data we permit earnings in the model to also
depend on the education educ of a household, and consequently specify the production
function as F (t, educ, h, ε − x). Given this extension we have to take a stance on how
households of different education levels interact in equilibrium under each policy. Since
our objective is to highlight the insurance aspect of both policies with respect to health-
related consumption risks we assume that even in the presence of a wage discrimination law
individuals with higher education can be paid more, and that health insurance companies
can charge differential premia to individuals with heterogeneous education levels even in
the presence of a no-prior conditions law.
Third, for the model to have a change of generating the observed heterogeneity in exercise
levels of individuals that are identical in terms of their age, health and education levels we
introduce preference shocks to the disutility from effort. Instead of being given by q(e), as in
the theoretical analysis so far, the cost of exerting effort is now assumed to be given as γq(e),
where γ ∈ Γ is an individual-specific preference shock that is drawn from the finite set Γ
at the beginning of life and remains constant during the individual’s life cycle.23 Note that
since γ only affects the disutility of effort which is separable from the utility of consumption,
the analysis of the static model in section 2.3 remains completely unchanged (and so do the
optimal health insurance contracts and health expenditure allocations). In the analysis of
the dynamic model, since γ is a permanent shock, all expressions involving q(.) turn into
γq(.) but the analysis is otherwise unaltered. Under the maintained assumption that wages
and insurance premia are allowed to differ across different γ-groups even in the presence
of the laws (an assumption that parallels the one made in the previous paragraph) there
is no interaction between the different (γ, educ) types and equilibrium allocations under all
23It does not matter whether firms/health insurance companies observe a worker’s preference parameter
γ since they engage only in short-term contracts and since h is observable (γ only affects effort and firms as
well as health insurance companies do not care how the individual’s health evolves due to the restriction of
attention to short-term contracts).
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policies can be solved for each (γ, educ) pair separately.24 These assumptions again highlight
the role of (γ, educ)-heterogeneity modeled here: it is not the focal point of our insurance vs.
incentives analysis, but rather allows us to capture some of the heterogeneity in outcomes in
the data and thus avoids attributing all of this observed heterogeneity to health differences.
Ignoring these other sources of heterogeneity would quantitatively overstate likely both
the insurance benefits as well as the incentive costs of the policies we analyze in this paper.
Consistent with the introduction of preference and skill (education) heterogeneity the initial
distribution over household types is now denoted by Φ0(h, γ, educ) and will be determined
from the data (but exploiting predictions of the structural model).
The last, and perhaps most significant departure from the theoretical model is that
we now endow the household with a health-dependent continuation utility vT+1(h) from
retirement. The theoretical model implicitly assumed that this continuation utility was
identically equal to zero, independent of the health status at retirement. The vector vT+1(h)
will be determined as part of our structural model estimation. Endowing individuals with
nontrivial continuation utility at retirement avoids the counterfactual prediction of the
model that effort is zero in the last period of working life, T. This assumption also introduces
a direct utility benefit from better health (albeit one that materializes at retirement) and
thus avoids the complete collapse of incentives to provide effort under both policies (that
is, proposition 9 no longer applies).
In the rest of this section, we use the so extended version of our model to estimate
parameters to match PSID data on health, expenditure and exercise in 1999. In the main
body of the paper, we describe the procedure we follow in a condensed form, relegating the
detailed data description and estimation procedures to the Appendix B.6. Once the model
is parameterized and its reasonable fit of the data established, in section 2.6 we then use
it to analyze the positive and normative short- and long-run consequences of introducing
non-discrimination legislation.
24In order to obtain a meaningful welfare comparison with socially optimal allocations we also solve the
social planner problem separately for each (γ, educ) combination, therefore ruling out ex ante social insurance
against bad initial (γ, educ) draws.
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2.5.2 Parameter Estimation and Calibration
The determination of the model parameters proceeds in three steps. First, we fix a small
subset of parameters exogenously. Second, parts of the model parameters can be estimated
from the PSID data directly. These include the parameters governing the health transition
function Q(h′|h, e), the probabilities (g(h), κ(h)) of receiving the ε and z health shocks, as
well as the productivity effect of the z-shocks given by ρ. Third, (and given the parameters
obtained in step 1 and 2) the remaining parameters (mainly those governing the production
function F, the ε-shock distribution f(ε) and preferences) are then determined through a
method of moments estimation of the model with PSID wage, health and effort data. We
now describe these three steps in greater detail.
A Priori Chosen Parameters
First, we choose one model period to be six years, a compromise between assuring that
effort has a noticeable effect on health transitions (which requires a sufficiently long time
period) and reasonable sample sizes for estimation (which speaks for short time periods).
We then select two preference parameters a priori. Consistent with values commonly used
in the quantitative macroeconomics literature we choose a risk aversion parameter of σ = 2
and a time discount factor of β = 0.96 per annum.
Parameters Estimated Directly from the Data
In a second step we estimate part of the model parameters directly from the data, without
having to rely on the equilibrium of the model.
Health Transition Function Q(h′|h, e) The PSID includes measures of light and heavy
exercise levels25 starting in 1999 which we use to estimate health transition functions. We
denote by el and eh the frequency of light and heavy exercise levels, and assume the following
25Number of times an individual carries out light physical activity (walking, dancing, gardening, golfing,
bowling, etc.) and heavy physical activity (heavy housework, aerobics, running, swimming, or bicycling).
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parametric functional form for the health transition function:
Q(h′;h, el, eh) =

(1 + pi(h, el, eh)αi(h))G(h, h′), if h′ = h+ i, i ∈ {1, 2}
(1 + pi(h, el, eh))G(h, h′),
if h′ = h, h > 1
or h′ = h+ 1, h = 1

1−
∑
h′≥h
Q(h′;h, el, eh)∑
h′<h
G(h, h′)
G(h, h′), if h′ = h− 1, h > 1
or h′ = h, h = 1
where
pi(h, el, eh) = φ(h)(δel + (1− δ)eh)λ(h).
Since light and heavy physical exercise can have different effects on health transition, we
give weight δ on light exercise, and (1 − δ) on heavy exercise. We think of δel + (1 − δ)eh
as the composite exercise level e used in the theoretical analysis of our model.
Health Shock Probabilities g(h) and κ(h) In our model, g(h) represents the proba-
bility of not receiving any shock, and κ(h) is the probability of facing a z-shock. Since we
assume that households do not receive both an ε-shock and a z-shock in the same period,
the probability of facing an ε-shock is given by 1 − g(h) − κ(h). From PSID, we first con-
struct the probabilities of having a z-shock and an ε-shock. We define households that have
received a z-shock as those who were diagnosed with cancer, a heart attack, or a heart dis-
ease26 and those who spent more on medical expenditures than their current income when
hit with a health shock. Households with all other health shocks or those who missed work
due to an illness are categorized as having received an ε-shock.
26These three diseases lead to the most mean medical expenditures, relative to other health conditions
reported in the data.
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Impact ρ of a z-shock on Productivity Using the criterion for determining ε and
z-shocks specified above, we use mean earnings of those with a z-shock relative to those
without any health shock to directly estimate ρ.
Parameters Calibrated within the Model
In a final step we now use our model to find parameters governing the production function,
the ε- and z-shock distribution, the distribution of preference parameters for exercise, and
the terminal value function vT+1(h
′). The structure of our model allows us to calibrate
the parameters in two separate steps. The first part of the estimation consists of finding
parameters for the production function and distribution of health shocks, and only involves
the static part of the model from section 2.3. This is the case since realized wages and
health expenditures in the model are determined in the static part and are independent of
effort decisions and the associated health evolution in the dynamic part of the model. In
a second step we then employ the dynamic part of the model to estimate the preference
distribution for exercise and the terminal value of health.27
Production Function and Health Status We assume the following parametric form
for the production technology:
F (t, educ, h, ε− x) = A(t, educ)h+ (k − (ε− x))
φ(a,educ)
hξ(a,educ)
, 0 < φ(·), ξ(·) < 1, A(·) > 0.
The production function captures two effects of health on production: the direct effect
(first term) and the indirect effect which induces the marginal benefit of health expen-
ditures x to decline with better health (that is −F12 < 0). The term A(t, educ) allows
for heterogeneity in age and education of the effect of health on production and thus
wages. Here age can take seven values, t ∈ {1, 2, ..., 7} and we classify individuals into
27Even though we describe the parameters and calibration targets of the different model elements in
separate subsections below for expositional clarity, the parameters for production function and health shock
distributions are calibrated jointly, using the targets in these sections. Similarly, the parameters for exer-
cise preference distribution and marginal value of health at terminal date are calibrated jointly, using the
observations in both subsections.
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two education groups, those that have graduated from high school and those that have
not: educ ∈ {less than High School, High School Grad}. We also allow for differences in
marginal effects of medical expenditures on production across education and two broad age
groups through parameters φ(a, educ) and ξ(a, educ), where a ∈ {Young,Old}. We define
Young as those individuals between the ages of 24 and 41 and the rest as Old. This age classi-
fication divides our sample roughly in half. We represent the functions A(t, educ), φ(a, educ)
and ξ(a, educ) by a full set of age and education dummies.
Since in the unregulated equilibrium the production of individuals (after health ex-
penditures have been made) equals their labor earnings, we use data on labor earnings of
households with different health status
(
w(h2)
w(h1)
,
w(h3)
w(h1)
,
w(h4)
w(h1)
)
as well as relative average
earnings of the Young and the Old to pin down the health levels {h1, h2, h3, h4} in the
model.28 Moreover, since A(t, educ) captures the effects of age t and education educ on la-
bor earnings we use conditional (on age and education) earnings to pin down the 14 (7× 2)
parameters A(t, educ).
In order to determine the values of the dummies representing φ(·) and ξ(·) we recognize
that in the model they determine the expenditure cutoffs for the ε-shock, as a function
of individual health status. Thus we use medical expenditure data to estimate these pa-
rameters. More specifically the four parameters representing φ(a, educ) are determined to
fit the percentage of labor earnings spent on medical expenditure (averaged over h) for
each (a, educ)-group and the four parameters representing ξ(a, educ) are chosen to match
the percentage of labor earnings spent on medical expenditures (averaged over (a, educ)
groups) for each level h ∈ H of household health.29
Distribution of Health Shocks In order to estimate the parameters governing the
distribution of health shocks ε we exploit the theoretical result from section 2.3 that medical
expenditures on these shocks is linear in the shock: x∗(ε, h) = max{0, ε − ε¯(h)}. Thus
28The categories {Excellent, Very Good, Good, Fair} used in the data itself have no cardinal interpreta-
tion.
29Since there is more variation in the data for labor earnings than by health spending by age we decided
to use a finer age grouping when estimating A(t, educ) using wage data than when estimating ξ(a, educ) and
φ(a, educ) using health (expenditure) data.
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the distribution of medical expenditures x coincides with that of the shocks themselves,
above the endogenous health-specific threshold ε¯(h). French and Jones (2004) argue that
the cross-sectional distribution of health care costs30 can best be fitted by a log-normal
distribution (truncated at the upper tail). We therefore assume that the health shocks ε
follow a truncated log-normal distribution:
f(ε;µε, σε, ε, ε¯) =
1
σε
φ
(
ln ε−µε
σε
)
Φ
(
ln ε¯−µε
σε
)
− Φ
(
ln ε−µε
σε
)
where φ and Φ are standard normal pdf and cdf. We then choose the mean and standard
deviation (µε, σε) of the shocks such that the endogenously determined mean and standard
deviation of medical expenditures in the model matches the mean and standard deviation
of health expenditures for those with ε-shocks from the data.
For the catastrophic health shock z, apart from the probability of receiving it (which
was determined in section 2.5.2), only the mean expenditures µz(h) matter. We use the per-
centage of labor income spent on catastrophic medical expenditures, conditional on health
status h, to determine these.
Distribution of Exercise Preference Parameters With estimates of the production
function and health shock distributions in hand we now calibrate the preference for exercise
distribution, using the dynamic part of the model. We assume that the effort utility cost
function takes the form
γq(e) = γ
[
1
1− e − (1 + e)
]
.
The functional form for q guarantees that q′′(e) > 0, that q(0) = q′(0) = 0 and that
lime→1 q′(e) =∞. We assume that for each education group the preference shock γ can take
two (education-specific) values, γ ∈ {γ1(educ), γ2(educ)}. We treat these values (4 in total)
as parameters. The initial joint distribution Φ0 over types (h, educ, γ) is then determined by
the eight numbers Φ0(γ1|educ, h) that give the fraction of low cost (γ1) individuals for each
30They use HRS and AHEAD data. Health care costs include health insurance premia, drug costs and
costs for hospital, nursing home care, doctor visits, dental visits and outpatient care.
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of the eight (educ, h)-combinations. Thus we have to a total of 12 parameters determining
preference heterogeneity in the model. We choose the initial distribution Φ0(γ1|educ, h) so
that model effort levels match mean effort levels in period 1 (ages 24-29), conditional on
health (4 targets) and conditional on education (2 targets), and mean effort levels in period
7 (ages 60-65), conditional on education (2 targets) in the data. To pin down the four values
γ(educ), we use the aggregate mean and standard deviation of effort in period 1, and the
measure of households with fair and excellent health in the last period, t = 7.
Marginal Value of Health at Terminal Date As discussed above, absent direct ben-
efits from better health upon retirement households in the model have no incentive to exert
effort, whereas in the data we still see a significant amount of exercise for those of ages 60
to 65. By introducing a terminal and health dependent continuation utility vT+1(h) this
problem can be rectified. Given the structure of the model and the parametric form of the
health transition function Q(h′|h, e) only the differences in the continuation values
∆i = vT+1(hi)− vT+1(hi−1), for i = 2, 3, 4
matter for the choice of optimal effort in the last period T. We choose the ∆2,∆3,∆4 such
that the model reproduces the health-contingent average effort levels of the 60 to 65 year
olds, for h2, h3, h4.
The data targets and associated model parameters are summarized in Tables B.7 and
B.8. The estimated parameter values are reported in Table B.9, together with their perfor-
mance in matching the empirical calibration targets.
2.5.3 Model Fit
Our model is fairly richly parameterized (especially along the production function/labor
earnings dimension). It is therefore not surprising that it fits life cycle earnings profiles
well. We have also targeted effort levels for very young and very old households (the latter
by health status), but have not used data on h-specific effort levels (apart from at the final
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pre-retirement age) in the estimation. How well the model captures the age-effort dynamics
is therefore an important “test” of the model. Figures 2.5 (for mean effort) and B.13- B.16
in appendix B.7.1 (for effort by health status) plot the evolution of effort (exercise) over
the life cycle both in the data and in the model. The dotted lines show the one-standard
deviation confidence bands. From Figure 2.5 we see that our model fits the average exercise
level over the life cycle very well, and Figures B.13- B.16 show the same to be true for effort
conditional on Very Good and Excellent health. For households with Fair and Good health
the model fit is not quite as good as that for the Very Good and the Excellent health groups,
but still within the one-standard deviation confidence bands (which are arguably quite wide
though, on account of smaller samples once conditioning both on age and health).31
2.6 Results of the Policy Experiments: Insurance, Incentives
and Welfare
After having established that the model provides a good approximation to the data for the
late 1990’s and early 2000’s in the absence of non-discrimination policies, we now use it to
answer the main counterfactual question of this paper, namely, what are the effects of intro-
ducing these policies (one at a time and in conjunction) on aggregate health, consumption
and effort, their distribution, and ultimately, on social welfare.
The primary benefit of the non-discrimination policies is to provide consumption in-
surance against bad health, resulting in lower wages and higher insurance premia in the
competitive equilibrium. However, these policies weaken incentives to exert effort to lead
a healthy life, and thus worsen the long run distribution of health, aggregate productivity
and thus consumption. In the next two subsections, we present the key quantitative in-
dicators measuring this trade-off: first, the insurance benefits of policies, and second, the
adverse incentive effects on aggregate production and health. Then, in subsection 2.6.3,
31For Fair and Good health, our model predicts higher exercise level between the ages of 30 and 54 than
in the data. This is partly due to a composition effect: in the second period of life, many workers with low
disutility for exercise have fair health and exercise a lot, leading to an increase in the average exercise level
for the fair health group. One mechanical way of rectifying this problem would be to let the values the taste
parameter γ can take on vary with age, reflecting differences in taste for exercise at different stages of life.
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we display the welfare consequences of our policy reforms. In the main text we focus on
weighted averages of the aggregate variables and welfare measures across workers of differ-
ent (educ, γ)-types, and document the disaggregated results (which are qualitatively, and
to a great extent, quantitatively similar to the averaged numbers) in appendix B.7.2.
2.6.1 Insurance Benefits of Policies
Turning first to the consumption insurance benefits of both policies, we observe from figure
2.6 that the combination of both policies is indeed effective in providing perfect consump-
tion insurance. As in the social planner problem, within-group consumption dispersion, as
measured by the coefficient of variation, is zero for all periods over the life cycle if both
a no-prior conditions law and a no-wage discrimination law are in place (the lines for the
social planner solution and the equilibrium under both policies lie on top of one another and
are identically equal to zero).32 This is of course what the theoretical analysis in sections 2.3
and 2.4 predicted. Also notice from figure 2.6 that a wage non-discrimination law alone goes
a long way towards providing effective consumption insurance, since the effect of differences
in health levels on wage dispersion is significantly larger than the corresponding dispersion
in health insurance premia. Thus, although a no-prior conditions law in isolation provides
some consumption insurance and reduces within-group consumption dispersion by about
30%, relative to the unregulated equilibrium, the remaining health-induced consumption
risk remains significant.
Another measure of the insurance benefits provided by the non-discrimination policies
is the level of cross-subsidization or implicit transfers: workers do not necessarily pay their
own competitive (actuarially fair) price of the health insurance premium or/and they are not
fully compensated for their productivity. Under no-prior conditions policy, as established
theoretically in Proposition 6, the healthy workers subsidize the premium of the unhealthy.
Similarly, wages of the unhealthy workers are subsidized by the healthy, productive workers
32Due to the presence of heterogeneity in education levels and preferences the economy as a whole displays
non-trivial consumption dispersion even in the presence of both policies (as it does in the solution of the
restricted social planner problem).
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under the no-wage discrimination policy. Moreover, under both policies, there is cross-
subsidization in both health insurance premia and wages.
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 plot the degree of cross-subsidization over the life cycle, both for
households with excellent and those with fair health, and Table B.11 in appendix B.7.2
summarizes the transfers for all health groups. The plots for the health insurance premium
measures the differences between the actuarially fair health insurance premium a particular
health type household would have to pay and the actual premium paid in the presence of
either a no-prior conditions policy or the presence of both policies. Similarly, the wage plots
display the difference between the productivity of the worker (and thus her wage in the
unregulated equilibrium) and the wage received under a no-wage discrimination policy and
in the presence of both policies. Negative numbers imply that the worker is paying a higher
premium, or is paid lower wage than in a competitive equilibrium without government
intervention. Thus such a worker, in the presence of government policies, has to transfer
resources to workers of different (lower) health types. Reversely, positive numbers imply
that a worker is being subsidized, i.e., she is paying a lower premium and is paid higher
wage.
We observe from Figure 2.7 that the workers with excellent health significantly cross-
subsidize the other workers, both in terms of cross-subsidies in health insurance premia as
well as in terms of wage transfers. To interpret the numbers quantitatively, note that average
consumption of the excellent group is 1.04 when young and 1.75 when aged 42-47. Thus the
wage transfers delivered by this group amount to 12 − 14% of average consumption when
young and close to 30% in prime working age (note that the share of workers in excellent
health in the population has shrunk at that age, relative to when this cohort of workers was
younger). From figure 2.7 we also observe that the implicit transfers induced by a no-prior
conditions law are still significant (they amount to 3-7% of consumption for young workers
of excellent health, and 4-10% when middle-aged), but quantitatively smaller than those
implied by wage-nondiscrimination legislation.
Figure 2.8 displays the same plots for households of fair health. These households are
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the primary recipients of the transfers from workers with excellent health,33 and for this
group (which is small early in the life cycle but grows over time) the transfers are mas-
sive. In terms of their average competitive equilibrium consumption, the implicit health
insurance premium subsidies amount to a massive 37-60% and the wage transfers amount
to a staggering 65-75% of pre-policy average consumption of this group. Although these
transfers shrink (as a fraction of pre-policy consumption) over the life cycle as the share of
households with fair health increases and that with excellent health declines, they continue
to account for a significant part of consumption for households of fair health. These num-
bers indicate that the insurance benefits from both policies, and specifically from the wage
nondiscrimination law, will be substantial.
An interesting property of the subsidies is that the level of subsidization implied by a
given policy is higher when only one of the non-discrimination laws is enacted, relative to
when both policies are present. This is especially true for the no-prior conditions law and
is due to the fact that the government insures the workers with bad health through an
inefficient level of medical expenditure.
Thus far, we have discussed the insurance benefits of the non-discrimination policies. In
the next subsection, we analyze the aggregate dynamic effects of the policies on production
and the health distribution.
2.6.2 Adverse Incentive Effects on Aggregate Production and Health
The associated incentive costs from each policy are inversely proportional to their con-
sumption insurance benefits, as figure 2.9 shows. In this figure we plot the average exerted
effort over the life cycle, in the socially optimal and the equilibrium allocations under the
various policy scenarios. In a nutshell, effort is highest in the solution to the social plan-
33Table B.11 in the appendix shows that households with very good health are also called upon to deliver
transfers, albeit of much smaller magnitude, and workers with good health are on the receiving side of (small)
transfers. As the cohort ages the share of households in these different health groups shifts, and towards
the end of the life cycle the now larger group of households with fair health receives subsidies from all other
households, at least with respect to health insurance premia.
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ner problem, positive under all policies,34 but substantially lower in the presence of the
non-discrimination laws.
More precisely, two important observations emerge from figure 2.9. First, the policies
that provide the most significant consumption insurance benefits also lead to the most
significant reductions in incentives to lead a healthy life. It is the very dispersion of con-
sumption due to health differences, stemming from health-dependent wages and insurance
premia that induce workers to provide effort in the first place, and thus the policies that re-
duce that consumption dispersion the most come with the sharpest reduction in incentives.
Whereas a no-prior conditions law alone leads to only a modest reduction of effort, with a
wage nondiscrimination law in place the amount of exercise household find optimal to carry
out shrinks more significantly. Finally, if both policies are implemented simultaneously the
only benefit from exercise is a better distribution of post-retirement continuation utility,
and thus effort plummets strongly, relative to the competitive equilibrium.
The second observation we make from figure 2.9 is that the impact of the policies on
effort is most significant at young and middle ages, whereas towards retirement effort levels
under all polices converge. This is owed to the fact that the direct utility benefits from
better health materialize at retirement and are independent of the nondiscrimination laws
(but heavily discounted by our impatient households), whereas the productivity and health
insurance premium costs from worse health accrue through the entire working life and are
strongly affected by the different policies.35
Given the dynamics of effort over the life cycle (and a policy invariant initial health
distribution), the evolution of the health distribution is exclusively determined by the health
transition function Q(h′;h, e). Figure 2.10 which displays average health in the economy
under the various policy scenarios is then a direct consequence of the effort dynamics from
Figure 2.9. It shows that health deteriorates under all policies as a cohort ages, but more
34Recall that, relative to the theoretical analysis, we have introduced a terminal value of health which
induces not only effort in the last period even under both policies, but through the continuation values in
the dynamic programming problem, positive effort in all periods. How quantitatively important this effect
is for younger households depends significantly on the time discount factor β.
35In fact, absent the terminal (and policy invariant) direct benefits from better health the differences in
effort levels across policies remain fairly constant over the life cycle.
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rapidly if a no-prior conditions law and especially if a wage nondiscrimination law is in
place. As with effort, the conjunction of both policies has the most severe impact on public
health.
Figure 2.12 demonstrates that the decline of health levels over the life cycle also induce
higher expenditures on health (insurance) later in life. The level of these expenditures (and
thus their relative magnitudes across different policies) are determined by two factors, a)
the health distribution (which evolves differently under alternative policy scenarios) and b)
the equilibrium health expenditures, which are fully determined by the thresholds ε¯(h) from
the static analysis of the model and that vary across policies. The evolution of health is
summarized by figure 2.10, and figure 2.11 displays the health dependent thresholds ε¯(h)
for the youngest households.36 Recall from section 2.3 that the thresholds ε¯(h) under the
unregulated competitive equilibrium and the equilibrium with both policies are socially
efficient and thus the three graphs completely overlap. Also observe that, relative to the
efficient allocation (=unregulated equilibrium) under the no-prior conditions law workers
with low health are strongly over-insured (they have lower thresholds, ε¯NP (hi) > ε¯
SP (hi)
for i = 1, 2) and workers with very good and excellent health are slightly under-insured.
This was the content of Proposition 6, and it is quantitatively responsible for the finding
that health expenditures are highest under this policy. The reverse is true under a no-wage
discrimination law: low health types are under-insured and high types are over-insured,
relative to the social optimum, but quantitatively these differences are minor.
Finally, figures 2.13 and 2.14 display aggregate production and aggregate consumption
over the life cycle. Since the productivity of each worker depends on her health and on the
non-treated fraction of her health shock, aggregate output is lower, ceteris paribus, under
policy configurations that lead to a worse health distribution and that leave a larger share
of health shocks ε untreated. From figure 2.13 we observe that the deterioration of health
under a policy environment that includes a wage nondiscrimination policy is especially
severe, in line with the findings from figure 2.10. Interestingly, the more generous health
36The figures are qualitatively similar for older cohorts.
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insurance (for those of fair and good health) under a no-prior conditions law alone leads
to output that even exceeds that in the unregulated equilibrium, despite the fact that the
health distribution under that policy is (moderately) worse. But health expenditures of
course command resources that take away from private consumption, and as figure 2.14
shows, resulting aggregate consumption over the life cycle under this policy is substantively
identical to that under the wage discrimination law (and the consumption allocation is more
risky under the no-prior conditions legislation). Relative to the unregulated equilibrium
both policies thus entail a significant loss of average consumption in society (in one case,
because less is produced, in the other case because more resources are spent on productivity
enhancing health goods); the same is even more true if both policies are introduced jointly.
Overall, the effect on aggregate effort, health, production and thus consumption suggests
a quantitatively important trade-off between consumption insurance and incentives. Within
the spectrum of all policies, the unregulated equilibrium provides strong incentives at the
expense of risky consumption, whereas a policy mix that includes both policies provides
full insurance at the expense of a deterioration of the health distribution. The effects
of the no-prior conditions law on both consumption insurance and incentives are modest,
relative to the unregulated equilibrium. In contrast, implementing a no wage discrimination
law or both policies insures away most of the consumption risk, but significantly reduces
(although does not eliminate completely) the incentives to exert effort to lead a healthy life,
especially early in the life cycle. In the next subsection we will now document how these
two quantitatively sizable but countervailing effects translate into welfare consequences from
hypothetical policy reforms.
2.6.3 Welfare Implications
In this section we quantify the welfare impact of the policy innovations studied in this paper.
For a fixed initial distribution Φ0(h) over health status,
37 denote by W (c, e) the expected
37Recall that we carry out our analysis for each (educ, γ)-type separately and report averages across these
types. Thus in what follows Φ0 suppresses the (policy-independent) dependence of the initial distribution
on (educ, γ).
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lifetime utility of a cohort member (where expectations are taken prior to the initial draw h
of health) from an arbitrary allocation of consumption and effort over the life cycle.38 Our
consumption-equivalent measure of the welfare consequences of a policy reform is given by
W (cCE(1 + CEV i), eCE) = W (ci, ei)
where i ∈ {SP,NP,NW,Both} denotes the policy scenario under consideration. Thus
CEV i is the percentage reduction of consumption in the competitive equilibrium consump-
tion allocation required to make households indifferent (ex ante) between the competitive
equilibrium allocation39 and that arising under policy regime i.
In order to emphasize the importance of the dynamic analysis in assessing the normative
consequences of different policies we also report the welfare implications of the same policy
reforms in the static version of the model in section 2.3. Similar to the dynamic consequences
we compute the static consumption-equivalent loss (relative to the competitive equilibrium)
as
U(cCE(1 + SCEV i)) = U(ci)
where U(c) is the expected utility from the period 0 consumption allocation40, under the
cross-sectional distribution Φ0, and thus is determined by the static version of the model.
41
38That is, using the notation from section 2.4, for the socially optimal allocation
W (cSP , eSP ) = V (Φ0)
and for equilibrium allocations, under policy i,
W (ci, ei) =
∫
vi0(h)dΦ0.
39Recall that even the social planner problem is solved for each specific (γ, educ) group separately and
thus also does not permit ex-ante insurance against unfavorable (γ, educ)-draws. We consider this restricted
social planner problem because we view the results are better comparable to the competitive equilibrium
allocations.
40In the static version of the model effort is identically equal to zero in the social planner problem and in
the equilibrium under all policy specifications, and therefore disutility from effort is irrelevant in the static
version of the model.
41Thus, using the notation from section 2.3
U(cCE) = UCE(Φ0) for i ∈ {SP,NP,NW,Both}
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Therefore SCEV i provides a clean measure of the static gains from better consumption
insurance induced by the policies against which the dynamic adverse incentive effects have
to be traded off.
The static welfare consequences reported in the first column of Table 2.1 that isolate the
consumption insurance benefits of the policies under consideration are consistent with the
consumption dispersion displayed in Figure 2.6. Perfect consumption insurance, as imple-
mented in the solution to the social planner problem and also achieved if both policies are
implemented jointly, are worth close to 6% of unregulated equilibrium consumption. Each
policy in isolation delivers a substantial share of these gains, with the no wage discrimination
law being more effective than the no-prior conditions law.
Turning now to the main object of interest, the dynamic welfare consequences (column
2 of Table 2.1) paint a somewhat different picture. Consistent with the static analysis,
both policies improve on the laissez-faire equilibrium, and the welfare gains are substantial,
ranging from 6% to 9.5% of lifetime consumption. The sources of these welfare gains are
improved consumption insurance (as in the static model) and reduced effort (which bears
utility costs), which outweigh the reduction in average consumption these policies entail
(recall Figure 2.14). Furthermore, as in the static model a wage nondiscrimination law
dominates a no-prior conditions law. In light of Figures 2.14 and 2.6 this does not come
as a surprise: both policies imply virtually the same aggregate consumption dynamics, but
the no-prior conditions law provides substantially less consumption insurance.
But what we really want to stress is that there are crucial differences to the static
analysis. First and foremost, it is not optimal to introduce a no-prior conditions law once a
wage non-discrimination law is already in place. The latter policy already provides effective
(albeit not complete) consumption insurance, and the further reduction of incentives and
associated mean consumption implied by the no prior conditions law makes a combination
of both policies suboptimal. The associated welfare losses of pushing social insurance too far
and
U(cCE) =
∫
UCE(h)dΦ0.
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amount to about 1.3% of lifetime consumption.42 Finally we see that in contrast to the static
case the best policy combination (a wage nondiscrimination law alone) does not come close to
providing welfare as high as the social optimum: the gap between these two scenarios turns
out to about 7% of lifetime consumption. This gap is due to inefficiently little consumption
insurance, inefficiently low aggregate consumption and an inefficient health expenditure
allocation (see again Figure 2.11), although the latter effect is quantitatively modest. This
effect is however quantitatively crucial in explaining why the no-prior conditions law in
isolations fares worse than the wage nondiscrimination policies (and a combination of both
policies, which restores efficiency in health expenditures, recall proposition 8).
The welfare consequences reported in Table 2.1 were measured under the veil of igno-
rance, before workers learn their initial health level. They mask very substantial hetero-
geneity in how workers feel about these policies once their initial health status in period
0 has been revealed. Given the transfers across health types displayed in Figures 2.7 and
2.8 and the persistence of health status this is hardly surprising. Table 2.2 quantifies this
heterogeneity by reporting dynamic consumption-equivalent variation measures, computed
exactly as before, but now computed after the initial health status has been materialized.
Broadly speaking, the lower a worker’s initial health status, the more she favors policies
providing consumption insurance. For the middle two health groups the ranking of policies
coincides with that in the second column of Table 2.1; households with excellent health
prefer only the no prior conditions law (and thus only very moderate implicit transfers) to
the unregulated equilibrium, whereas young households with fair health would support the
simultaneous introduction of both policies. The differences in the preference for different
policy scenarios across different h-households are quantitatively very large: whereas fair-
health types would be willing to pay 54% of laissez faire lifetime consumption to see both
policies introduced, households of excellent health would be prepared to give up 4.5% of
lifetime consumption to prevent exactly this policy innovation.
42It should be stressed that these conclusions follow under the maintained assumption that a wage nondis-
crimination law is indeed fully successful in curbing health-related wage variation, and does so completely
costlessly.
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2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the effect of labor and health insurance market regulations on
evolution of health and production, as well as welfare. We showed that both a no-wage
discrimination law (an intervention in the labor market), in combination with a no-prior
conditions law (an intervention in the health insurance market) provides effective consump-
tion insurance against health shocks, holding the aggregate health distribution in society
constant. However, the dynamic incentive costs and their impact on health and medical
expenditures of both policies, if implemented jointly, are large. Even though both policies
improve upon the laissez-faire equilibrium, implementing them jointly is suboptimal (rel-
ative to introducing a wage nondiscrimination in isolation). We therefore conclude that a
complete policy analysis of health insurance reforms on one side and labor market (non-
discrimination policy) reforms cannot be conducted separately, since their interaction might
prove less favorable despite welfare gains from each policy separately.
These conclusions rest in part on our assumption that both policies can be implemented
optimally at no direct overhead cost. To us, this assumption seems potentially more prob-
lematic for the no-wage discrimination policy than the no-prior conditions policy because
match-specificity between a worker and a firm appears to be more important than between
a worker and a health insurance company. One can likely implement the no-prior conditions
policy through the health insurance exchanges proposed by Obama Care in which a govern-
ment agency links those seeking health insurance to health insurance providers and thereby
overcomes, at low cost, the incentives of the health insurance companies to cherry-pick their
clients. However, a similar institution (e.g. something akin to a union hall type institution),
is likely to demand higher costs, given the specificity in most worker-firm matches. In ad-
dition, the average output produced by a worker-firm pair is much larger than the expenses
involved in health insurance (both in our model as well as in the data).43
Finally, our analysis of health insurance and incentives over the working life has ignored
43To put these potential costs in perspective, from our quantitative results it follows that if as little as 3%
of production was consumed in implementing the no-wage discrimination policy (and the no prior conditions
policy is cost-free), then it is the latter policy that would constitute the ex ante preferred policy option.
110
several potentially important avenues through which health and consumption risk affect
welfare. First, the benefits of health in our model are confined to higher labor productivity,
and thus we model the investment motives into health explicitly. It has abstracted from an
explicit modeling of the benefits better health has on survival risk, although the positive
effect of health h on the continuation utility after retirement partially captures this effect
in our model, albeit in a fairly reduced from. Similarly, better health might have a direct
effect on flow utility during working life.44 Finally, in our analysis labor income risk directly
translates into consumption risk, in the absence of household private saving. We conjecture
that the introduction of self-insurance via precautionary saving against this income risk
further weakens the argument in favor of the policies studied in this paper. Future work
has to uncover whether such an extension of the model also affects, quantitatively or even
qualitatively, our conclusions about the relative desirability of these policies.
44As we argue in appendix B.8 at least in one extension of the model introducing a direct flow utility
benefit from better health leaves our analysis qualitatively unchanged.
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2.8 Tables and Figures
Figure 2.2: Production Function F (h, ε− x) for fixed ε
Figure 2.3: Timing of the Model
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Figure 2.4: Optimal Health Expenditure and Production
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Figure 2.5: Average Effort in Model and Data
24 30 36 42 48 54 60
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Average Effort in Equilibrium
Time
A
ve
ra
ge
 E
ffo
rt
 
 
Model
Data: Mean
Data: Mean ± St.Dev
113
Figure 2.6: Consumption Dispersion
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Figure 2.7: Subsidy: Excellent
24 30 36 42 48 54 60
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Cross−Subsidy: Fair Health
Time
Tr
an
sf
er
 
 
Premium: No Prior
Premium: Both Pol.
Wage: No Wage
Wage: Both Pol.
Figure 2.8: Subsidy: Fair
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Figure 2.9: Effort
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Figure 2.10: Average Health
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Figure 2.11: Cutoffs
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Figure 2.12: Health Spending
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Figure 2.13: Production
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Figure 2.14: Consumption
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Table 2.1: Aggregate Welfare Comparisons
Static CEV i Dynamic CEV i
Social Planner 5.6527 16.4799
Competitive Equilibrium 0.0000 0.0000
No Prior Conditions Law 4.1593 6.9782
No Wage Discrimination Law 5.3486 9.5399
Both Policies 5.6527 8.1656
Table 2.2: Welfare Comparison in the Dynamic Economy Conditional on Health
Fair Good Very Good Excellent
Social Planner 56.5681 13.7796 14.4002 10.5597
Competitive Equilibrium 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No Prior Conditions Law 36.3452 7.9579 4.2954 0.5892
No Wage Discrimination Law 45.8741 14.4826 6.6942 -1.8221
Both Policies 54.2835 13.2129 5.0420 -4.4532
116
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Long-Term Changes in Tax Rates
Since the analysis conducted in the paper is a steady-state analysis, the aggregate statistics
in 2000 might be the outcome of government policies in previous years. In this section, I
document long-term changes in tax rates in the UK and CE presented in Figures in Mendoza
and Tesar (2005) and an OECD report (2012).63
There is a consistent trend of a higher capital income tax rate (Figure A.1) and lower
labor income tax rate (Figure A.2) in the United Kingdom compared to France, Italy, and
Germany. Moreover, top combined statutory personal income tax rates (an indication of
the degree of progressiveness in labor income tax code) shows similar patterns in 1980s as
it does in 2000 across countries (Figure A.3).
A.2 Summary Statistics of Continental European Countries
In the quantitative exercises, I analyze the tax competition between the UK and Continental
European countries comprising France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and Sweden. These are
the countries in the European Union with comparable GDP per capita so that I could
focus more on the economic incentives for households to move between the two regions.
63Figure A.1 and A.2 are from Mendoza and Tesar (2005), and Figure A.3 from OECD.
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Figure A.1: Capital Income Tax Rates
tax policy operating via relative prices, wealth distribution and ﬁscal solvency. Tax
competition is modeled as a one-shot game over time-invariant capital taxes with dynamic
payoffs relative to a status quo calibrated to European data. The calibration is preceded by an
empirical analysis that shows that the relationship linking taxes to labor supply and the
investment rate in the model are in line with empirical evidence and that domestic taxes seem
to respond to foreign taxes. The solutions of the games show that when countries compete
over capital taxes adjusting labor taxes to maintain ﬁscal solvency, there is no race to the
bottom and the Nash equilibrium is close to observed taxes. In contrast, if consumption taxes
adjust to maintain ﬁscal solvency, competition over capital taxes triggers a ‘‘race to the
bottom,’’ but this outcome entails large welfare gains. Surprisingly, the gains from
coordination are small in all of these experiments.
r 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: F210; F240; H230
Keywords: Tax competition; Tax harmonization; Race to the bottom; Nash equilibrium
1. Introduction
The creation of the uniﬁed ﬁnancial market in Europe at the beginning of the
1980s created a region with a very high degree of international capital mobility
across countries with uneven tax structures. The agreements on indirect tax
harmonization of the 1960s and 1970s pegged the countries to nearly uniform rates
of indirect taxation, but large differences in factor income taxation remained. As the
macroeconomic estimates of effective tax rates shown in Figs. 1–3 indicate, the
United Kingdom had a higher capital income tax and a lower labor tax than France,
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Fig. 1. Capital income tax rates in France, Germany, Italy and the UK: 1965–1996.
E.G. Mendoza, L.L. Tesar / Journal of Monetary Economics 52 (2005) 163–204164
Figure A.2: Labor Income Tax Rates
Germany and Italy (henceforth Continental Europe, or CE). Financial integration
thus created ripe conditions for competition in the taxation of capital income to take
place.
The views on the effects of this tax competition and on the policies needed to
address them varied widely across countries and over time. In 1997, the ofﬁcial
European position was that tax competition was harmful and needed to be
contained:
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Fig. 2. Labor income tax rates in France, Germany, Italy and the UK: 1965–1996.
Fig. 3. Consumption tax rates in France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom: 1965–1996.
E.G. Mendoza, L.L. Tesar / Journal of Monetary Economics 52 (2005) 163–204 165
Figure A.3: Trends in Top Labor Income Tax Rates in OECD Countries
SPECIAL FEATURE: TRENDS IN PERSONAL INCOME TAX AND EMPLOYEE SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTION SCHEDULES
TAXING WAGES 2011 © OECD 201232
Turkey in 2006. Likewise, increases in the number of tax brackets tended to be
accompanied by increases in top statutory rates, though not always. Among countries that
increased their number of tax brack ts from 2000 to 2010, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Japan
and Portugal increased their top statutory rates when introducing new brackets. In
contrast, Chile and the United States reduced their top statutory rate when they added tax
brackets, and Canada held its top rate constant. 
2.1.2. Trends in top statutory personal income tax rates
Along with a general reduction in the number of tax brackets over the last three
decades, OECD countries have seen a general reduction in their top statutory PIT rates. Like
with the number of tax brackets, the reduction in top statutory PIT rates was most
pronounced during the 1980’s. Across OECD countries for which data are available, the
average combined central and sub-central top statutory rate (including surtaxes and taking
into account the deductibility of sub-central or other income taxes from the central tax
base) declined by more than 15 percentage points, from 65.7% in 1981 to 50.6% in 1990. But
unlike the number of tax brackets, top statutory rates have continued to display a
pronounced declining trend well after the 1980’s. The average top statutory rate across
OECD countries declined by about four percentage points in the 1990’s (to 46.5% in 2000),
and then by almost five percentage points in the 2000’s (to 41.7% in 2010; see Figure S.2).
Changes in the average top rate across OECD countries must be interpreted with caution
because rates are not available or applicable for ten countries in 1981 and for seven
countries in 1990. However, if these countries were excluded from the analysis, the top rate
would still display a declining trend (see Table S.1).
Figure S.2. Top combined statutory personal income tax rate1, 2
1. The sum of the central and sub-central top rates in PIT rate schedule, inclusive of surtaxes and adjusted for the
deductibility of sub-central or other income taxes from the central tax base where applicable.
2. Countries are ranked by decreasing top statutory rates in 2010.
* 24-country average. The top rate is not applicable in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and not available for Chile, Iceland, Korea and Turkey.
** 27-country average. The top rate is not applicable in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, the Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, and not available for Chile and Korea.
Source: OECD Tax Database Tables I.1, I.2 and I.3 (www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932586789
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Moreover, the selected five countries have relatively higher labor (more progressive) income
tax rates, and lower capital income tax rates than the UK. In getting the composite measures
of macroeconomic outcomes and tax policies in the CE, I use weighted averages of these
countries, where weights are obtained from the GDP and population of individual countries.
Aggregate Statistics Table A.1 presents the summary statistics for five Continental
European countries that I analyze in the main part of the paper. Most of data are from
IMF, OECD, and a series of papers under the project Cross Sectional Facts for Economists
published in 2011.64 The intergenerational persistence in schooling measures are taken from
64Summary of the project is presented in Krueger, et al (2010). Moreover, I obtain data for individual
countries from Blundell and Etheridge (2010), Domeij and Floden (2010), Fuchs-Schuendeln, et al. (2010),
Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010), and Pijoan-Mas and Sanchez-Marcos (2010) which summarize macroeconomic
facts in Britain, Sweden, Germany, Italy, and Spain, respectively.
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Causa and Johansson (2009) who use 2005 OECD data to obtain a percentage increase in
probability of a child going to college when his father is a college graduate rather than
upper-secondary educated.
Table A.1: Summary Statistics of Continental European Countries
France Germany Italy Spain Sweden
GDP per capitaa $25,972 $26,090 $24,669 $22,359 $26,465
Skill Premiumb - 1.38 1.51 1.48 1.61
Intergen. Schooling Persistencec 0.18 - 0.30 0.21 0.16
Gini of Labor Earningb - 0.35 0.34 0.40 0.32
% College Graduatesd 22 % 24% 9 % 22.6% 30.1%
Tertiary Educ. Exp.(% GDP)d 1.32% 1.08% 0.83% 0.89% 1.27%
Public Spending 1.13% 0.94% 0.70% 0.72% 1.12%
Private Spending 0.18% 0.15% 0.13% 0.17% 0.15%
Average Hours Workedd 0.333 0.307 0.388 0.363 0.341
Relative Weights 0.24 0.34 0.23 0.15 0.04
a IMF
b Cross Sectional Facts for Economists (2011)
c Causa and Johansson (2009)
d OECD
Labor Income Taxation Figure A.4 plot the labor income tax functions
τ(y) = 1− a0
(
y
y¯
)−a1
of the individual Continental European countries which are imputed using top marginal
income tax rates and thresholds at multiples of average labor earnings (y¯), following the
procedure described in Guvenen et al (2011). These countries have progressive labor income
tax schedules with Germany having the highest labor income tax rates and France, the most
progressive.
Capital Income Taxation In Table A.2, capital income tax rates in individual Con-
tinental European countries are reported. There are several ways of calculating capital
income tax rates. Since different capital incomes are taxed at different rates, it is difficult
to find a single measure of capital income tax rates. Here, I use tax rates reported in Carey
and Tchilinguirian (2000) who apply the methodology presented in Mendoza et al. (1994)
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Figure A.4: Average Labor Income Tax Rates in Continental European countries
0 2 4 6 8
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Income/(Average Income)
A
ve
ra
ge
 T
ax
 R
at
e
 
 
France
Germany
Italy
Spain
Sweden
to find average effective tax rates between the years of 1991 and 1997.
Mendoza et al. calculates effective tax rates by dividing sum of corporate income and
personal capital income taxes by net operating surplus. These rates are not uncontroversial,
but they are often used in macroeconomics literature.
Table A.2: Capital Income Tax Rates in Continental European Countries
Country Capital Income Tax Rate
France 26.8
Germany 25.1
Italy 33.1
Spain 21.5
Sweden 52.7
A.3 Computation of the Nash Equilibrium
I describe the computation procedure of finding the Nash equilibrium tax systems. The
governments in this model maximize the steady-state welfare of households by choosing
labor income tax function parameters, a0 and a1, and a capital income tax rate τk. Let a0 ∈
{a01, ..., a0m} and a1 ∈ {a11, ..., a1n}. Since I need to find the best responses taking as given
the other country’s tax rates, I iteratively find the tax parameters that maximize steady-
state welfare of households in each country and satisfy the government budget balance
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constraint.
1. Fix Country 2’s tax system ({a20, a21, τ2k}).
2. Fix Country 1’s labor income tax parameters, {a10, a11}.
3. Guess a capital income tax rate for Country 1, τ1k .
4. Guess an after-tax return to capital R.
5. Guess aggregate moments in the economy: the wages wi(θ), average labor earnings
y¯i (necessary since labor income tax code is a function of average earnings in the
economy), and population ratio (since per capita budget constraint has to be satisfied).
6. Solve household problems (both countries).
7. Aggregate and check if the guesses for wages, average labor earnings, and population
size coincide.
8. If they do, check if the bond market clears.
- If not, go back to Step 4, and update guesses for wages, average labor earnings,
and population ratio.
9. If the bond market clears, check if the government budget constraint is satisfied.
- If the bond market does not clear, go back to Step 3, and update the guess for
the after-tax return to capital.
10. If the government budget constraint is satisfied, then go back to Step 2, and repeat
the procedure for the next set of labor income tax parameters in Country 1.
- If not, go back to Step 3, and make a new guess for the capital income tax rate.
11. Find the level of {a10, a11} and the budget-balancing τ1k that maximize the steady-state
welfare of households in Country 1 (Best Response).
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12. Taking as given the tax system of Country 1, repeat the procedure (Steps 1 through
11) for Country 2.
13. Iterate until the tax systems arrive at a fixed point.
A.4 Constrained Efficiency in a Three-Factor, Open-Economy
Model
Here, I consider a simplified version of my model to provide an explanation for why in the
Nash equilibrium, the UK sets a lower capital income tax rate than the CE does.
I simplify my model to a two-period analysis to provide a condition for constrained
efficiency which shed light on why τ∗UKk < τ
∗CE
k .
Assume that:
 the only sources of heterogeneity are skill level and initial wealth, (θ, a), with their
initial distribution being Φ(θ, a);
 labor is given exogenously with its endowment, either ε1 or ε2, occurring with proba-
bilities pi1 and pi2 = 1− pi1, respectively; and
 the social planner makes savings decision for households a′(θ, a).
With a three-factor production function and two kinds of labor (the unskilled and skilled
labor), as used in the benchmark model, since the production function is homogeneous of
degree one,
fkkK + fukU + fskS = 0
is satisfied.
Here, households are either unskilled or skilled. Then, the planner chooses a′(θ, a) that
solves
max
a′(θ,a)∈[0,a]
∫
(θ,a)
 u(a− a′(θ, a))
+β
∑
i=1,2 piiu
(
fk(K,U, S)a
′(θ, a) + fθ(K,U, S)εi
)
Φ(d(θ, a))
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where
K =
∫
(θ,a)
a(θ, a)Φ(d(θ, a))
U =
∫
(U,a)
(piε1 + (1− pi)ε2)Φ(d(U, a)),
S =
∫
(S,a)
(piε1 + (1− pi)ε2)Φ(d(S, a)).
The first order condition of the social planner’s problem is:
u′(c(θ, a)) = β
∑
i=1,2
piiu
′(ci(θ, a))
 fk(K,U, S) + ∆,
where
∆ = β
∫
(θ,a)
∑
i=1,2
piiu
′
(
fk(·)a(θ, a) + fθ(·)εi
)[
fkk(·)a(θ, a) + fkθ(·)εi
]
Φ(d(θ, a))
by fkkK + fukU + fskS = 0, and with some algebra,
= βfkk(·)K

∫
(U,a)
∑
i=1,2
piiu
′(c(U, a))
[
a(U, a)
K
− εi
U
AUρ
AUρ + (1−A)Sρ
]
Φ(d(U, a))
+
∫
(S,a)
∑
i=1,2
piiu
′(c(S, a))
[
a(S, a)
K
− εi
S
(1−A)Sρ
AUρ + (1−A)Sρ
]
Φ(d(S, a))

The relative labor income terms for each skill level
(εi
U
and
εi
U
)
are weighted by their
relative importance (efficiency) in production
(
AUρ
AUρ + (1−A)Sρ and
(1−A)Sρ
AUρ + (1−A)Sρ
)
.
Under the calibrated parameters, the UK has a higher relative efficiency of the skilled
in production, and a more dispersed wealth distribution. Thus, the consumption-poor in
the UK is relatively more wealth-poor than they are labor income-poor. This is a force that
leads the UK to prefer higher capital (therefore, higher wages), more than the CE does.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1
Proof: Since exercise does not carry any benefits in the static model, trivially eSP = 0.
Attaching Lagrange multiplier µ ≥ 0 to the resource constraint, the first order condition
with respect to consumption c(ε) is
u′(c(ε, h)) = λ
and thus cSP (ε, h) = cSP for all ε ∈ E and h ∈ H. Thus, not surprisingly, the social
planner provides full consumption insurance to households. The optimal health expenditure
allocation maximizes this consumption
cSP = max
x(ε,h)
∑
h
 g(h) [F (h,−x(0, h))− x(0, h)]+(1− g(h)) ∫ f(ε) [F (h, ε− x(ε, h))− x(ε, h)] dε
Φ(h)
Denoting by µ(ε, h) ≥ 0 the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint x(ε, h) ≥ 0, the first
order condition with respect to x(ε, h) reads as
−F2(h, ε− x(ε, h)) + µ(ε, h) = 1
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Fix h ∈ H. By assumption 4 F22(h, y) < 0 and thus either x(ε, h) = 0 or x(ε, h) > 0
satisfying
−F2(h, ε− x(ε, h)) = 1
for all ε. Thus off corners ε− x(ε, h) = ε¯SP (h) where the threshold satisfies
− F2(h, ε¯SP (h)) = 1. (B.1)
Consequently
xSP (ε, h) = max
[
0, ε− ε¯SP (h)] .
The fact that ε¯SP (h) is increasing in h, strictly so if F12(h, y) > 0, follows directly from
assumption 4 and (B.1).
Proposition 2
Proof: Attaching Lagrange multiplier µ(h) to equation (2.11) and λ(h) to equations (2.12)
the first order conditions read as
u′(w(h)− P (h)) = λ(h) = −µ(h) (B.2)
λ(h)F2(h,−x(0, h)) ≤ µ(h) (B.3)
= if x(0, h) > 0
λ(h)F2(h, ε− x(ε, h)) ≤ µ(h) (B.4)
= if x(ε, h) > 0
Thus off corners we have
F2(h, εˆ− x(εˆ, h)) = F2(h, ε− x(ε, h)) = K (B.5)
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for some constant K. Thus off corners ε− x(ε, h) is constant in ε and thus medical expen-
ditures satisfy the cutoff rule
xCE(ε, h) = max
[
0, ε− ε¯CE(h)] . (B.6)
Plugging (B.6) into (B.4) and evaluating it at ε = ε¯CE(h) yields
λ(h)F2(h, ε¯
CE(h)) = µ(h). (B.7)
Using this result in the second part of (B.2) delivers the characterization of the equilibrium
cutoff levels
F2(h, ε¯
CE(h)) = −1 for all h ∈ H
which are unique, given the assumptions imposed on F. Wages, consumption and health
insurance premia then trivially follow from (2.11) and (2.12).
Proposition 5
Proof: Let Lagrange multipliers to equations (2.19) and (2.20) be µ and λ(h), respectively.
Then, the first order conditions are:
∑
h
u′(w(h)− P )Φ(h) = µ
u′(w(h)− P )Φ(h) = λ(h)
(1− g(h))f(ε)[−F2(h, ε− x(ε, h))]λ(h) ≤ µ(1− g(h))f(ε)Φ(h)
= if x(ε, h) > 0
g(h)[−F2(h,−x(0, h))]λ(h) ≤ µg(h)Φ(h)
= if x(0, h) > 0
Thus, off-corners we have
F2(h, ε− x(ε, h)) = F2(h, εˆ− x(εˆ, h)) = K
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for some constant K and the cutoff rule is determined by
u′(w(h)− P )[−F2(h, ε¯NP (h))] =
∑
h
u′(w(h)− P )Φ(h). (B.8)
Moreover, let us take the derivative of (B.8) with respect to h.
u′′(w(h)− P )∂w(h)
∂h
F2 + u
′(w(h)− P )
{
F12 + F22
∂ε¯NP (h)
∂h
}
= 0
u′′(w(h)− P )∂ε¯
NP (h)
∂h
∂w(h)
∂ε¯NP (h)
F2 + u
′(w(h)− P )
{
F12 + F22
∂ε¯NP (h)
∂h
}
= 0
⇒ ∂ε¯
NP (h)
∂h
{
u′′(w(h)− P )F2 ∂w(h)
∂ε¯NP (h)
+ u′(w(h)− P )F22
}
= −u′(w(h)− P )F12
Note that as ε¯ increases w(h) decreases, since F (h, ε− x(ε, h)) is decreasing for ε < ε¯, and
constant for ε ≥ ε¯. Thus, we have
∂ε¯NP (h)
∂h
> 0.
Proposition 6
Proof: From (2.21), we immediately obtain
−F2(h, ε¯NP (h)) =
∑
u′(w(h)− P )Φ(h)
u′(w(h)− P )
< 1 ε¯NP (h) < ε¯SP (h)
= 1 ⇒ ε¯NP (h) = ε¯SP (h)
> 1 ε¯NP (h) > ε¯SP (h)
as −F2(h, ε¯SP (h)) = 1.
Let us take hL < h˜ < hH , and suppose
− F2(hL, ε¯NP (hL)) > 1 > −F2(hH , ε¯NP (hH)), (B.9)
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i.e.
ε¯NP (hH) < ε¯
SP (hH) ⇒ wNP (hH) > wSP (hH)
ε¯NP (hL) > ε¯
SP (hL) ⇒ wNP (hL) < wSP (hL),
where wSP (h) = g(h)F (h, 0) + (1− g(h)) ∫ f(ε)F (h, ε− x(ε, h))dε. Then, we have
u′NP (c(hH)− P ) < u′SP (c(hH)− P ) < u′SP (c(hL)− P ) < u′NP (c(hL)− P ),
where the second inequality follows from (B.12). This result, in combination with (B.9)
implies
u′NP (c(hL)− P )[−F2(hL, ε¯NP (hL))] > u′NP (c(hH)− P )[−F2(hH , ε¯NP (hH))],
a contradiction to (2.21).
Proposition 9
Proof: Is by backward induction. Trivially eT (h) = 0. In period T, since both policies are
in place, the wage and health insurance premium of every household is independent of h.
Thus
vT (h) = u(wT − PT ) = vT
and therefore the terminal value function is independent of h. Now suppose for a given time
period t the value function vt+1 is independent of h. Then from the first order condition
with respect to et(h) we have
q′(et(h)) = βvt+1
∑
h′
∂Q(h′;h, e)
∂e
But since for every e and every h, Q(h′;h, e) is a probability measure over h′ we have∑
h′
∂Q(h′;h,e)
∂e = 0 and thus et(h, γ) = 0 for all h, on account of our assumptions on q
′(.).
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But then
vt(h) = u(wt − Pt) +
{
−0 + βvt+1
∑
h′
Q(h′;h, 0)
}
= u(wt − Pt) + βvt+1 = vt
since
∑
h′ Q(h
′;h, 0) = 1 for all h. Thus vt is independent of h. The evolution of the health
distributions follows from (2.23), and given these health distributions wages and health
insurance premia are given by (2.39) and (2.41).
B.2 Further Analysis of the No-Wage Discrimination Case
B.2.1 Health Insurance Distortions with No-Wage Discrimination
The firm’s break-even condition is
∑
h
{
g(h)F (h, 0) + (1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
0
f(ε)[F (h, ε− xNP (ε, h))]dε− w(h)
}
Φ(h) = 0,
and hence on average the production level of a worker will equal his gross wage. Taking
εw > 0 and δ > 0 as given, workers for whom the wage limits, maxh,h′ |w(h)− w(h′)| ≤ εw,
bind will be paid either more or less than their production level depending on whether the
wage discrimination bound binds from above or below. The firm will optimally choose to hire
less than the population share of any health type h whose wage is above their production
level, and hence some of these workers will be unemployed. Since we have assume that
there is no cost to working and workers pay for their own insurance, competition over
health insurance will lead these workers to increase their health insurance, x(e, h), so that
their productivity is within εw of their wage w(h). In the limit as εw → 0, this implies that
w(h) = g(h)F (h, 0) + (1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
0
f(ε)[F (h, ε− xNP (ε, h))]dε, (B.10)
holds and they are fully employed, or w(h)−P (h) = 0. On the flip side, there will be excess
demand for workers whose expected production is more than w(h), they will therefore find
129
it optimal to either lower their insurance, and in the limit as ε→ 0 either (B.10) holds they
or set x(e, h) = 0 if they end up at corner with respect to health insurance. Assuming that
neither corner binds, this implies that the no-wage discrimination policy will be undone
by adjustments in the health insurance market. This motivated our assumption that the
government will choose to regulate the health insurance market to prevent this outcome as
part of the no-wage discrimination policy.
For health types for which the bounds do not bind, market clearing implies that
w(h) = g(h)F (h, 0) + (1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
0
f(ε)[F (h, ε− xNP (ε, h))]dε
while actuarial fairness implies that
P (h) = (1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
0
f(ε)xNP (ε, h))dε.
Hence, an efficient health insurance contract for this type will maximize w(h) − P (h) =
wCE(h) − PCE(h). Since wCE(h) − PCE(h) is increasing in h, it follows that the wage
bound binds for the lowest and highest health types.
B.2.2 No-Wage Discrimination with Realized Penalties in Equilibrium
Here we assume that the firm must pay a cost for having wage dispersion conditional on
health type or for having the health composition of its work force differ from the population
average. The wage variation penalty is assumed to take the form
C
∑
h
[w(h)− w(0)]2 n(h),
since health type 0 will have the lowest wage in equilibrium, and where C is the penalty
parameter and n(h) is measure of type h workers the firm hires. Note that with this penalty
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function the penalty will apply to all workers with health h > 0.63 The penalty from having
one’s composition deviate from the population average is given by
∑
h
D
[
n(h)∑
n(h)
− Φ(h)∑
Φ(h)
]2
.
Since these penalties are small for small deviations, it will turn out that penalty costs
will be realized in equilibrium. Since both of these penalties are real we need to subtract
them from production. We will assume that there too the government will regulate the
insurance market to prevent workers low health status workers raising their productivity by
over-insuring themselves against health risks and high health status workers lowering their
productivity by under-insuring themselves.
We begin analyzing this case by assuming that the penalties for wage discrimination
C and hiring discrimination D are both finite and then we examine the equilibrium in the
limit as they become large. The firm takes as given the health policy of the worker and the
equilibrium wage w(h) and chooses the measure of each health type to hire n(h) so as to
maximize
max
n(h)
∑
h
 g(h) [F (h,−x(0, h))− x(0, h)]
+(1− g(h)) ∫ ε¯0 f(ε) [F (h, ε− x(ε, h))− x(ε, h)] dε− w(h)
n(h)
−C
∑
h
[w(h)− w∗)]2 n(h)−
∑
h
[
n(h)∑
n(h)
− Φ(h)∑
Φ(h)
]2
,
where w∗ is taken here to mean the lowest wage. Trivially, the firm will want to hire more
63If we have assumed that the form of the penalty was
C
∫
h
[w(h)− w∗]2 ψ(h)dh,
where w∗ is the average wage, this would mean that low productivity workers are more costly and less
productive, which will discourage hiring them. Hence, with this form the low productivity workers will only
be employed because of the compositional penalty, which means that the hiring penalty must bind at the
margin. Hence the less than average productivity workers will be in positive net supply in equilibrium, which
will complicate the analysis because some of these workers will be employed and some will not be.
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than the population share of any type h for whom
N(h) ≡
 g(h) [F (h,−x(0, h))− x(0, h)]
+(1− g(h)) ∫ ε¯0 f(ε) [F (h, ε− x(ε, h))− x(ε, h)] dε− w(h)

−C [w(h)− w∗)]2
is positive and less that the population share if N(h) is negative. Since all firms share this
condition, they will all choose the same relative shares of each type of worker. Since workers
are willing to work so long as w(h)−P (h) > 0, it follows that w(h) cannot be more than w∗
if N(h) is not positive. To see this note that there would be excess supply of type h workers
and hence the labor market would not clear. Moreover, a firm would rather hire a worker
of type h at w∗ − ε than for w∗ for ε small. Hence, if w(h) = w∗, then N(h) = 0 so long as
w∗ − P (h) > 0. Hence, for the labor market to clear for each health type, either N(h) = 0
for type h or N(h) > 0 but w(h)− P (h) = 0. This implies the following proposition.
Proposition 10. If C and D are positive but finite, and w(h) − P (h) > 0 for all h, then
in equilibrium all households are hired, all firms are representative, and the wage w(h) is
equal to a worker’s productivity less the cost of paying him.
Since the government can set x(ε, h) = 0 which implies that P (h) = 0, we assume that
w(h)− P (h) > 0 for all health types.
B.2.3 Realized Penalties with Both Policies
Since all that workers care about is their net wage w˜(h), which is also equal to their con-
sumption, it follows that workers are indifferent over contracts that offer combinations of a
gross wage w(h) and medical costs P (h) for which w˜(h) = w(h)−P (h) is constant. Hence,
it is natural to assume that the firm takes the equilibrium net wage function w˜(h) as given
and chooses the measure of each health type to hire, n(h), and its health plan, x(ε, h), to
solve the following problem
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max
n(h),x(ε,h)
∑
h
 g(h) [F (h,−x(0, h))− x(0, h)]
+(1− g(h)) ∫ ε¯0 f(ε) [F (h, ε− x(ε, h))− x(ε, h)] dε− w˜(h)
n(h)
−C
∑
h
[w˜(h)− w˜(0)]2 n(h)−
∑
h
D
[
n(h)∑
n(h)
− Φ(h)∑
Φ(h)
]2
.
Proposition 11. If C and D are positive but finite, then in equilibrium all households are
hired, all firms are representative, the net wage w˜(h) is equal to a worker’s productivity less
the cost of paying him more than w˜(0), and w˜(0) = wCE(0)−P (0). The firm optimally sets
x(ε, h) = xCE(ε, h). As C →∞, w˜(h)→ w˜(0).
Proof: The optimality condition for x(h, ε) if ε = 0 is
F (h,−x(0, h))− 1 ≤ 0
and if ε > 0 is
F (h, ε− x(ε, h))− 1 ≤ 0 w. equality if x(ε, h) > 0.
These are the same conditions as in the competitive equilibrium.
Next, we show that w˜(h) has to be increasing in h and hence w˜(0) is the lowest paid
type. The wage penalty is w.r.t. to the lowest paid worker type, which we denote by w∗.
Given that optimum insurance is the same as in the competitive equilibrium, it follows that
the net earnings per worker is wCE(h)−PCE(h)− w˜(h), and from before wCE(h)−PCE(h)
is increasing in h. Hence, for the firm to break even
∑
h
[
wCE(h)− PCE(h)− w˜(h)]n(h)
− C
∑
h
[w˜(h)− w∗]2 n(h)−
∑
h
D
[
n(h)∑
n(h)
− Φ(h)∑
Φ(h)
]2
= 0,
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and the optimality condition for n(h) is
[
wCE(h)− PCE(h)− w˜(h)]− C [w˜(h)− w∗]2
− D
[
n(h)∑
n(h)
− Φ(h)∑
Φ(h)
] [
1− n(h)∑
n(h)
]
1∑
n(h)
= 0.
This condition implies that a firm will hire more that the population share of any type
h for whom
N˜(h) ≡ wCE(h)− PCE(h)− w˜(h)− C [w˜(h)− w∗]2 > 0,
and less than the population share if the reverse is true. However any health type h that
are not fully employed in equilibrium would have excess members who would be happy
to be hired any positive wage. Hence, either type h is paid the lowest equilibrium wage
or they are fully employed. Hence, any type h for whom w(h) > w∗ are fully employed.
Any type receiving the lowest wage must be fully employed since the firm would be willing
to hire more of these workers if we lowered the bottom wage by ε. Since all workers are
fully employed, it follows that all firms will choose to be representative to avoid the hiring
penalty, and that w˜(0) = wCE(0) = w∗ and w˜(h) is increasing h. Finally, since the marginal
penalty for a deviation in a type’s net wage from the economy-wide lowest type’s wage is
given by
−C [w˜(h)− w˜(0)]2 ,
and since this cost goes to infinity as C → ∞ for any positive wage gap, it follows that as
C becomes large w˜(h) → w˜(0), and all of the workers are paid as if they were the lowest
health status type and all of their productivity gap is absorbed by the cost of discriminating
on wages. Q.E.D.
The fact that the productivity advantage of higher health status individuals is completely
absorbed by the discrimination costs means that the society as a whole gets no gain from
their productivity advantage. So the health expenditures that raise their productivity above
the lowest type are inefficient. In addition, expenditure on the lowest health type relaxes
the wage discrimination penalty on other types. So this equilibrium outcome is not socially
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efficient.
B.3 Wages in the Competitive Equilibrium
To understand the implications of proposition 2 for the behavior of equilibrium wages, note
that our results imply that the equilibrium competitive wage is given by
wCE(h) = g(h)F (h, 0) + (1− g(h))
∫ ε¯CE(h)
0
f(ε)F (h, ε− x(ε, h))dε
+(1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
ε¯CE(h)
f(ε)F (h, ε¯CE(h))dε.
Hence
dwCE(h)
dh
= g′(h)
 F (h, 0)− ∫ ε¯CE(h)0 f(ε)F (h, ε− x(ε, h))dε
− ∫ ε¯ε¯CE(h) f(ε)F (h, ε¯CE(h))dε

+g(h)F1(h, 0) + (1− g(h))
∫ ε¯CE(h)
0
f(ε)F1(h, ε− x(ε, h))dε
+(1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
ε¯CE(h)
f(ε)F1(h, ε¯
CE(h))dε
+(1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
ε¯CE(h)
f(ε)F2(h, ε¯
CE(h))
dε¯CE(h)
dh
dε,
since net effect of the change in the integrand bounds generated by dε¯
CE(h)
dh is zero. Next
note that our optimality condition for ε¯CE(h), (2.17), implies that
F12(h, ε¯
CE(h))dh+ F22(h, ε¯
CE(h))dε¯CE(h) = 0,
and hence
dε¯CE(h)
dh
=
−F12(h, ε¯CE(h))
F22(h, ε¯CE(h))
.
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This result, along with (2.17), implies that
dwCE(h)
dh
= g′(h)
 F (h, 0)− ∫ ε¯CE(h)0 f(ε)F (h, ε− x(ε, h))dε
− ∫ ε¯ε¯CE(h) f(ε)F (h, ε¯CE(h))dε
 (B.11)
+g(h)F1(h, 0) + (1− g(h))
∫ ε¯CE(h)
0
f(ε)F1(h, ε− x(ε, h))dε
+(1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
ε¯CE(h)
f(ε)F1(h, ε¯
CE(h))dε
−(1− g(h))
∫ ε¯
ε¯CE(h)
f(ε)F2(h, ε¯
CE(h))
F12(h, ε¯
CE(h))
F22(h, ε¯CE(h))
dε.
All of the terms in (B.11) are trivially positive except the last, which is negative since
F22 < 0. However, so long as the spillover ratio F12/F22 evaluated at (h, ε¯
CE(h)) is not too
negative then, then wages will vary positive with health status. Note that this is trivially
implied if the direct effect of the change in health status offsets the spillover, or
F1(h, ε¯
CE(h))− F2(h, ε¯CE(h))F12(h, ε¯
CE(h))
F22(h, ε¯CE(h))
> 0. (B.12)
Note that this is a condition purely on the fundamentals of the economy since ε¯CE(h)
is given by an (implicit) equation that depends only on exogenous model elements. We
summarize our results in the following proposition:
Proposition 12. The competitive wage is increasing in h if (B.11) is positive.
B.4 Computation of the Social Planner Problem
The idea to solve the problems in (2.25) is to iterate on sequences {ct, et(h),Φt(h)}, using
the first order condition (2.26) for the optimal effort choice and the envelope condition
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(2.27). To initialize the iterations, note that
VT (ΦT ) = u(cT )
∂VT (ΦT )
∂ΦT (h)
= u′(cT ) ·
 g(h)F (h, 0)
+(1− g(h)) ∫ε f(ε) [F (h, ε− xSP (ε, h))− xSP (ε, h)] dε

≡ u′(cT ) ·Ψ(h) (B.13)
For these expressions we only need to know cT , the term Ψ(h) is just a number that depends
on h and is known once we have solved the static insurance problem. This suggests the
following algorithm to solve the dynamic social planner problem:
Algorithm 13. 1. Guess a sequence {ct}Tt=0
2. Determine ∂VT (ΦT )∂ΦT (h) from (B.13)
3. Iterate on t to determine {et(h)}T−1t=0
(a) For given ∂Vt+1(Φt+1)∂Φt+1(h′) use (2.26) to determine et(h).
(b) Use ct, et(h),
∂Vt+1(Φt+1)
∂Φt+1(h′) and (2.27) to determine
∂Vt(Φt)
∂Φt(h)
4. Use the initial distribution Φ0 and {et(h)}T−1t=0 to determine {Φt}Tt=0 and thus
{cnewt }Tt=0.
5. If {cnewt }Tt=0 = {ct}Tt=0 we are done. If not, set {ct}Tt=0 = {cnewt }Tt=0 and go to 1.
This algorithm is straightforward to implement numerically, since we only have to iterate
on the aggregate consumption sequence, not on the sequence of distributions. In particular,
the only moderately costly operation comes in step 2a) but even there we only have to solve
one nonlinear equation in one unknown (although we have to do it T ∗ card(H) times per
iteration).
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B.5 Computation of the Equilibrium with
a No-Prior-Conditions Law and/or
a No-Wage Discrimination Law
The algorithm to solve this version of the model shares its basic features with that for the
social planner problem, but differs in terms of the sequence of variables on which we iterate:
Algorithm 14. 1. Guess a sequence64 {Eu′t, Pt}Tt=0.
2. Given the guess use equations (2.30)-(2.33) to determine health cutoffs and wages
{ε¯NPt (h), wt(h)}.
3. Given {wt(h), Pt}, solve the household dynamic programming problem (2.34) for a
sequence of optimal effort policies {et(h)}Tt=0.
4. From the initial health distribution Φ0 use the effort functions {et(h)}Tt=0 to derive
the sequence of health distributions {Φt}Tt=0 from equation (2.23).
5. Obtain a new sequence {Eu′newt , Pnewt }Tt=0 from (2.32) and (2.33).
6. If {Eu′newt , Pnewt }Tt=0 = {Eu′t, Pt}Tt=0 we are done. If not, go to step 1. with new guess
{Eu′newt , Pnewt }Tt=0.
The algorithm for no-wage discrimination is a slight modification of that for no-prior
conditions. The algorithm iterates over {Eu′t, wt}Tt=0. In Step 1 given the guess use equations
(2.36)-(2.40) to determine health cutoffs and premia {ε¯NPt (h), Pt(h)}. In Step 4 obtain a
new sequence {Eu′newt , wnewt }Tt=0 from (2.39) and (2.38). With both policies, equation (2.41)
replaces (2.40) in all expressions.
64Instead of {Eut} one could iterate on {wt(h)} which is more transparent, but significantly increases
the dimensionality of the problem.
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B.6 Details for Data and Calibration
B.6.1 Details of the Augmented Model Analysis: Inclusion of the z-shock
We assume that households must incur the cost z, when the z-shock hits. This assumption
and the fact that households are risk averse imply that the z-shock will be fully insured in
the competitive equilibrium under any policy (and of course by the social planner).
Moreover, we assume that households receiving a z-shock can still work, but that their
productivity is only ρ times that of a healthy worker. Therefore, in a competitive equilib-
rium, the wage of a worker with health status h is given by
w(h) = g(h)F (h, 0) + ρκ(h)F (h, 0) + (1− g(h)− κ(h))
∫
F (h, ε− x(ε, h))f(ε)dε
and the health insurance premium is determined as
P (h) = (1− g(h)− κ(h))
∫
x(ε, h)f(ε)dε+ µz(h)
Given our assumptions there is no interaction between the z-shocks and the health insurance
contract problem associated with the ε-shock since it is prohibitively costly by assumption
not to bear the z-expenditures. The role of the z-expenditures is to soak up the most
extreme health expenditures observed in the data associated with catastrophic illnesses,
but to otherwise leave our theory from the previous sections unaffected.
The static analysis goes through completely unchanged in the presence of the z-shocks.
In the dynamic analysis the benefits of higher effort e and thus a better health distribution
Φt(h) now also include a lower probability κ(h) of receiving a positive z-shock and a lower
mean expenditure µz(h) from that shock with better health h. This extension of the model
leads to straightforward extensions of the expressions derived in the analysis of the dynamic
model in section 2.4, and does not change any of the theoretical properties derived in sections
2.3 and 2.4.
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B.6.2 Descriptive Statistics of the PSID Data
Before we proceed to descriptive statistics of the PSID data, we summarize, in Table B.1,
the mapping between variables in our model and data.
Table B.1: Mapping between Data and Model
Model Description Data
PSID Variable Actual Data Used
x, µz Medical Expenditure
Average of total expenditure
1997-2002
reported in 1999, 2001, 2003
w Earning
Average of total labor income
1998,2000,2002
reported in 1999, 2001, 2003
h Health Status Self-reported Health in 1997 1997
Since our model period is six years, we take average of reported medical expenditure
and wages over six year periods that we observe. Moreover, we use health status data from
1997 (rather than 1999) to capture the effect of health on wages and medical expenditure.
Table B.2 documents descriptive statistics of key variables from the 1999 PSID data
that we use in our analysis.
Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables in PSID
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 41 10 23 65
Labor Income 30,170 40,573 0 1,153,588
if Labor Income > 0 32,076 41,097 0.55 1,153,588
Excellent 38,755 55,406 0 940,804
Very Good 32,768 40,351 0 1,153,588
Good 25,516 25,908 0 384,783
Fair 12,605 13,926 0 81,300
Medical Expenditure 1,513 4,624 0 127,815
Excellent 1,234 2,374 0 28,983
Very Good 1,647 5,812 0 127,815
Good 1,486 4,283 0 93,298
Fair 1,792 4,950 0 65,665
Health Status 2.77 0.95 1 4
Physical Activity: fraction(number) of days in a year
Light 0.63 (230.99) 0.39 (142.28) 0 1 (365)
Heavy 0.29 (105.69) 0.35 (126.85) 0 1 (365)
In the PSID, each individual (head of household) self-reports his health status in a 1
to 5 scale, where 1 is Excellent, 2, Very Good, 3, Good, 4, Fair, and 5 is Poor. Even with
large number of observations, only about 1% of total individuals report their health status
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to be poor. Thus, for our analysis, we will use four levels of health status (merge poor and
fair together).65 Since PSID reports household medical expenditure, we control for family
size using modified OECD equivalence scale. 66
As we model working-age population, each household starts his life as a 24 year old and
makes economic decisions until he is 65 years old. Our model time period is 6 years and
thus they live for 7 time periods. We choose six year time period to capture the effect of
exercises on health transition. Since exercises tend to have positive longer-term effects than
do medical expenditure, by allowing for a medium-term time period, we are able to quantify
the impact of exercises in a more reliable way.
Data on Health Transitions Table B.3 presents the transition matrix of health status
over six years. We see that health status is quite persistent.
Table B.3: Health Transition over 6 years
Excellent Very Good Good Fair Total
Excellent 1,286 904 335 92 2,617
49.14 % 34.54 % 12.80 % 3.52 % 100 %
Very Good 482 1,844 1,217 274 3,817
12.63 % 48.31 % 31.88 % 7.18 % 100 %
Good 187 712 1,592 637 3,128
5.98 % 22.76 % 50.90 % 20.36 % 100 %
Fair 36 109 358 957 1,460
2.47% 7.47 % 24.52 % 65.55 % 100 %
Total 1,991 3,569 3,502 1,960 11,022
18.06 % 32.38 % 31.77% 17.78 % 100 %
Physical Activity Data Here, we report some statistics on physical activity.
 Variation of Physical Activity and Its Impact on Health Transition
Density of light and heavy physical activity levels by health are summarized in Figures
B.1 and B.2. From variations in health evolution by physical activity and initial health
status, we find that about 30% of variance in health status in the future is explained by
65Labor income and medical expenditure data for fair health in Table B.2 include poor (5) in data.
66Each additional adult gets the weight of 0.5, and each child, 0.3.
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health status today, whereas, light and physical activity explains about 8% and 14%,
respectively. Moreover, both initial health status and light (heavy) exercise explains
46% (41%) of variance in future health outcome.67
Figure B.1: Density of Light Activity Figure B.2: Density of Heavy Activity
 Physical Activity Over Time
Light physical activity has steadily decreased over time, whereas heavy physical ac-
tivity decreased for a while, but started increasing in 2005 (Figures B.3 and B.4).
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Figure B.3: Light Activity
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Figure B.4: Heavy Activity
67From the law of total variance, we know
var(Y ) = E (var(Y |X)) + var (E(Y |X)) ,
where the former is the unexplained and the latter, explained component of the variance.
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B.6.3 Health Shocks, Distribution of Medical Expenditures, and Discus-
sion of Categorization of Health Shocks
Before going into discussing the medical expenditure distribution in data, we briefly discuss
the appropriate counterparts of data moments for our model. In our model, households do
not consume medical care when they do not get a health shock (although, they can choose
not to spend any in case of health shock, since x∗(h, ε) = max{0, ε¯(h)}). Therefore, in data,
we are interested in the distribution of medical expenditure conditional on having gotten
any health shocks (which we have some information in PSID).
Table B.4 summarizes medical expenditure by shock. Note that all numbers reported
are yearly average taken over six years (1997-2002).
Table B.4: Average Medical Expenditure by Health Shock Categories
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All 4,226 1,513 4,624 0 127,815
No Shock 1,419 1,350 4,447 0 101,952
Any Shock 2,807 1,595 4,710 0 127,815
Catastrophic Disease Shock 168 3,745 9,363 0 93,298
Cancer 51 5,210 15,134 0 93,298
Heart Attack 46 3,334 4,705 0 27,161
Heart Disease 94 3,382 5,535 0 38,500
Light Shock 2,767 1,585 4,732 0 127,815
Diabetes 183 2,088 7,196 0 93,298
Stroke 33 2,200 4,905 0 27,161
Arthritis 322 1,684 3,166 0 38,500
Hypertension 566 1,825 6,143 0 93,298
Lung Disease 63 1,705 2,476 0 12,595
Asthma 61 1,135 1,444 0 7,170
Ill 2,351 1,637 5,040 0 127,815
z-shock 297 4,704 12,834 0 127,815
ε-shock 2,510 1,227 2,023 0 32,909
We see that cancer, heart attack, and heart disease incur the most medical expenditure,
and thus we categorize them to be catastrophic shocks (z-shocks). Although the diseases
PSID specifically reports information on are those that are common, they are not, by all
means, exhaustive of the kind of health diseases that one can be diagnosed with. And
this is hinted when we look at the medical expenditure statistics for those who report to
have missed work due to illness. The maximum amount of medical expenditure they spend
exceeds those of the others, and this might be due to some severe diseases for which they
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had to be treated.
Therefore, in addition to cancer, heart attack, and heart disease, we categorize those
who have spent more than their labor income on medical expenditure as having had a
catastrophic (z) health shock.68 Those who had a health shock that were not cancer, heart
attack, or heart disease, and who spent less than their income on medical expenditure is
considered to have had an ε-shock.69
Figures B.5 - B.8, plot logs of medical expenditure distribution for all population, for
those with ANY health shock, those with z-shock, and those with ε-shock. By definition,
mean medical expenditure of z-shock households are higher than those of ε-shock, and so
are standard deviations.
Figure B.5: Average Medical Expendi-
ture Distribution
Figure B.6: Average Expenditure with
Health Shock
Figure B.7: Average Expenditure w/
z-shock
Figure B.8: Average Expenditure w/
ε-shock
68Categorizing catastrophic health shocks using expenditures as percentage of income is not new. There
has been discussion on insuring catastrophic health shocks, and they mostly refer to high amount of expen-
diture as percentage of income.
69In PSID sample, median of percentage of labor income spent on medical expenditure is 2%, and the
mean, 132%. Only about 5% of households with health shocks spend medical expenditure in excess of their
labor income.
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B.6.4 Estimation Results
Health Transition Using the functional form described in the main body of the paper,
we estimate the health transition function in the following way.
Let set of parameters to be estimated be θ =
{
{G(h, h′)}, δ, φ(h), λ(h), α1(h), α2(h)
}
.
We use Generalized Method of Moments to estimate these parameters.
We first determine the exercise intervals and assign each individual initial health status
and exercise level bins, k. Using the transition from the data E(qk(h′)), we minimize the
distance between our estimated transition function and data, i.e.
θ = arg min
θ
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
[
Q(h′k;θ)− E(qk(h′))
])
Wˆ
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
[
Q(h′k;θ)− E(qk(h′))
])
,
where K denotes the total number of groups and Wˆ, weighting matrix. Here, we use the
efficient weighting matrix.
With exercise step size of nine,70 we get the following estimated parameter values (h =
1, 2, 3, 4 corresponds to health being fair, good, very good, and excellent, respectively, i.e.
the higher the h the better one’s health status.).
Gˆ(h, h′) =

0.8742 0.0927 0.0230 0.0101
0.6597 0.2547 0.0609 0.0249
0.1404 0.3949 0.3442 0.1204
0.0850 0.3170 0.5406 0.0573

δ = 1
φ = [2.2796, 1.1063, 0.5179, 8.4123]
λ = [0.3308, 0.0193, 0.5939, 0.1878]
α1 = [1.3274, 12.8747, 7.0260]
α2 = [0.8035, 5.8693]
70The PSID has exercise data from 1999 to 2009. The total number of observations for 6 year transition
is 11,022.
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The estimated transition functions are plotted in Figures B.9 - B.12. In the figures, the
smoothed functions are estimated transition, whereas the straight lines represent the data.
We see that our functional form fits the data quite well.
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Figure B.9: GMM: Transition of Ex-
cellent Health
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Figure B.10: GMM: Transition of Very
Good Health
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Figure B.11: GMM: Transition of
Good Health
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Figure B.12: GMM: Transition of Fair
Health
Table B.5: Health Shock Probabilities by Health Status
Observations Any Health Shock z Shock ε Shock
1− g(h) κ(h) 1− g(h)− κ(h)
All 4,226 0.66 0.07 0.59
Fair 458 0.66 0.21 0.45
Good 1,139 0.71 0.07 0.63
Very Good 1,618 0.68 0.05 0.62
Excellent 1,143 0.60 0.03 0.57
Health Shock Probabilities As seen in Table B.5, there are about 7% of households
who receive z-shocks over six years, and the probabilities are decreasing in health status.
However, probability of getting any health shock is not the highest for the Fair health
individuals (from Good to Excellent, it is monotone). This might be due to the fact that
given that the health status is already bad, probabilities that one would get other minor
adverse health shocks (ε shocks in the model) are not very high.
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Effect of Health Shock on Productivity In Table B.6, we summarize working hours
and labor income reported by those with different health shock categories.
The six year average hours worked of those with z-shocks are about half that of the ones
who did not get any shock (and worked) and they earn about half on average. Therefore,
we take ρ = 0.4235, which is the percentage of labor income earned by those with z-shock,
compared to those who have worked and did not experience any health shock (since we
denote earnings of those with z-shock as ρF (h, 0)).
Table B.6: Hours Worked and Labor Income by Health Shock
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Hours Worked
All 4,226 1,823 856 0 5,300
Positive Hours 3,903 1,974 704 7 5,300
No Shock, Positive Hours 1,259 1,987 781 14 4,732
z-shock 297 998 1,033 0 3,640
ε-shock 2,639 1,892 763 0 5,300
Labor Income
All 4,226 30,171 40,573 0 1,153,588
Positive Hours 3,903 32,362 41,364 0 1,153,588
No Shock, Positive Hours 1,259 32,606 49,358 0 940,804
z-shock 297 13,809 25,470 0 253,560
ε-shock 2,639 31,163 36,883 0 1,153,588
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B.6.5 Calibration Results
Table B.7: Data Targets
Parameters Data Targets
Health Status {hi}i=1,2,3,4 Income of hi relative to h1
log
w(h2)
w(h1)
= 0.2739
log
w(h3)
w(h1)
= 0.4691
log
w(h4)
w(h1)
= 0.5948
Income of Old relative to Y oung
log
w(O)
w(Y )
= 0.1114
Production Function A(t, educ) Income in t of less than HS relative to Income (Y oung, Fair)
t = 1, < HS : −0.0042
t = 2, < HS : 0.1449
t = 3, < HS : 0.1715
t = 4, < HS : 0.1980
t = 5, < HS : 0.0907
t = 6, < HS : −0.0969
t = 7, < HS : −0.1112
Income in t of HS Grad relative to Income (Y oung, Fair)
t = 1, HS : 0.2980
t = 2, HS : 0.4738
t = 3, HS : 0.5082
t = 4, HS : 0.5988
t = 5, HS : 0.6060
t = 6, HS : 0.5395
t = 7, HS : 0.2406
φ(a, educ) % Income spent on Med Exp. by Health
E(x|h1)
E(w|h1) = 0.0525
E(x|h2)
E(w|h2) = 0.0429
E(x|h3)
E(w|h3) = 0.0353
E(x|h4)
E(w|h4) = 0.0308
ξ(a, educ) % Income on Med Exp. by Educ. and Age(a ∈ {Y,O})
E(x|Y,< HS)
E(w|Y,< HS) = 0.0386
E(x|Y,HS)
E(w|Y,HS) = 0.0348
E(x|O,< HS)
E(w|O,< HS) = 0.0428
E(x|O,HS)
E(w|O,HS) = 0.0356
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Table B.8: Data Targets (continued)
Parameters Data Targets
ε-shock Distribution µ, σε Mean, St.Dev of Med. Exp. on Light
E(x)
E(w)
= 0.0362
σ(x)
E(x)
= 1.6462
z-shock Distribution µz(h) % Income on Cata. Shock by Health
E(z|h1)
E(w|h1) = 0.4664
E(z|h2)
E(w|h2) = 0.2234
E(z|h3)
E(w|h3) = 0.1520
E(z|h4)
E(w|h4) = 0.1261
Exercise Disutility {γ1(educ), γ2(educ)} Mean and St.Dev of Exercise in t = 1
E(et=1) = 0.5735
σ2(et=1) = 0.2828
Measure of Fair and Excellent in t = 7
Φt=T (h1) = 0.1944
Φt=T (h4) = 0.1618
Preference Distribution p(γ|educ, h) Mean Exercise in t = 1 by Health
E(et=1|h1) = 0.5030
E(et=1|h2) = 0.5235
E(et=1|h3) = 0.5950
E(et=1|h4) = 0.6087
Mean Exercise by Education in t = 1, 7
E(et=1| < HS) = 0.5303
E(et=1|HS) = 0.5956
E(et=7| < HS) = 0.5517
E(et=7|HS) = 0.6159
Terminal (Marginal) Value {∆2,∆3,∆4} Exercise in the Last Period by Health
E(et=T |h1) = 0.4641
E(et=T |h2) = 0.6092
E(et=T |h3) = 0.6535
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Table B.9: Calibrated Parameters
Parameters Description Value Statistics Data Model
h1
Health Status
0.0740 0.2739 0.2897
h2 0.1271 Relative log Wages 0.4691 0.5215
h3 0.1983 in Health and Age 0.5948 0.6191
h4 0.2194 0.1114 0.1066
A(t = 1, < HS) 1.0472 -0.0042 -0.0042
A(t = 2, < HS) 2.0529 0.1449 0.1438
A(t = 3, < HS) 2.3091 0.1715 0.1696
A(t = 4, < HS) 2.6729 0.1980 0.1986
A(t = 5, < HS) 1.9297 0.0907 0.0908
A(t = 6, < HS) Effect of 0.7790 -0.0969 -0.0966
A(t = 7, < HS) Age, Education 0.6939 Relative log Wages -0.1112 -0.1126
A(t = 1, HS) on Productivity 2.6970 in Time and Education 0.2980 0.2919
A(t = 2, HS) 4.0000 0.4738 0.4175
A(t = 3, HS) 4.4284 0.5082 0.4371
A(t = 4, HS) 6.6842 0.5988 0.6241
A(t = 5, HS) 6.8899 0.6060 0.6314
A(t = 6, HS) 6.0985 0.5395 0.5547
A(t = 7, HS) 3.2487 0.2406 0.2433
φ(Y,< HS) 0.4727 0.0525 0.0502
φ(O,< HS) 0.4917 0.0429 0.0432
φ(Y,HS) 0.5435 0.0353 0.0342
φ(O,HS) Effect of Med. Exp. 0.6326 % Income on Med.Exp. 0.0308 0.0277
ξ(Y,< HS) on Productivity 0.0103 by Health,Education,Age 0.0386 0.0392
ξ(O,< HS) 0.0050 0.0348 0.0364
ξ(Y,HS) 0.0122 0.0428 0.0427
ξ(O,HS) 0.0085 0.0356 0.0376
µε Mean: health shock 0.9239 Mean: Med. Exp. 0.0362 0.0405
σε St. Dev.: health shock 0.1048 St.Dev: Med. Exp. 1.6462 2.0163
µz(h1)
Mean: z-shock
0.3657 0.4664 0.4753
µz(h2) 0.2272 Income spent on 0.2234 0.2211
µz(h3) 0.1974 Cata. Shock 0.1520 0.1523
µz(h4) 0.1799 0.1261 0.1259
γ1(< HS) 0.0024 Mean: Exercise, t = 1 0.5735 0.5792
γ2(< HS) Disutility 0.0928 St.Dev: Exercise, t = 1 0.2828 0.2761
γ1(HS) by Education 0.0001 Measure of Fair in t = T 0.1944 0.2292
γ2(HS) 0.0984 Measure of Ex. in t = T 0.1618 0.1292
p(γ1| < HS, h1) 0.0473 0.5030 0.4961
p(γ1| < HS, h2) 0.5015 0.5235 0.5201
p(γ1| < HS, h3) 0.1656 0.5950 0.6095
p(γ1| < HS, h4) Pop. with γ1 0.3229 Mean Effort 0.6089 0.6165
p(γ1|HS, h1) by Health,Educ. 0.0544 by Health, Educ. 0.5303 0.5375
p(γ1|HS, h2) 0.0712 in t = 1, 7 0.5956 0.5906
p(γ1|HS, h3) 0.5109 0.5517 0.5511
p(γ1|HS, h4) 0.4884 0.6159 0.6192
∆2 Value of health 0.0015 Conditional Mean Effort 0.4641 0.4937
∆3 in t = T 2.0313 in t = T 0.6092 0.6041
∆4 3.1129 0.6535 0.6761
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B.7 Additional Quantitative Results
B.7.1 Model Fit
Figures B.13–B.16 represent the model fit for average effort of each health level.
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Figure B.13: Fair
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Figure B.14: Good
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Figure B.15: Very Good
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Figure B.16: Excellent
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B.7.2 Policy Implications
Insurance Benefits Tables 12 and 13 present the weighted-averages (across education
and exercise preference) of the cross-subsidies by health level under different policy regimes.
We measure cross subsidies in premium by the differences between the actuarially fair health
premium and premium paid under policies; and cross subsidies in wage by the differences
between the aggregate wage and productivity of the worker (of a given health level). As
discussed in the main text, the negative cross-subsidy implies that the worker is paying
higher premium than the actuarially fair price and/or getting paid less in wages than he
produces.
Since under no-prior conditions law, only premium is subsidized, and under no-wage
discrimination law, only wage is subsidized, we report cross-subsidies of premium and wages
under each law. The second row under each health level reports separately the subsidies of
premium and wage, under both policies.
Table B.10: Cross-Subsidy by Health Level under Different Policy Regimes: Young
Health Policy
24–29 30–35 36–41
Prem. Wage Prem. Wage Prem. Wage
Fair
One Policy 0.276 0.285 0.306 0.370 0.290 0.368
Both Policies 0.141 0.247 0.123 0.319 0.111 0.310
Good
One Policy 0.041 0.107 0.014 0.111 -0.012 0.084
Both Policies 0.011 0.102 -0.007 0.096 -0.019 0.066
Very Good
One Policy -0.030 -0.029 -0.0850 -0.138 -0.106 -0.199
Both Policies -0.011 -0.026 -0.034 -0.143 -0.045 -0.205
Excellent
One Policy -0.071 -0.139 -0.114 -0.269 -0.132 -0.338
Both Policies -0.033 -0.129 -0.054 -0.266 -0.067 -0.338
Table B.11: Cross-Subsidy by Health Level under Different Policy Regimes:Old
Health Policy
42–47 48–53 54–59 60–65
Prem. Wage Prem. Wage Prem. Wage Prem. Wage
Fair
One Policy 0.352 0.481 0.3402 0.470 0.316 0.411 0.245 0.266
Both Policies 0.105 0.411 0.103 0.404 0.104 0.353 0.107 0.214
Good
One Policy -0.034 0.094 -0.044 0.080 -0.043 0.064 -0.026 0.033
Both Policies -0.024 0.073 -0.025 0.066 -0.025 0.058 -0.023 0.035
Very Good
One Policy -0.151 -0.318 -0.155 -0.333 -0.150 -0.291 -0.121 -0.172
Both Policies -0.050 -0.327 -0.052 -0.337 -0.052 -0.288 -0.051 -0.157
Excellent
One Policy -0.173 -0.505 -0.177 -0.521 -0.173 -0.461 -0.149 -0.291
Both Policies -0.073 -0.507 -0.075 -0.519 -0.075 -0.451 -0.074 -0.267
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Welfare Implications Tables B.12 and B.13 present the static and dynamic consumption
equivalent variations for each (educ, γ)-groups as well as the aggregates.
Table B.12: Welfare Comparisons in Static Economy
(< HS,γL) (< HS,γH) (HS Grad,γL) (HS Grad,γH) Aggregate
Social Planner 2.6341 8.4298 1.6131 7.5427 5.6527
Competitive Equilibrium 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No Prior Conditions Law 1.9557 7.1836 1.1334 5.2777 4.1593
No Wage Discrimination Law 2.4443 7.4681 1.5778 7.2692 5.3486
Both Policies 2.6341 8.4298 1.6131 7.5427 5.6527
Table B.13: Welfare Comparisons in Dynamic Economy
(< HS,γL) (< HS,γH) (HS Grad,γL) (HS Grad,γH) Aggregate
Social Planner 7.8120 14.4481 17.1213 17.8447 16.4799
Competitive Equilibrium 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No Prior Conditions Law 5.4108 7.7063 5.8094 7.6374 6.9782
No Wage Discrimination Law 6.4213 8.6671 8.7076 10.6941 9.5399
Both Policies 4.9908 6.7668 8.3978 8.8680 8.1656
Moreover, in Table B.14 are the lifetime welfare comparisons in the dynamic economy,
conditional on health and (educ, γ)-group.
Table B.14: Lifetime Welfare Comparisons in the Dynamic Economy Conditional on Type
and Health
Type Policy Fair Good Very Good Excellent
Low Educ, Low γ
Social Planner 45.6618 8.3078 7.3379 2.5327
Comp. Eq. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No Prior 34.3609 6.9402 3.0803 -0.4095
No Wage 34.9972 9.7912 3.1518 -3.5944
Both 46.4916 9.0499 1.0363 -7.0393
Low Educ, High γ
Social Planner 46.4190 9.7199 8.1054 3.1847
Comp. Eq. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No Prior 31.4642 5.7174 1.7938 -1.5060
No Wage 33.8613 9.1959 2.4047 -4.2708
Both 42.5672 6.9865 -1.2339 -9.1102
High Educ, Low γ
Social Planner 69.4954 18.5571 18.0361 14.2185
Comp. Eq 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No Prior 49.3466 13.5551 6.6835 2.3228
No Wage 66.9188 24.0447 11.2267 1.8703
Both 78.9321 25.3647 11.2843 0.7706
High Educ, High γ
Social Planner 62.4530 15.3438 13.7657 9.6096
Comp. Eq. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No Prior 38.6852 8.1877 2.9285 -0.4819
No Wage 52.4471 15.7693 4.0127 -4.5987
Both 60.3707 14.3834 1.4297 -8.1014
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B.8 Sensitivity Analysis
B.8.1 Robustness of Results with Respect to Age and Gender
The PSID asks questions on ethnicity71, and among them, we take those who answered to
be of a national origin (47% of the total sample in 1997) to test robustness. We also restrict
our sample to males (about 77%) for the second robustness check.
The health transition function and production function related parameters are the key
driving forces of our quantitative results. Therefore, we provide evidence for the similarity
in health transition and the labor earnings over the life cycle between the total population
and the subsamples.
For the health transition function Q(h′|h, e), we obtain a measure of differences in the
estimated probabilities and the data moments, i.e., χ2 =
∑
i=1,N
qdata(h′i)−Qest(h′i)
Qest(h′i) , where
the qdata(h′i) and Qest(h′i) are the actual data and the estimated probability of a worker
with initial health status h with exercise level ei72 ending up being health status of h′ in the
next period. The χ2 value for the health transition is 1.16 and 1.02 for whites and males,
where the χ249,0.05
73 is 79.
With regards to the production function, we provide in Table B.15, the data moments
associated with the subsamples, in comparison with the full sample. The qualitative features
of the moments are similar across different samples: although the absolute numbers for the
changes in income over the life-cycle vary in their levels, the gradients over the life cycle are
similar. Thus our quantitative results are robust to restricting our samples to white and
males.
71The exact choices are American (5%); Hyphenated American (e.g., African-American, Mexican-
American) (14%); National origin (e.g., French, German, Dutch, Iranian, Scots-Irish) (47%); Nonspecific
Hispanic identity (e.g., Chicano, Latino) (2%); Racial (e.g., white or Caucasian, black) (29%) and; 6 Reli-
gious (e.g., Jewish, Roman, Catholic, Baptist).
72We divide the population into five exercise bins, and use them to evaluate the differences, as we do in
our estimation procedure. The only difference is that due to the shortage of observations (since we only use
half the total sample), instead of nine bins (in the full model), we use five bins.
73The degrees of freedom is 49, as the number of observations are 4× 4× 5 (] Health Today × ] Health
Tomorrow × ] Exercise Bins), and the number of parameters, 30 (80-1-30). Using the full sample, the χ2
value is 0.9986.
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Table B.15: Moments for the Subsample of Population
Moments Description All Whites Male
Income by Age of Less than HS
t = 1 -0.0042 -0.0892 0.0320
t = 2 0.1449 0.2026 0.1214
t = 3 0.1715 0.2464 0.1653
t = 4 0.1980 0.2901 0.2091
t = 5 0.0907 0.0014 0.0183
t = 6 -0.0969 -0.3306 -0.1409
t = 7 -0.1112 -0.0970 -0.0742
Income by Age of HS Grad.
t = 1 0.2980 0.3019 0.2990
t = 2 0.4738 0.5867 0.4835
t = 3 0.5082 0.6073 0.5522
t = 4 0.5988 0.6274 0.6027
t = 5 0.6060 0.6500 0.6216
t = 6 0.5395 0.5276 0.5366
t = 7 0.2406 0.1792 0.3376
% Income Spent on Med. Exp.
Fair 0.0525 0.0573 0.0482
Good 0.0429 0.0428 0.0395
Very Good 0.0353 0.0376 0.0346
Excellent 0.0308 0.0320 0.0290
% Income Spent on Med. Exp Young 0.0386 0.0350 0.0373
by Less than HS Old 0.0348 0.0357 0.0376
% Income Spent on Med. Exp. Young 0.0428 0.0465 0.0495
by HS Grad Old 0.0356 0.0379 0.0447
B.8.2 Benefits of Effort Not Related to Labor Productivity
So far the only benefit of effort e consisted in probabilistically raising health in the future
which in turn impacts positively future wages and health insurance premia. As a result,
a combination of both policies reduces optimal effort to zero, unless a health-dependent
terminal continuation utility (as in the quantitative version of our model) is introduced.
We now briefly argue that our main results do not necessarily hinge on this assumption.
Suppose that the net cost of providing effort is given by
γ [q(e)− θe] .
Our previous specification is a special case with θ = 0, and γθ measures the direct utility
benefit from one unit of exercise. In the absence of any other benefits from exercise (say,
from higher wages or lower health insurance premia), as in the economy with both laws in
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place, the optimal effort level eBP now solves
q′(eBP ) = θ
and thus eBP > 0 if and only if θ > 0. Thus for a given function q the parameter θ governs
the minimal effort level that each household will provide, and thus a lower bound below
which no policy can distort effort levels.
The equations determining optimal effort levels (equation (2.26) for the social planner
problem and equation (2.29) for the competitive equilibrium under the various policies)
with preference shocks γ and direct utility benefits from exercising γθe now become
q′(et(h)) = θ +
β
γ
∑
h′
∂Vt+1(Φt+1)
∂Φt+1(h′)
· ∂Q(h
′;h, et(h))
∂et(h)
q′(et(h)) = θ +
β
γ
∑
h′
∂Q(h′;h, et(h))
∂et(h)
vt+1(h
′)
and for any given initial health level h, for any preference shock γ and any policy the optimal
effort level is simply shifted upwards.
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